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Three Essays at the Interface of Operations Management, Accounting and
Entrepreneurship
Joyaditya Laik, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2021
This dissertation is a study on the role that metrics and measures serve to incentivize ac-
tions by stakeholders whose payoffs are related to how these metrics perform relative to a goal.
Specifically, stakeholders maximizing individual payoffs by affecting these measures, may lead
to actions that jeopardizes the larger system objective. I study this phenomenon (referred
as Goodhart’s Law) in the areas of Crowdfunding and Supply Chains. In crowdfunding an
entrepreneur sets a target amount to raise, through the duration of a live “campaign.” Unless
the target is reached, the entrepreneur does not get the investments put forth by investors
(“backers,” in crowdfunding parlance). If the target amount is raised, the entrepreneur is
obligated to deliver the physical product to the investors. The intended purpose of having
the target as threshold is to incentivize the entrepreneurs to set a target amount that is large
enough to cover for the product development cost, so that the entrepreneur does not find
itself in a position where the campaign manages to reach the target, and yet does not have
enough to start production. In chapter 2 we find that an entrepreneur, responding rationally
to a platform’s rule of “campaign promotion,” sets a target amount that is lower than the
product development cost and exposes backers to the risk of non-delivery. In chapter 3, the
entrepreneur can choose to not pursue production after observing the subscription level of
the crowdfunding campaign. The investors are exposed to the risk of non-delivery when
the crowdfunding campaign manages to reach the target, and yet the entrepreneur chooses
to not pursue production. To exercise its right to not produce, the entrepreneur pays a
premium to the supplier who supplies the parts to the entrepreneur. In chapter 4, I critique
the Cash Conversion Cycle, a measure for operational efficiency. Including individual firm
differences of sales growth rates, fiscal year endings and seasonality can significantly alter the
interpretations. We show that a lower cash conversion cycle can merely be a result of firm
specific differences which, if unaccounted, can be mistaken for better operational efficiency.
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Preface
In my experience as a supply chain professional, I often had to work with novice en-
trepreneurs who were suppliers to TATA Hitachi, the firm I worked for before starting my
PhD. One of their prime concerns was timely payment and ensuring liquidity. These were
individuals who had little or no transactional history with our organization, and therefore no
established credibility. It was then that I realized the unique problems a novice entrepreneur
faces, specifically in the context of funds availability and liquidity. I realized that the metric
through which the financial health of these businesses got evaluated was equally critical.
This had always inspired me to look at operations management, not as a discipline in silo,
but one that is deeply entwined with finance and accounting.
The three chapters of my thesis deal with generation of funds and monitoring liquidity. I
look at the role of crowdfunding platforms in matching entrepreneurs in need of money with
investors, and interpretation of the Cash Conversion Cycle to measure operational efficiency.
Specifically, I study the impact of the “rule” to feature some campaigns in a crowdfunding
platform’s recommended pages, and “learning” from crowdfunding subscription levels, on an
entrepreneur’s ability to deliver on its commitments. In showing how crowdfunding platforms
can discipline opportunistic entrepreneur behavior, policy makers can incorporate these ideas
to improve the entrepreneur’s product delivery commitment. In the context of supply chain,
I highlight how Cash Conversion Cycle, a purported “scale-free” metric is susceptible to the
time of measurement, unique differences of demand seasonality and growth rates.
Throughout this long journey of my pursuit for a PhD, my advisor, Professor Prakash
Mirchandani has been a pillar of support, both academically and personally. By gently
nudging me into areas that I had been sceptical about, he saw what I didn’t when I embarked
on these projects. I am also deeply indebted to Professor Esther Gal-Or for introducing me
to the beauty of Game Theory in her seminar. The papers on crowdfunding stand a lot better
due to her hands on involvement, constant support and encouragement. I am thankful to
Professor Mihai Banciu, who provided unconditional support on all matters academic and
otherwise. I am also very grateful to my other committee members; Professor Jennifer Shang
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and Professor Leon Valdes, who were generous in sparing time to provide support and advice
in my most challenging moments. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the role of
the doctoral office, especially Ms. Carrie Woods, without whose support I would have failed
to make progress. A huge thank you to past and present inmates of 241 Mervis: Meheli,
Mike, Krista, Tiffany and Jing, who made tough moments lighter and therefore bearable.
Lastly, my deepest gratitude to the Port Authority of Pittsburgh for letting me commute
for free. The passengers and drivers, some of whom I got to know personally, were typical
Pittsburghers; friendly and warm. I will miss them!
They say it is not the goal but the pursuit that is important. The people who were
most directly affected by my state; academic and emotional, were my parents and wife,
Kusum. There are no words that can describe how grateful I feel for their support. Your
companionship and encouragement gave me hope in the darkest of times. It is only fitting,
therefore, that I dedicate this thesis to you.
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1.0 Introduction
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the need to revitalize small businesses was acutely
felt worldwide. To make capital more accessible for entrepreneurs, the US Congress signed
the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012.1 Crowdfunding, a product of the JOBS Act, soon became
a preferred mode of raising funds for new business startups. Crowdfunding not only offered
greater participation by including people with average or low incomes, it also served as a sig-
nal to convince investors of a promising future market (Roma et al. 2018). A crowdfunding
platform facilitates transactions between an entrepreneur seeking funds from “backers” in ex-
change for a “pledge” amount. We study reward-based crowdfunding in which entrepreneurs
get the money raised, and deliver “rewards” to “backers,” only if the total amount raised
exceeds a “target” amount the entrepreneur wants to raise (henceforth, a commercially
“successful” campaign). If the campaign is “unsuccessful,” the pledges are returned to the
“backers.” The intended use of a “target” threshold is to protect entrepreneurs and “back-
ers” against delivery commitment unless the amount raised is sufficient for production. That
is, the stated “target” should be more than the cost of product development. We investi-
gate the role of a profit maximizing crowdfunding platform and supplier in engendering a
situation where, although the campaign is successful, the raised amount either falls short of
development cost or isn’t sufficiently large to justify investment in product quality by the
entrepreneur. In such a situation rewards cannot be delivered. The Pebble smart watch2 and
Zano drone3 are among many instances where immensely “successful” campaigns failed to
deliver “rewards” to backers. This thesis sheds light on the role of production, and therefore
product delivery, being contingent on raising a minimum product development cost.
In chapter 2, I study how a crowdfunding platform’s choice of a specific campaign pro-
motion rule affects delivery risk. In chapter 3, I study the role of a supply chain contract






subscription levels in crowdfunding being large enough to justify investment in quality by the
entrepreneur. By studying the equilibrium conditions in these two chapters we can infer why
many campaigns, which are otherwise remarkably successful in raising the target amount,
may still fail to deliver the product to the investors. By studying the role of two impor-
tant stakeholders, the platform and the supplier, I contribute to studies at the confluence of
crowdsourcing and operations management (Allon and Babich 2020).
In chapter 4, I look at a metric that represents cash turnaround time of an organization,
the Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC ). A frequently used metric, CCC is purported to be
a boundary spanning metric of operational efficiency. We find that CCC is sensitive to
sales growth rate, seasonality and fiscal cycles which are exogenous to the operations of an
organization. Benchmarking CCC with industry peers, therefore, is fraught with the risk of
wrongfully attributing a lower CCC to good operating policy, when in reality, it maybe due
to an advantageous demand seasonality, growth rate, and fiscal cycle. I study the sensitivity
of CCC to seasonality, growth rate and fiscal year end by treating existing credit terms
to suppliers and customers, and inventory processing time as parameters of an analytical
model. Deriving our hypotheses from the model, we validate them empirically by compiling
a dataset of firms that offer a rich variety in the sales growth they have experienced, their
demand seasonality and fiscal cycle.
My thesis lies at the intersection of supply chain management, entrepreneurship and
accounting. I position the thesis along the dimensions of business maturity and the specific
discipline(s) it addresses (Table 1.1). Since chapter 2 looks at the role of a crowdfunding
platform in affecting the decisions of the entrepreneur, it falls under a larger ambit of Plat-
form Economics as applied to a startup. Chapter 3 looks at the role of a specific supply
chain contract on the crowdfunding parameters set by an entrepreneur, and chapter 4 looks
at the role a widely used accounting metric plays in conveying efficiency of a supply chain.
In effect, the thesis brings caveats to the extant understanding of target and pledge amount
as signals of quality in crowdfunding (Chakraborty and Swinney 2019); and of a low CCC
to be a result of operational improvements and policy measures.
2
Startup Mature Firm
Platform Economics Chapter 2
Supply Chain Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Accounting Chapter 4
Table 1.1: Research Area - Map with reference to business maturity and discipline.
In summary, we study a new mechanism for fundraising, crowdfunding, and its vulnerabil-
ity to fail as a mechanism, by inviting entrepreneurs who have “little to lose.” Crowdfunding
involves the “crowd” and therefore, anything that increases the crowd’s risk of not getting
their returns, merits investigation. As businesses grow in size, metrics need to be devised
to gauge operating efficiency. However, when these metrics become the basis of compensat-
ing managers, people are incentivized to manage the metric rather than the objective it is
designed to measure.4 The cash conversion cycle, which is often treated as a scale free all
encompassing measure of operating efficiency, runs the risk of being such a metric if, as we
show, differences in sales growth rate, seasonality and fiscal year are not accounted for.
4This phenomenon is referred to as “Goodhart’s Law” which is captured in the maxim: When a measure
becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. A more rigorous statement for the same phenomenon from
Goodhart (1975) is “Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it
for control purposes.”
3
2.0 How Does the Rule to Promote Campaigns by a Crowdfunding Platform
Affect Target Setting and Sharing of Campaign’s Revenues?
We investigate strategies a reward-based crowdfunding platform employs to align an
entrepreneur’s choice of pledge and target levels with its own preferences. We consider two
instruments the platform can employ: the way it chooses to promote campaigns to potential
backers, and its share of the campaign revenues. Kickstarter, for instance, promotes a select
set of campaigns by compiling a list of projects on its “recommended list.” We find that in
choosing its promotion and sharing rule the platform exposes entrepreneurs to the risk of
not generating sufficient funds to start production. Only when the damage to the platform’s
reputation, in case the entrepreneur fails to fulfil her obligations, is sufficiently high, does
the platform’s promotion and sharing rules strategies ensure that any promoted campaign
will have sufficient funds to start production. The strategies utilized by the platform are
more likely to ensure production when backers are more altruistic, when the development
cost is lower, or when the entrepreneur has minimal liability and reputational cost in case
production fails. In such instances, the entrepreneur is motivated to set a low target, which
increases the likelihood that the funds raised are insufficient to start production despite
raising enough to meet the campaign’s target. The platform’s choice of promotion and
sharing rule is intended to rectify such misalignments on the part of the entrepreneur.
2.1 Introduction
Crowdfunding (CF) platforms have gained prominence as viable channels to raise funds
for new projects. Participants on CF platforms consist of entrepreneurs seeking funds and
investors (backers) 1 willing to contribute to campaigns. Unlike conventional investments,
backers active on reward-based CF platforms do not anticipate growth in value of an un-
1For terms prevalent in the crowdfunding community, we refer the reader to
https://help.kickstarter.com/hc/en-us/articles/115005028514-What-are-the-basics-
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derlying asset. Instead, they expect consumption of a novel product in the future.2 In a
reward-based CF campaign, the entrepreneur chooses a funding target that determines the
minimum amount necessary for the campaign to be declared successful, and a pledge amount
that backers need to contribute to be entitled to the promised product if completed. If the
aggregate pledge amount exceeds the target, the platform deducts its commission and remits
the remaining fraction of the amount raised to the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur
receives the campaign funds, backers expect to receive a reward. If the campaign is unsuc-
cessful in reaching the funding target, pledges are returned to backers.3
The entrepreneur can deliver the promised product only when her share of the campaign
proceeds covers the development cost of the product. Hence, a higher target ensures that
whenever the campaign is successful, the entrepreneur is also more likely to deliver the
promised product to backers. As a result, a higher target allows the entrepreneur to raise
the pledge amount because the expected payoff of the backer increases. Setting a very
high funding target, however, reduces the likelihood of reaching the target, in which case
neither the entrepreneur nor the platform receives any proceeds from the campaign. When
the funding target is set low in comparison to the development cost, backers face greater
risk of not receiving the promised product and losing their pledge. With non-delivery, both
the entrepreneur and the platform may face legal costs and reputational losses. In fact,
recent contractual changes have substantially increased the cost entrepreneurs face upon non-
delivery of the promised product (Swanner 2014, Markowitz 2013). Similarly, competition in
the CF market forces each CF platform to pay closer attention to preserving its reputation
for trustworthiness.
The interests of the entrepreneur and the platform in setting the target level are not
always aligned. Whereas the entrepreneur may anticipate sales in the external market (i.e.,
post-campaign sales) if the product development is successful, the profits of the platform
accrue only from its share of the revenues generated in the CF campaign. In addition,
in case of product non-delivery, the limited resources of an early-stage entrepreneur cap her
liability cost, while the platform’s loss is much greater when its trustworthiness is questioned
2We use “he” for an investor (backer), “she” for the entrepreneur and “it” for the platform.
3Such a rule is popularly known as All-or-Nothing, and is the focus of this paper. In other formats, a
campaign keeps the amount even if the raised amount falls short of the target.
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and its appeal to new backers and projects is weakened.
In this paper, we investigate strategies a platform can employ to motivate entrepreneurs
to choose the pledge and target levels of the campaign that are consistent with its interests.
We consider two instruments that the platform can employ: the rule to promote campaigns to
potential backers and its share of campaign revenues. The platform plays an important role
in providing extra visibility to some campaigns. Reward-based CF platforms promote a select
set of campaigns by compiling a list of recommended projects. Because it is difficult for some
backers to differentiate among the many campaigns active on a CF platform, being included
on the “recommended list” carries great benefits to the entrepreneur.4 The sharing rule of
campaign revenues is also an important instrument at the platform’s disposal. When the
platform awards a larger share of campaign revenues to the entrepreneur, she is more likely
to have sufficient funds to produce the product, thus lowering the likelihood of reputational
losses to the parties due to promises being unfulfilled.
Because the platform has very limited verifiable information about the project quality
at the time of its launch, it is unclear what its strategy should be for compiling its “recom-
mended list.” One rule that seems to be utilized by Kickstarter in choosing its “recommended
list” is the success of a campaign, early after its launch, in raising a substantial share of its
declared funding target. Figure 1 illustrates that recommended campaigns tend to be those
that raised a substantial share of their declared funding target, soon after their launch.
Raising a substantial share indicates that many backers are interested in the project. If
early backers tend to be those who are better informed about the specifics of the project,
a large number of early contributions can serve as a signal of a higher quality project to
less informed potential backers.5 Moreover, using the early success of the campaign in rais-
ing funds as a basis for promoting the campaign is also consistent with results reported in
the herding and information cascades literature (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992,
Chamley and Scaglione 2013). This literature has demonstrated that the convergence of
beliefs among individuals about an uncertain environmental parameter leads to informa-
4Adomavicius et al. (2017) conduct a controlled experiment to show that willingness to pay increases for
a highly recommended product, even if it is of poor quality.
5Hildebrand et al. (2016) demonstrate this possibility in the context of a peer-to-peer lending platform
(Prosper.com), where the early investment of ‘group leaders’ incentivizes unsophisticated investors to extend
loans to borrowers.
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tion cascades, where individuals start disregarding their own private signals after observing
overwhelming agreement by others.
By setting a high-enough threshold for promoting campaigns, measured by the proportion
of the target raised, the platform can guarantee that the promoted campaign raises sufficient
funds not only to meet its target but also to cover the development cost to start produc-
tion. Thus, setting a high threshold reduces the risk of delivery failure by the entrepreneur,
minimizing possible loss of reputation for both the platform and the entrepreneur. However,
setting a very demanding threshold level for promotion implies that fewer campaigns are
eligible for promotion. This reduces visibility of campaigns and size of potential backers,
thus adversely affecting the platform’s profits.
The sharing rule for campaign revenues introduces similar counteracting effects on the
platform’s profits. While a bigger share awarded to the entrepreneur increases the odds of
successful product delivery, it also reduces the platform’s share of the campaign revenues, and
thus its expected profits. Our analysis suggests that when backers derive lower consumption
or altruistic benefits, when there are fewer informed backers who can evaluate the product
characteristics, when entrepreneurs incur significant reputational losses if they cannot deliver
the product, and when the product development cost is high, the platform finds it optimal
to lower its share of the campaign revenues. As well, if altruism plays a role in the decision
of backers to fund the campaign and the platform’s reputational cost is low, the revenue
sharing rule selected by the platform does not prevent participation of some entrepreneurs
who are projected, with certainty, to never deliver the promised product.
We consider an entrepreneur, who has access to only CF as a source of funding, and
assume that potential backers of the campaign derive both consumption benefits when the
product becomes available and altruistic benefits from helping novice entrepreneurs. Burtch
et al. (2013) demonstrate that investors are, indeed, driven by motivation to help creators
of new ideas when participating in CF campaigns. There are two types of backers in our
model: informed and uninformed. Informed backers know about the campaign when it is
launched. The number of informed backers who fund the campaign is a random variable, and
the platform may choose to promote a campaign based upon the realization of this random
variable. Our supplementary empirical investigation verifies that Kickstarter tends to include
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campaigns on its “recommended list” based upon their success in raising a substantial share
of their declared target during the early period of the campaign.6 Therefore, in formulating
the platform’s promotion strategy, we assume that the platform includes campaigns on its
“recommended list” that are successful in raising a prespecified share of their declared target.
We refer to this promotion rule as the Fractional Threshold (FT) rule. After the platform
promotes the campaign, uninformed potential backers become familiar with the campaign
and can also observe the level of contributions so far in the campaign. When a larger
number of informed backers have already contributed, more uninformed backers are willing
to contribute to the campaign. Hence, the uninformed use the number of the informed
backers as a signal of the potential success of the project.
When backers are altruistic, we find that the entrepreneur sets a funding target that
exposes backers to the risk of not receiving the product because, even though the funding
target is reached, the amount raised is insufficient to start product development. We ob-
tain this result despite our assumption that the entrepreneur can expect positive net profits
from sale of the completed product in the external market. It seems that altruism causes
entrepreneurs to intentionally raise the risk of forgoing future profits in favor of short-term
proceeds from the campaign. We also find that the FT level for campaign promotion chosen
by the platform may not ensure that the entrepreneur generates sufficient funds to start
production. Hence, the platform may choose a threshold that does not eliminate the risk
induced by the target setting behaviour of the entrepreneur. Only when the damage to its
reputation, in case the entrepreneur is unable to fulfil her promises, is sufficiently high, does
the platform choose a threshold level to guarantee that the necessary funds to start pro-
duction are raised. Also, when the platform’s promotion strategy does not ensure sufficient
funds for starting production, we show that the platform’s profits remain the same even if
it switches from using the FT promotion rule to simply choosing campaigns randomly.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on strategies that a CF
platform can use to enhance its profitability. Earlier theoretical work on CF has focused
6Because crowdfunding platforms use the “Load More” or “Show More” buttons at the bottom of each
page of recommended campaigns to continue displaying additional campaigns from the recommended list,
we use improvement in the ranking of a campaign as a measure of the recommendation in our empirical
investigation.
8
on strategies entrepreneurs should adopt to ensure success in raising funds or to facilitate
learning about the state of the demand for their products. Belavina et al. (2019) is the only
paper with which we are familiar that addresses the role of the platform in operating the
CF market. The emphasis of this paper is on designing mechanisms to eliminate deliberate
malicious intent and to alleviate the problem of performance opacity of the entrepreneur.
We consider an environment where the inability of entrepreneurs to deliver their promised
products is not the result of malicious intent. Instead, entrepreneurs fail to fulfill their
promises because they are unable to raise sufficient funds or because they encounter technical
difficulties. In our setting, the legal costs and reputational losses facing the platform and the
entrepreneurs in case of non-delivery of the promised products play the role of disciplining
the entrepreneurs against dishonest behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we conduct a review of the
literature. In Section 3, we describe the assumptions of the model. In Section 4, we derive the
equilibrium implied by the FT promotion rule, for a fixed sharing rule of campaign revenues.
In Section 5, we derive the optimal sharing rule of revenues chosen by the platform to
maximize its profits, and in Section 6, we conclude the paper. We present the technical
results related to this paper in two online appendices. Appendix A contains the proofs of
our theoretical results, and Appendix B discusses two extensions of our model.
2.2 Literature Review
Although most early studies on CF are empirical (Ordanini et al. 2011, Agarwal et al.
2011, Mollick 2014, Ahlers et al. 2015, Burtch et al. 2013, Colombo et al. 2015, Mollick and
Nanda 2016), there is a growing number of theoretical studies of late. These studies address
various aspects of CF campaigns, mostly with a focus on the entrepreneur’s behavior. One
important theme in this stream is how entrepreneurs use CF campaigns as vehicles for learn-
ing about future demand of the product. Roma et al. (2018), for instance, demonstrate how
demand information gained in the campaign can help entrepreneurs convince venture capi-
talists (VC) to invest in the company. Babich et al. (2019) study learning via CF campaigns
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when VC and/or bank financing can supplement funds raised in the campaign. Drawing
from the real option literature, Chemla and Tinn (2019) investigate how the outcome of the
CF campaign can guide the entrepreneur in her decision on whether to initiate production.
This option to abandon production is especially valuable when the demand uncertainty is
high. Our study does not address issues related to entrepreneurs using CF as a vehicle for
learning. The only aspect of learning that we touch on is that of uninformed backers learning
from the pledging behaviour of informed backers in their decision on whether to fund the
campaign.
CF is also a price discrimination strategy when consumers have heterogenous product
valuations. Hu et al. (2015) examine how a project creator offers a menu of product options
in a CF campaign to facilitate price discrimination. Bender et al. (2019) show that allowing
consumers to pledge can lead to more successful extraction of consumer surplus when they
have different valuations and when the cost of gaining access to external funding is not
prohibitive. Because all consumers in our model have the same valuation for the product,
price discrimination is not relevant in our study.
The extant literature has also addressed whether signalling can resolve problems re-
lated to incomplete information of backers regarding the quality of crowdfunded projects.
Chakraborty and Swinney (2019b) and Sayedi and Baghaie (2017), for instance, investigate
how an entrepreneur can select instruments of the campaign (funding target and pledge) to
signal project quality. While we do not formally model the type of incomplete information
facing potential backers, in our model uninformed backers use the behavior of early backers
in assessing prospects of the project.
The question of “why investors invest” has received extensive attention. Besides capital
appreciation, extant studies show altruistic motives influence investment behaviour. In a
controlled experiment, Gneezy et al. (2012) find that people are willing to incur an expense
to validate their self-perceived social image. In the CF context, the desire for self-image
confirmation, rather than purely utilitarian motives, may drive ‘serial backers’ to pledge.
Andreoni (1989) studied the distinction between altruism and warm-glow in the context of
a public good. We use the term altruism in our model broadly, to refer to any non-economic
motives that might guide backer behaviour. Burtch et al. (2013) have confirmed the possible
10
altruistic motives of backers in a CF marketplace for online journalism projects. They
find evidence of a slowdown in contributions once participants observe that contributions
by others have already reached a high level, and interpret this behavior as indication that
altruism may guide the decision of backers in CF campaigns. We demonstrate that when
backers have such non-economic motives, entrepreneurs may choose a funding target lower
than that necessary to accomplish production, and the platform’s share of campaign revenues
may attract entrepreneurs who, with certainty, will never deliver the product to backers.
All the above studies focus on entrepreneur behaviour and not on platform strategies for
governing campaigns. Rietveld et al. (2019) study specific factors that lead to endorsement
of complements in the video game industry and find support that games with sales in the
top 2.6 - 20th. percentile are more likely to be endorsed by the platform. We find that
the percentage of target raised affects promotion in the first pages of a reward-based CF
campaign. Belavina et al. (2019) is the only paper, to our knowledge, that addresses the
platform’s role in eliminating deliberate malicious intent of fund misappropriation by the
entrepreneur and in reducing performance opacity of the entrepreneur. We address the
platform’s role in lowering the risk backers face of product non-delivery. Our model captures
the reputational cost that entrepreneurs and platform incur when the entrepreneur reneges
on delivering the reward. Wessel et al. (2017) and Gaessler and Pu (2019) study the choice
and effect of moving from a manual review of campaigns before listing them in platforms to
“open acceptance”. By establishing a rule of campaign promotion, the platform attains the
objective of providing lower visibility to some campaigns. Although not a binary screening
process, we find that when a platform optimizes its revenue share, it may exclude campaigns
with high development cost. The literature has also addressed other forms of CF, besides
reward-based-campaigns. Belleflamme et al. (2014), for instance, compare reward-based
and equity-based campaigns, where in the former funders are consumers who pre-order the
product and in the latter funders invest in exchange for a share of future profits. Gal-Or
et al. (2019) consider equity-based CF, where the investor and the entrepreneur populations
differ by their risk profiles and ask whether competing platforms can appeal to different
entrepreneur populations. Our paper focusses exclusively on reward-based CF.
To summarize, our main contribution to the literature stems from our focus on strategies
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a CF platform can use to enhance its profitability. We address the following questions: Is the
target and pledge setting strategy of the entrepreneur fully aligned with the interests of the
platform? When deciding which campaigns to promote, should the platform use a promotion
strategy to ensure that the campaign cover the development cost? What characteristics of
the CF environment determine the platform’s share of campaign revenues? And, should the
platform choose this rate to minimize the risk of production failure by the entrepreneur?
2.3 Model
There are two types of backers, informed and uninformed. Informed backers know about
the campaign when it is launched and can evaluate its characteristics. Unless a campaign
is promoted by the platform, the uninformed backers are either unaware of the project’s
existence or are uninterested in finding out information about it. Thus, uninformed backers
back a campaign only if it is promoted. When a platform promotes a campaign in its
“recommended list”, the uninformed backers consider contributing to the campaign. At that
time, the uninformed backers can also observe how many informed backers have funded the
campaign. They interpret a larger number of informed backers as a signal of a higher quality
project. Hence, the number of uninformed backers who fund the campaign increases with
the number of informed backers that the campaign attracted before promotion.
The rule used by the platform to promote a campaign is to tie promotion to the cam-
paign meeting a certain specified fraction α of its declared target.7 We refer to this rule as
the Fractional Threshold (FT) rule.8 When promoted, the number of uninformed backers
attracted to the campaign is determined as a non-negative multiple, δ of the number of
informed backers. There is uncertainty regarding the size of the informed backer popula-
tion. We designate by N the random size of the informed backer population and assume
7In a supplementary empirical investigation, we demonstrate that the ability of a campaign to cover a
significant share of its declared target soon after its launch guides Kickstarter in its promotion strategy.
8Alternately when a campaign is promoted if the aggregate contributions from informed backers exceed
a certain threshold level is available from the authors upon request. We refer to this rule as the Aggregate
Threshold rule. The expected profits of the platform remain the same under both promotion rules, except
when the reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur in case of non-delivery of the product is relatively
high.
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. Thus, if n is the realized
number of informed backers, conditional on a campaign’s promotion, the total size of the
backer population becomes n (1 + δ). Intuitively, uninformed backers use the realization of
the number of informed backers as a proxy for the probability of project success. That is, if
a total of N̄ informed backers are able to evaluate projects in a certain category, and only n
of them choose to back the project, uninformed backers infer that the probability of project
success is n
N̄
. If the total size of the uninformed backer population on the platform is Z,
then promoting the project will attract nZ
N̄
new backers. Hence, defining δ to be Z
N̄
, we get
an expansion of nδ, as we suggest.10
The entrepreneur chooses two instruments when she launches a campaign: a target T and
a pledge p. The target determines the minimum amount necessary for the campaign to be
successful. Only when the campaign revenues reach the selected target, can the entrepreneur
collect its share of the revenues. Paying the pledge amount, p entitles the backers to receive
the product when successfully developed. We assume that the only source of funding available
to the entrepreneur is the CF campaign. This assumption is consistent with the reality that
early-stage entrepreneurs have very limited access to conventional funding sources such as
banks or equity markets. Therefore, to initiate production, the entrepreneur needs to raise
the development cost, M from the campaign. Even if enough funds to cover this cost are
raised, technical difficulties may prevent the entrepreneur from delivering the product as
promised. We designate the probability of technical success by k. If the entrepreneur raises
sufficient funds to reach the target but is unable to deliver the promised product to backers,
both the entrepreneur and the platform suffer reputational loss and legal costs of settling
lawsuits because backers, in this case, lose their pledges. We designate the reputational
cost incurred by the entrepreneur (platform) as Re (Rp). Given that the entrepreneur has
no financial sources, except CF, to cover the development cost, M , it is unlikely that she
would be able to compensate disappointed backers by an amount bigger than M . Therefore,
we assume Re < M . If the entrepreneur completes and successfully delivers the product,
9In Appendix A.4, we show that our results remain qualitatively similar for a general distribution function.
10In Appendix A.3, we extend our investigation to allow for the possibility that some informed backers
may withdraw their pledge upon observing a low number of other informed backers participating in the
campaign.
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she can expect additional profits π from selling the product in the external market, where
kπ− (1− k)Re > M . Hence, we focus on projects that have a positive expected payoff from
the external market.
We assume that informed backers are rational and fully informed of the values of the
parameters M , π, Re, Rp, and of the probability distribution function of the random variable
N . They know that they may lose their pledges because the entrepreneur cannot always
deliver the product. They incorporate this risk in their decision on whether to submit the
required pledge p. All backers have the same willingness to pay for the product if delivered
as promised, which we designate by g. This willingness to pay declines to v ≡ kg, when
backers incorporate the possibility that the product might not be successfully produced even
when the development cost is collected from the campaign.
In addition, backers are altruistic and derive additional utility from backing new en-
trepreneurs. We designate this altruistic utility by s, and assume that s < v. The parameter
s measures the amount backers are willing to pledge even in absence of any promise of re-
ceiving a reward. The existence of altruism among contributors to CF campaigns has been
discussed in Burtch et al. (2013). We assume that the informed backer population is not
large enough to ensure that the development cost can be raised in the campaign. Recall that
promoting the campaign has the potential to expand the population of backers by attracting
more backers who were not initially interested in the project. Table A.1 summarizes our
notation.
The game proceeds in the following stages. In the first stage, the platform chooses which
fractional threshold level α to use in implementing the FT promotion rule and the fraction
γ for sharing funds raised with the entrepreneur. In the second stage, the entrepreneur
chooses the target level, T and pledge amount, p, while being aware of the platform’s stage-
one decisions. In the third stage, informed backers submit their pledges after observing
the selection of the entrepreneur. In the fourth stage, the platform chooses whether to
promote the campaign using the FT rule. If the campaign is promoted by the platform,
the uninformed backers become aware of and invest in the project in the fifth stage. When
the combined revenue from informed and uninformed backers exceeds the target, T , the
campaign is declared successful. In this case, the platform collects a fraction 1 − γ of the
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proceeds from the campaign and the entrepreneur retains the residual share γ. In the sixth
and final stage, production takes place if the entrepreneur’s share of revenues covers the
development cost M . If the production stage is technically successful (with probability k),
the entrepreneur delivers the promised product to the backers and receives the additional
profit π from selling the product in the external market. If the entrepreneur is unable to
deliver the product to backers either because of insufficient funds to cover development cost
or because of technical difficulties, backers lose their investment, and both the entrepreneur
and platform incur the reputational and legal costs Re and Rp, respectively. Note that for
production to occur in stage six, the total revenues raised in the campaign should exceed
M/γ. We refer to a campaign as a commercial success if the revenues raised are at least as
high as the target T set by the entrepreneur, and as a production success if the revenues
raised in the campaign suffice to start production, that is, revenues exceed M/γ. In order for
the campaign to be viable we assume that γp (1 + δ)N > M , namely in the best state, when
the number of informed backers is realized at its highest value N , the funds the entrepreneur
receives from the campaign are sufficient to cover the development cost. Recall that if the
campaign is not promoted, the funds raised do not cover the development costs, namely
γpN ≤M . Figure A.1 depicts the stages of the game.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis for the Fractional Threshold (FT) Rule
When using the FT rule, the platform promotes a campaign if the amount raised in the
first round by informed backers exceeds a fraction α of the target T , namely if pn ≥ αT . An
appropriate selection of the threshold α can guarantee commercial success of the campaign
and/or that sufficient funds to start production become available. For instance, if α ≥ 1
1+δ
,
the commercial success of the campaign is assured. Promotion implies that np ≥ αT and
the commercial success of the campaign implies that (1 + δ)np ≥ T . The former inequality
imposes a more demanding constraint on the realization of the random variable N when
α ≥ 1
1+δ
, implying that when the campaign is promoted, it will definitely raise enough
funds to meet the target. Similarly, when α ≥ M
γT (1+δ)
, it is guaranteed that the aggregate
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funds raised in the campaign are sufficient to start production. Promotion implies that
np ≥ αT and the production success of the campaign implies that (1 + δ)np ≥ M
γ
.The
former inequality imposes a more demanding constraint on n when α ≥ M
γT (1+δ)
.
It is never optimal for the entrepreneur to set a target level higher than the amount of
pledges required to start production.11 Thus, we restrict attention to the case T ≤ M
γ
, and
consider three cases depending on the FT value. We say that the FT value is:
• low if α < 1
1+δ
. In this case, neither the commercial nor the production success of the
campaign can be guaranteed,
• intermediate if 1
1+δ
≤ α < M
γT (1+δ)
. In this case, commercial success can be guaranteed
but not production success, and
• high if α ≥ M
γT (1+δ)
. In this case, both commercial and production success can be guar-
anteed.
We denote the low, intermediate, and high cases by L, I, and H respectively. In all the
three cases we consider, we will assume that the entrepreneur sets the instruments of the
campaign to ensure that informed backers are not exposed to the risk of losing their pledges
when the campaign is not selected for promotion. Specifically, she does not set the target so
low that she can collect the pledges of the informed backers when pn < αT . We will later
impose conditions on the parameters that guarantee that to be the case at the equilibrium.
If α ≤ 1, the additional risk is definitely removed because when a campaign is not promoted
pn < αT ≤ T , and the aggregate pledges of the informed backers are insufficient to meet
the target when a campaign is not promoted.
11We show that when T = Mγ , the entrepreneur can set the pledge level at the highest willingness to pay
of informed backers v + s. Hence, raising the target level further cannot increase the pledge level. As well,
setting a higher target than Mγ does not reduce the risk of the entrepreneur not delivering the product.
The only effect of raising the target beyond Mγ is to lower the likelihood that the campaign is commercially
successful, thus reducing the expected profits of the entrepreneur.
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2.4.1 Case 1: Low fractional threshold
Because promotion of the campaign cannot guarantee either commercial success or start






















denotes the expected payoff of an informed backer for the low fractional thresh-
old case. Despite his ability to evaluate the project quality at the time of submitting his
pledge, an informed backer faces several uncertainties. He is uncertain whether the platform
will promote the campaign. He is also uncertain of how many other informed backers will
back the project, and whether production will materialize even if the platform promotes the
campaign. If the platform does not promote the project, the payoff of informed backers is s
given our assumption that the entrepreneur does not set the target so low that the informed
backers face the risk of losing their pledges when the campaign is not promoted. If the plat-
form promotes the project, informed backers derive the expected benefit12 v from consuming
the product if production is successful, namely if the proceeds of the campaign are sufficient
to cover the development cost (if γp (1 + δ)n ≥M). They must pay the pledge whenever the
campaign is commercially successful (when p (1 + δ)n ≥ T ). Note that in all cases informed
backers derive the additional altruistic benefit s from supporting new entrepreneurs. This
benefit is added to the payoff regardless of whether backers get to consume the product. 13
Since for Case 1, the conditions γp (1 + δ)n ≥ M
γ
and p (1 + δ)n ≥ T are more binding
than the condition necessary for promotion, pn ≥ αT , the prior probabilities of production
and commercial success do not depend on the threshold level α selected by the platform.
Recall that informed backers are concerned about prior probabilities because at the time of
their submitting the pledge they are uncertain of whether the campaign will be promoted
and whether there are sufficiently many informed backers to support commercial success
or the start of production. The instruments selected by the entrepreneur must ensure that
12Recall that v = kg, thus the informed backers incorporate the likelihood of the technical success of the
entrepreneur in forming their expected benefit.
13We implicitly assume that capital markets are perfect, implying that backers don’t face a budget con-
straint. Specifically, they can procure funds to invest in any project that they perceive to be profitable. The
fact that many backers, especially those who are better informed, may be venture capital funds justifies this
assumption.
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informed backers derive non-negative expected utility. From 2.1, therefore, we can solve for
the highest pledge level that the entrepreneur can choose as a function of the target level.
We express this highest level, pL(T ) as follows:








if T < Mv
γ(v+s)
v + s if T ≥ Mv
γ(v+s)
(2.2)
From the expression 2.2, we observe that the pledge level is strictly increasing with the
target for T < Mv
γ(v+s)
. Moreover, the entrepreneur can extract the entire willingness to pay
of backers, v + s, when setting a target at least at Mv
γ(v+s)
. Interestingly, when s > 0, the last
expression is strictly smaller than the campaign revenues of M
γ
needed to start production.
Hence, when backers derive some altruistic benefits from participating in the campaign, the
entrepreneur can expose them to the risk of production failure and still extract their full
willingness to pay for participating in the campaign.
It also follows from 2.2 that the pledge level increases when the consumption or altruistic
benefits (v or s) are higher, when the entrepreneur’s share (γ) of the campaign revenues is
larger, and when the development cost (M) is lower. While the effect of changes in v and
s on the pledge level are to be expected, the effect of changes in the other variables require
additional explanation. To understand the effect of the target level, note that when the en-
trepreneur sets a higher target, she reduces the likelihood that the campaign is commercially
successful, but the product is never delivered to backers. This is also the case when γ is
higher or when M is lower.

















(1 + δ) pN̄
)2]
+ [kπ − (1− k)Re −M ]
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(1 + δ) pN
] (2.3)
when T ≤ M
γ
and p is expressed in terms of T as in 2.2. The first term in 2.3 is the en-
trepreneur’s expected revenues from the campaign. The second term measures the expected
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profits of the entrepreneur from external sale of the completed product if she collects sufficient
funds to start production, and the last term corresponds to the entrepreneur’s reputational
cost if the campaign is a commercial but not a production success. When T > M
γ
, the last
term of 2.3 vanishes because production success is guaranteed. As well, in this region of
target levels, it follows from 2.2 that the pledge level is equal to the backers’ willingness to
pay, v+ s. As a result, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is a strictly decreasing function of
the target level when T > M
γ
, implying that the entrepreneur will never set his target level
in this region. We summarize this result in Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. The entrepreneur never sets the target at a level higher than M/γ, that is,
she sets the target so that the amount she receives from the campaign does not exceed the





the target level yields the optimal target level, TL
∗
e reported in Proposition 2.1.



















If the reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur is relatively high (i.e., Re ≥ Mvv+s),
the optimal target level is set at Re
γ
. This level is higher the greater the reputational cost
and the lower the share of campaign revenues awarded to the entrepreneur. When the
reputational cost is not as high (i.e., Re <
Mv
v+s
), the entrepreneur evaluates the effect of
the target on both the expected revenues raised in the campaign and on her long-term
profitability. A higher target level may introduce two counteracting effects on the profits of
the entrepreneur. On one hand, a higher target reduces the likelihood that the campaign is
commercially successful, thus reducing expected profits. On the other hand, it also leads to
a higher pledge level and to improved long-term profits because the entrepreneur is less likely
to incur reputational cost and more likely to raise sufficient funds to cover the development
cost. It turns out that the latter effect dominates and the entrepreneur chooses the highest







if Re ≤ Mvv+s . In this
case, the target level is lower the more altruistic backers are (i.e., the bigger s is) and the
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bigger the share of campaign revenues awarded to the entrepreneur (the bigger γ is). Note
that regardless of the optimal target level chosen by the entrepreneur, it follows from 2.2
that she can set the pledge level equal to the maximum willingness to pay of backers, equal
to v + s.
It is noteworthy that whenever backers derive some altruistic benefit from participating
in the campaign, namely if s > 0, the target level set by the entrepreneur is lower than




are smaller than M
γ
in this case. By setting the target at a level lower than M
γ
, the entrepreneur exposes the
backers to higher risk of not receiving the promised product despite a commercially successful
campaign. We obtain this result despite our assumption that the entrepreneur can expect
positive net profits from sale of the completed product in the external market. It seems that
altruism causes the entrepreneur to intentionally raise the risk of foregoing future profits in
favor of short-term proceeds from the campaign.
In order to support our assumption that informed backers are not exposed to the risk
that they lose their pledges even when the campaign is not promoted, one of two scenarios
are necessary. Either α < 1, or if α ≥ 1 then T > Np. Given the result reported in
Proposition 2.1, the last inequality imposes an additional condition on the parameters of the







> N (v + s). The latter condition does
not violate the requirement that the campaign is viable, namely that (1 + δ)N (v + s) > M
γ
,
if δ is sufficiently big. Hence, when the expansion factor that is facilitated by promotion is
sufficiently big, we are assured that there are parameter values that support the assumption
we make regarding the reduced risk to backers.14
Given the optimal pledge and target setting of the entrepreneur we can now express the


























and T = Re
γ
if Re ≥ Mv(v+s) .
14Our model can be easily extended to allow for the possibility that informed backers are exposed to the
additional risk of losing their pledge even when the campaign is not promoted. Our qualitative results remain
the same with such an extension.
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The first term of equation 2.4 measures the platform’s expected revenues from the cam-
paign and the last two terms measure the expected reputational cost the platform incurs
when sufficient funds are raised in the campaign but the product is not delivered to back-
ers, either because of technical difficulties arising in production (second term) or because of
insufficient funds to start production (third term.)
It is noteworthy that the platform may be interested in a different target level than that
selected by the entrepreneur. Consider, for instance, the environment where the entrepreneur





. In this case, from 2.2, the pledge is a constant equal to v+s.
The optimal target level from the platform’s perspective, TL
∗
p , can be derived by optimizing











Re the platform would have preferred the entrepreneur to set a higher target





Re. It is interesting that even when the
liability borne by the platform for non-delivery of the product by the entrepreneur is lower
than that borne by the entrepreneur (i.e., even when Rp < Re) the platform may still
sometimes prefer a higher target level than that chosen by the entrepreneur. This happens
for relatively large values of the sharing rule γ chosen by the platform. Because in most CF
campaigns γ > 0.9, the platform may indeed prefer a higher target level if its reputational
cost is at least as high as 1/9th of the reputational cost borne by the entrepreneur.
2.4.2 Case 2: Intermediate fractional threshold
In this case, a promoted campaign will be definitely commercially successful but may not




























= 0 yields the highest pledge level that the entrepreneur can set as a function
of the target level, as follows:
p (T ) =

[(v+s)N̄+αT ]+










The effect of changes in the parameters on the pledge level remains as in 2.4.1. In particular,




















+ (kπ − (1− k)Re −M)
[
1− M









where T ≤ M
γ
and p is given in 2.6.
The explanation for the terms in (2.7) is very similar to that discussed for the en-
trepreneur’s expected profits in Case 1. The only difference is that the commercial success
of the campaign is now tied to meeting the threshold target required for promotion, αT ,
instead of meeting the target. As discussed in Lemma 2.1 for Case 1, here as well, the
entrepreneur will never set the target higher than Mγ. In this region, the last term of (2.7)
vanishes and the pledge according to (2.6) is equal to v + s. As a result, the entrepreneur’s
payoff is a strictly decreasing function of the target level when T > Mγ.
The entrepreneur chooses the target level to maximize (2.7) subject to the expression
derived for the pledge level in terms of the target level in (2.6). We report in Proposition
2.2 the optimal target levels, T I
∗
e from the entrepreneur’s perspective for the intermediate
fractional threshold case.

















γα (1 + δ)
.
22
As in the low fractional threshold case, in both regions of the reputational cost Re
included in Proposition 2.2, the entrepreneur is able to extract the entire surplus of backers
by setting the pledge at the backers’ maximum willingness to pay, v + s. Note that the
target level in Case 2 is unambiguously lower than in Case 1. When the platform sets
a more demanding threshold level α (recall that in Case 2, α ≥ 1
1+δ
), it incentivizes the
entrepreneur to lower the target in order to meet the more demanding threshold level for
promotion. However, by comparing (2.3) and (2.7) at the optimal target values, we note
that the likelihood of non-delivery of the product does not depend on the chosen value of α
and is the same for both Cases 1 and 2.
Substituting the optimal values of the pledge and target selected by the entrepreneur































and T = Re
γα(1+δ)
if Re ≥ vMv+s .
Observe that (by substituting the value of T for either of the two cases of the en-
trepreneur’s reputational cost), the expected profit of the platform does not depend on
the threshold level the platform selects for promoting projects. In Proposition 2.3, we use
expressions (2.4) and (2.8) to compare the expected profits of the platform in Cases 1 and
2.
Proposition 2.3. When the threshold level α selected by the platform does not guarantee the
production success of the campaign (i.e., α < M
γT (1+δ)
), the expected profit of the platform is
the same irrespective of whether or not the selected threshold value, α ensures the commercial
success of the campaign. Moreover, the expected profit is independent of the value of the
selected threshold level α.
2.4.3 Comparison of FT and Random Selection Promotion Rules for Low and
Intermediate Threshold Cases.
In view of the result reported in Proposition 2.3, we now investigate whether the platform
benefits from using the FT promotion rule if α is either low or intermediate. Specifically,
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we investigate whether by using a simpler promotion rule, called random selection (RS),
that identifies campaigns for promotion randomly after informed backers have submitted
their pledges, the platform can earn the same expected profits as with the FT approach. To
facilitate this comparison, we keep γ the same for both the FT and RS approaches. Corollary
2.1 shows that, under these conditions, the platform is indifferent between the FT and RS
rules.
Corollary 2.1. If by utilizing the FT promotional rule, the platform does not attempt to
ensure that sufficient funds to start production become available (i.e., α < M
γT (1+δ)
) and γ is
the same, the platform is indifferent between using the RS and the FT promotional rules.
The intuition behind this finding is as follows. Under Cases 1 and 2, the FT rule does not
provide any additional favorable information about the campaign beyond the information
regarding the realized number of informed backers. It is only this number that carries mean-
ingful information about the quality of the project to uninformed backers. The promotion
rule has some meaningful informational content only if it can reduce the likelihood of non-
delivery of the product despite a commercially successful campaign. In Cases 1 and 2, the
risk of product non-delivery is the same under both the RS and FT approaches. Therefore,
the information observable by the backers at the time of promotion is the same regardless
of the rule utilized by the platform, as is the total expected campaign revenue. Under both
approaches, the platform receives the same expected revenues and is at the same risk of
incurring reputational cost, thus making it indifferent between the two approaches.
From another perspective, when the FT rule utilizes a relatively low threshold level,
backers still face the same risk of production failure in Cases 1 and 2 (despite guaranteed
commercial success in Case 2), as they do with a random selection rule. The FT rule provides
risk mitigating information only when it guarantees production success.
2.4.4 Case 3: High fractional threshold
In this case, both the commercial and the production success of the campaign are guar-
anteed if the campaign is promoted. As a result, we can set the pledge at the maximum
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Notice that the entrepreneur incurs the reputational cost in this case only because of technical
failure and not because of lack of funds to start production. Because this objective is a
decreasing function of the target level, the entrepreneur sets the lowest target consistent




























The first term of (2.9) is the expected revenue the platform collects from the campaign
and the second term is the reputational loss it incurs when technical difficulties prevent the
entrepreneur from delivering the product. It is noteworthy that even when ensuring the
production success of the campaign, the platform does not eliminate completely the risk of
non-delivery of the promised product by the entrepreneur. Unexpected technical difficulties
may prevent, the entrepreneur from completing production successfully, even when raising
sufficient funds to start production. However, by setting the fractional threshold for pro-
motion sufficiently high, the platform eliminates the additional risk backers may face, that
the entrepreneur will not have sufficient funds to start production despite a commercially
successful campaign. As well, observe that the actual threshold level α for promotion does
not affect the platform’s expected profit. Any value of α that ensures production success
generates the same expected profits for the platform. When the platform chooses a higher
value of α, it incentivizes the entrepreneur to lower the target level T without changing
the value of αT , which equals M
γ(1+δ)
in all instances that ensure production success.15 Im-
portantly, the platform faces a tradeoff in its decision of whether to ensure the production
success of the campaign. While the platform reduces its liability for product non-delivery,
it reduces also its expected revenues from any given campaign. Because the requirement for
15For instance, when α = (1 + δ), T = M
γ(1+δ)2
. This implies that when n > αT implies n > Mγ(1+δ) , and
any project that qualifies for promotion will definitely lead to the start of production.
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promotion is more demanding, any given campaign is less likely to meet it, and therefore,
less likely to deliver revenues for the platform.
In Proposition 2.4, we use the results obtained in Proposition 2.3 and the expression of
the platform’s profits in (2.9), to report how the platform chooses the promotional threshold
level α.
Proposition 2.4 (Platform’s choice of promotion threshold to ensure production success).
For a fixed value of γ,
• If Re < vM(v+s) and
a. If Rp <
(1−γ)M(2v+s)
2γ(v+s)
, the platform chooses α in a manner that does not guarantee
production success (Low or Intermediate Threshold).
b. If Rp ≥ (1−γ)M(2v+s)2γ(v+s) the platform chooses α to ensure production success (High
Threshold).
• If Re ≥ vM(v+s) and
a. If Rp <
(1−γ)(M+Re)
2γ
, the platform chooses α in a manner that does not guarantee
production success (Low or Intermediate Threshold).
b. If Rp ≥ (1−γ)(M+Re)2γ , the platform chooses α to ensure production success (High
Threshold).
According to Proposition 2.4, the platform does not always have an interest in ensuring
the commencement of production unless the harm to its reputation upon non-delivery of
the product is sufficiently high. The fact that CF platforms specifically absolve themselves
of any responsibility16 for either non-delivery of rewards or for poor quality of the product
delivered implies, therefore, that the backers are exposed to the risk of non-delivery even
when the campaign is successful as it may not lead to the start of production. Note that the
platform is more likely to ensure the start of production if backers are more altruistic (higher
s), development cost (M) is lower, expected valuation of the product (v) is lower, and the
reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur (Re) is lower. In all of these instances, the
16Refer “Can Kickstarter refund the money if a project is unable to fulfill?” in the link https:
//www.kickstarter.com/blog/accountability-on-kickstarter . Indiegogo, a competing crowdfunding
platform, lists similar disclaimers at https://www.indiegogo.com/about/terms?utm_source=learn&utm_
medium=referral&utm_campaign=ent-trustandsafety&utm_content=bodylink#/backingacampaign.
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minimum level of the platform’s reputational cost that incentivizes the platform to ensure





thus making it more likely that the reputational cost of the platform exceeds these minimum
levels. We summarize these results in the next Corollary.
Corollary 2.2. The platform is more likely to choose its FT rule of promotion to ensure
production if the reputational cost incurred by the platform, Rp is higher, backers are more al-
truistic (i.e., higher value of s), the share of campaign revenue, γ awarded to the entrepreneur
is higher and if product valuation (v), development cost (M), and the reputational cost borne
by the entrepreneur (Re) are lower.
To provide some intuition for the results in Corollary 2.2, note that when s is higher or
when v and Re are smaller, the entrepreneur sets a lower target level if the threshold for
promotion chosen by the platform does not guarantee production success. The lower target
raises the odds that a commercially successful campaign is not a production success. Thus,
the reduction of the target level raises the likelihood that the platform suffers reputational
losses. The platform is more inclined, therefore, to raise the threshold level α to ensure that
sufficient funds for the start of production are available. The comparative statics results
with respect to Rp and M are quite intuitive. Higher Rp incentivizes the platform to ensure
production success to prevent disgruntled backers from eroding the platform’s reputation.
A lower M implies that it is easier to generate sufficient campaign revenues to cover the
development cost, thus making the FT rule to support production success easier to achieve.
It is noteworthy that choosing campaigns randomly for promotion instead of selecting a
campaign using the FT rule, cannot ensure that the campaign generates sufficient funds to
start production. Hence, given Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1, the advantage of using the
FT rule over a random selection rule for promotion depends upon the extent to which the
platform worries about the damage to its reputation when the entrepreneur cannot deliver
the product to backers. We summarize the comparison of the FT and random rules of
selection in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2.5 (Choice of Fractional Threshold and Random Selection promotion rules).
(i) For low levels of reputational cost incurred by the platform, as defined in Proposition 2.4,
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the platform is indifferent between using the random selection and the FT promotion rules.
(ii) For high levels of reputational cost incurred by the platform, as defined in Proposition
2.4, the platform strictly prefers using the FT rule. The actual level of this threshold does
not matter as long as it ensures the production success of the campaign.
When the reputational cost incurred by the platform is relatively high compared to the
reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur (part (ii) of Proposition 2.5) the platform’s
objective is to eliminate the risk to backers that a commercially successful campaign is
not a production success. It can accomplish this objective by utilizing the FT rule with
a sufficiently high threshold level α. It cannot accomplish this objective when randomly
selecting campaigns for promotion. However, when the platform’s reputational cost is low,
using the FT rule does not add any benefit over the random selection rule because the
platform has no interest in eliminating the risk facing backers.
2.5 Setting the Sharing Rule of Campaign Revenues
In this section we explore ways in which the platform chooses the parameter γ which
determines the share of campaign revenues to the entrepreneur. We distinguish between
two environments: (i) when the platform can tailor the sharing rule to the individual char-
acteristics of different campaigns, and (ii) when the platform sets the same sharing rule to
heterogenous campaigns. While the former case is not common on CF platforms, we con-
sider it in order to illustrate how changes in the parameters of the model affect the tradeoff
between the promotion and sharing rules in disciplining the target setting strategy of the











if j=L,I i.e., the platform does not ensure production success.
M
γα(1+δ)
if j=H i.e., if the platform ensures production success).
(2.10)
The pledge in either case is equal to the maximum willingness to pay of backers, i.e., p =
v + s.
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2.5.1 The platform can customize the sharing rule
To obtain the optimal sharing rule, we differentiate the expected profits of the platform
with respect to γ. When the platform does not choose the threshold level, α to guarantee
production success (i.e., α is sufficiently small), we differentiate (2.4) with respect to γ (recall
that the platform’s profits do not depend on α for Cases 1 and 2), and when the platform
chooses α to ensure production success (i.e., α is sufficiently big), we differentiate (2.9) with
respect to γ. The differentiation yields: When production success is not guaranteed, i.e., j


























2 − 1 = 0 if Re ≥ vM(v+s)
(2.11)














− 2 (1− k)RpM[
γ (v + s) (1 + δ) N̄
]2 − 1 = 0 (2.12)
Note that the expected profit of the platform is a concave function of γ, implying that the
first order conditions (2.11) and (2.12) are both necessary and sufficient. In Proposition 2.6,
we conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate how changes in the parameters affect the
sharing rule chosen by the platform.
Proposition 2.6 (Comparative Statics - Platform Commission).
1. When the platform’s choice of threshold for promotion does not ensure production success













The sharing rule is independent of the value of N̄ and δ.
2. When the platform’s choice of threshold for promotion ensures production success of






< 0. The sharing rule is
independent of the parameters Re, v, s, N̄ and δ.
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It is interesting that changes in the reputational cost incurred by the platform have a
different effect on the share of the revenues awarded to the entrepreneur, contingent upon
whether the platform’s choice of the promotion threshold, α guarantees production success.
If this threshold does not guarantee production success (part (i) of the Proposition), a higher
Rp leads to a higher share of revenues awarded to the entrepreneur. A higher share raises the
odds that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to deliver the product to backers, thus
reducing the likelihood that the platform incurs the higher reputational cost due to non-
delivery of the product. In contrast, when promotion of the campaign guarantees the start
of production (part (ii) of the Proposition), higher reputational costs lead to a lower share
of campaign revenues awarded to the entrepreneur. Because the FT level α guarantees that
sufficient funds to start production are available, the platform is more inclined to lower the
share of campaign revenue awarded to the entrepreneur, given that its expected payoff is lower
if it does incur higher reputational costs. The reduction of the entrepreneur’s share does not
change the odds of the entrepreneur’s ability to deliver the product. The entrepreneur may
still renege on her promises, but only because of technical difficulties unrelated to the revenue
sharing rule chosen by platform. The comparative statics with respect to Rp illustrate the
tradeoff facing the platform when choosing how to utilize the two instruments at its disposal.
When the promotion rule is ineffective (part (i)) in ensuring production, the platform relies
on the sharing rule in guiding the behaviour of the entrepreneur. When the promotion
rule guarantees production success (part ii), the platform relies more heavily on this rule
rather than on the sharing rule in guiding the entrepreneur’s behaviour. The comparative
statics imply that the entrepreneur’s share of revenues is highest at the boundary between








2.5.2 The platform sets a uniform sharing rule for heterogeneous campaigns
Campaigns active on the platform may differ along many dimensions including develop-
ment costs, consumption and altruistic benefits derived by consumers, and the reputation
costs incurred by the entrepreneur and platform when the product cannot be delivered to
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backers. Despite such heterogeneity, platforms usually set a uniform sharing rule to all cam-
paigns. We now investigate how the platform sets its uniform sharing rule for a heterogeneous
population of campaigns.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that campaigns differ along one dimension.17 Specif-
ically, all campaigns have the same characteristics except their development cost. We as-
sume that development costs in the population are distributed uniformly on the support[
M,M
]
. We consider the case that for all campaigns, the reputational cost incurred by the




To illustrate how a uniform sharing rule affects the composition of campaigns active on
the platform, we restrict attention to the case when the platform uses a low FT level (Case
1)18 because its reputational cost is relatively low. From (2.4), therefore, the platform’s
expected profits decrease with a campaign’s development cost. It is reasonable, therefore,
that the platform may choose the sharing rule γ to discourage campaigns characterized by
relatively high development costs from participating on the platform, so that only cam-
paigns in the interval [M,M∗], where M< M∗ ≤ M , are active. The threshold campaign,
with development cost M∗, is indifferent between participating and not participating in the
campaign. Specializing the general expression for expected profit (2.3) to an entrepreneur






















Define µ ≡ γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ , and λ ≡ kπ − (1− k)Re, where µ measures the highest
possible level of funds the entrepreneur can generate from the campaign when the number of
informed backers assumes the highest value possible N̄ , and λ measures the entrepreneur’s
expected payoff (excluding the funds raised in the campaign) when she is able to start
17It is possible to extend the analysis to consider heterogeneity along multiple dimensions without changing
the qualitative results of our investigation.
18The authors can provide upon request the derivations for the case that the platform chooses the threshold
for promotion to ensure commercial and production success of some campaigns.
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production. If a real solution to the above quadratic equation in M∗ exists, it can be
expressed as follows:19
M∗ = [ v+s
v2+4vs+2s2
{
[(µ+ λ) (v + s) +Res]−
√
[λ (v + s) +Res]
2 − sµ [(µ+ 2λ) (2v + s)− 2Re (v + s)]
}
(2.13)
Note, from, (2.13) that M∗ increases with µ. In turn, since µ increases with γ, it follows that
∂M∗
∂γ
> 0. Hence, when the platform awards a larger share of the revenues to entrepreneurs,
campaigns facing higher development costs join the platform. If for any value γ ∈ (0, 1)
there is no real solution to the equation W (M∗) = 0, W (M∗) > 0 for all values of γ, and
the entire population of entrepreneurs is active on the platform. We characterize further the
solution for M∗ in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2.2. For a given share of campaign revenues γ awarded to the entrepreneurs:
• As the share increases, more entrepreneurs choose to run a CF campaign.
• If this share is sufficiently big, the solution for M∗ in (13) may exceed the value of M .
In this case, the entire population of entrepreneurs will join the platform.
• If this share is sufficiently small, the solution for M∗ in (13) can fall short of the value
of M . In this case, none of the entrepreneurs will be interested in joining the platform.
• When s = 0, M∗ = µ, and if M < µ < M , only a portion of the population of en-
trepreneurs, having relatively low development costs, participates in the campaign. For
s > 0, M∗ > µ, and a larger number of entrepreneurs join the platform.
According to Lemma 2.2, the revenue sharing rule determines how many entrepreneurs
join the platform: A larger share awarded to the entrepreneur attracting more entrepreneurs.
Part (iv) of the Lemma states that the threshold development cost M∗ is equal to µ ≡
γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ , when backers do not derive any altruistic benefit, implying that all the
campaigns that do participate satisfy the inequality M ≤ γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ . As pointed
out earlier, unless this inequality holds, it is certain that campaign proceeds will not cover
the developmental costs and the product will not be produced. When backers derive positive
19The solution exists if the term inside the radical in (13) is positive. Namely, if [λ (v + s) +Res]
2 −
sµ [(µ+ 2λ) (2v + s)− 2Re (v + s)] > 0.
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altruistic benefits, part (iv) states that the threshold M∗ is greater than µ. Because M∗ > µ
when s > 0, altruism of backers attracts some entrepreneurs that will never be able to deliver
their products. Entrepreneurs facing development cost M in the interval µ < M ≤ M∗ can
expect to receive positive funds from the campaign in spite of never being able to deliver
the product. Note that the existence of heterogeneity in the types of campaigns active on
the platform exposes backers to different degrees of risk of losing their pledges. Specifically,
backers of campaigns that face higher development cost are more at risk of non-delivery of
the product. However, these backers are also submitting lower pledges to compensate for
this higher risk. We also find that when participation provides altruistic benefits to backers,
they definitely lose their pledges if they contribute to campaigns facing development cost in
the interval, µ < M ≤M∗. These backers are willing to contribute, nevertheless, because of
their altruism and the low pledges that such campaigns require.
Using the results reported in Lemma 2.2, we now investigate how the platform chooses
its uniform sharing rule. We first express the objective function of the platform using the
results reported in (2.4). Because we assume that Re <
vM
(v+s)




















































dM if M∗ ≥M.
where M∗ is given in (2.13).




































































= 0 if M ≤ M∗
(2.15)
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While the first order condition above appears rather cumbersome, it simplifies signifi-
cantly when s = 0, namely when backers do not derive any altruistic benefits. From (2.13),
when s = 0, M∗ = µ = γv (1 + δ) N̄ , and therefore, ∂M∗∂γ = v (1 + δ) N̄ whenM < µ < M .
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− 1 + Rpk(M+M)
µ2
= 0 if µ ≥M
(2.16)
Notice that the platform payoff is a concave function of γ, implying that the first order
condition is necessary and sufficient. In Proposition 2.7, we summarize the properties of the
uniform sharing rule.
Proposition 2.7 (Equilibrium Commission rate under the Uniform Sharing Rule).
• When backers derive only consumption benefit and no altruistic benefit, and the platform
selects the low fractional threshold for promotion:
a. If M < γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ < M , the optimal share awarded to the entrepreneur by
the platform is larger when M , and k are bigger, and (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ is smaller.
b. If M ≤ γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ , the optimal share awarded to the entrepreneur by the
platform is larger when M , M ,k, and Rp are bigger, and (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ is smaller.
• When backers derive both consumption and altruistic benefits in the campaign and M <
M∗ < M , the platform attracts some entrepreneurs who will never be able to deliver the
product because their development costs, M lie in the interval
(
γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ ,M∗
]
.
Section 2.4 shows that when platforms incur relatively low reputational costs they set an
FT level for promoting campaigns that does not guarantee production success (Proposition
2.4). When backers derive some altruistic benefits by merely supporting a campaign, the
entrepreneur sets a target level lower than the amount necessary to cover the development
cost. As a result, backers face a positive probability that following a commercially successful
campaign the entrepreneur will not be able to start production. Part (ii) of Proposition
2.7 states the stronger result: With altruistic backers and relatively low reputational cost
incurred by the platform for non-delivery of the promised product by the entrepreneur, there
34
are some entrepreneurs active on the platform that, with certainty, will not deliver the prod-
uct. These are campaigns facing a development cost in the region
(
γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ ,M∗
]
.
As M∗ increases, the risk of delivery failure from entrepreneurs whose development costs lie
in this interval increases. When γ can vary by campaign (Section 5.1), platforms can fully
mitigate this risk by setting γ based on a campaign’s development cost. When γ is fixed
across campaigns, as is currently the practice, platforms attempt to lower their reputational
costs by explicitly explaining to backers the inherent risks associated with crowdfunding
a startup, and by permitting easy refunds (see the discussion following Proposition 2.4).
When we restrict attention to the case where the platform incurs relatively low reputational
cost, the platform can use only the sharing rule and not the promotion rule to guide the
entrepreneur’s target and pledge setting behaviour. To lower the risk of non-delivery noted
in Part (ii) of Proposition 2.7, the platform can increase γ. Doing so, however, decreases its
payoff. On the other hand, when the platform’s reputational cost is relatively high, it can
raise the threshold level for promotion when using the FT rule to ensure production success
by all funded campaigns, thus eliminating the risk reported in Part (ii) of Proposition 2.7.
2.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Extensions
In this paper, we consider a reward-based CF platform and investigate how campaign
characteristics affect the entrepreneur’s optimal target and pledge levels. We find that when
backers derive some altruistic benefits from participating in the campaign, the target level set
by the entrepreneur is lower than the funds needed for successful production. By setting this
lower target, the entrepreneur increases the risk backers face of not receiving the promised
product when the campaign is commercially successful. We obtain this result despite our as-
sumption that the entrepreneur can expect positive net profits from the sale of the completed
product in the external market. This result implies that altruism causes the entrepreneur
to intentionally raise the risk of forgoing future profits in favor of short-term proceeds from
the campaign. We also find that the target setting strategy of the entrepreneur may be
inconsistent with the interests of the platform.
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We investigate how the platform can utilize two instruments to better align the behaviour
of the entrepreneur with its interests. These instruments are (i) the share of campaign rev-
enues that the platform charges, and (ii) the promotion rule it uses to raise awareness of
selected campaigns among uninformed backers. In setting its revenue share fraction, the
platform faces two counteracting effects. On the positive side, keeping a higher share of
revenue implies that the platform receives a larger portion of the campaign revenues. Con-
versely, keeping a higher share of the revenue implies that the entrepreneur is less likely to
raise sufficient funds to cover the development cost necessary to start production. Therefore,
the entrepreneur is more likely to renege on her promise to backers, damaging the platform’s
reputation as a trustworthy environment to attract projects and backers. Factoring this
trade-off, the platform has to lower its revenue share when the campaign faces higher de-
velopment cost, when there are fewer informed backers who are able to assess the quality of
the product, and when the willingness to pay of the informed backers is lower. We also find
that with altruistic backers, the share of revenue set by the platform may not prevent some
campaigns from participating even when it is certain that they will not be able to deliver
their promised products.
As far as the promotion rule utilized by the platform, we find that tying the promotion to
the campaign’s ability to reach a certain threshold of the declared target is more profitable
than randomly selecting projects for promotion only when the platform has an interest to
ensure that sufficient funds become available for the entrepreneur to start production. The
platform has such an interest when it is more concerned about damage to its reputation
resulting from backers losing their pledges without receiving the promised product from the
entrepreneur in return.
Relaxing the assumptions in this paper can lead to several fruitful research directions.
First, we assume that entrepreneurs do not have any source of funding other than CF. We
make this assumption to highlight the possibility that even in this case the entrepreneur
may not set a target level to ensure that the development cost is covered. Allowing for the
possibility that entrepreneurs do have access either to loans or venture capital investment
is likely to lead to an even lower target set by the entrepreneur because she can access her
outside funding source for any shortfall of funds not raised in the campaign. The risk imposed
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on backers declines in this case despite the lower funding target set by the entrepreneur
because funds can be secured externally. However, the external funding can be contingent
on how successful the campaign is. It might be useful to investigate this relationship and
see how the target level changes with external funding. Second, in our model, all backers
derive the same benefit from consuming the finished product, and we do not explicitly
model the valuation of the product by consumers in the external market. If backers and
consumers in the external market have different valuations or if the population of backers
has heterogeneous valuations, the entrepreneur may use the CF campaign as a vehicle for
price discrimination.
Third, in our model, informed backers know their valuation of the product with certainty.
Moreover, the backer population increases by a known expansion factor when the campaign
gets promoted. Earlier literature has investigated environments where there is uncertainty
regarding the customer valuation and the overall product demand. Hence, a secondary rea-
son for running the campaign is to learn about the product demand. With learning as a
secondary objective, the entrepreneur may abandon the project if the campaign disappoints
by attracting only a few backers. Introducing the possibility of learning by the entrepreneur
in our model would make it even more likely for backers to lose their pledges, because en-
trepreneurs may abandon the project despite a commercially successful campaign. Finally,
we do not introduce information asymmetry in our model, where the entrepreneur knows
more about the product quality than potential backers. With such asymmetry, the en-
trepreneur may use her choice of target and pledge as a vehicle to signal the quality of her
project. We leave it for future researchers to introduce such signaling considerations to the
model.
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3.0 Effect of Wholesale Price Contract on Target and Pledge amount in a
Crowdfunding Campaign
We study how a backer’s risk of not getting delivery of a product, even after a “successful”
crowdfunding campaign, is affected by an entrepreneur’s incentive to set a funding goal that
is lower than the amount needed to start product development. The entrepreneur estimates
the size of a positively correlated secondary market conditional on the subscription levels in
a crowdfunding campaign. Unless the total market size is sufficiently large, the entrepreneur
does not produce, incurs a cost to its reputation and pays a penalty to a supplier who is
contracted prior to starting the crowdfunding campaign. We call this penalty the “option
premium” paid by the entrepreneur to exercise the option to not produce. In a contract
where a supplier decides on the wholesale price and the option premium endogenously, we
study the effect of these parameters on the risk of delivery failure. We find that unlike
conventional wisdom, with a supplier involved, a more informative crowdfunding signal can
increase a backer’s risk of delivery failure. In an environment where the entrepreneur price
discriminates between backers and retail consumers in the post-campaign market, we find
that there is a greater risk of delivery failure to those who are “impatient”. Together, we
shed light on the operational issues of why some crowdfunding campaigns fail to deliver to
backers even when the campaigns themselves are very successful.
3.1 Introduction
Two central aspects of starting a new business are ensuring there is sufficient demand for
the product and having the ability to scale production if indeed sales gathers traction. Both
aspects require a healthy cash flow to start and continue operations. Most entrepreneurs
start seeking funds for product development very early in the life cycle, for example when
either the prototype is not fully developed, or when prototypes are developed which then
get tested for functionalities and market acceptability. The need for engaging a supplier
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is also felt early as both the core competence in developing the specific component, and
the ability to scale may not be compatible with a fully in-house production strategy. Early
Supplier Involvement (ESI) has received attention in the Operations Management literature
(Petersen et al. 2005), although most studies assume that manufacturers and retailers have
an established supply chain. In a fledgling business, the channels of supply are not yet
streamlined or even initiated. The suppliers need to be convinced about the prospect of
future return from the entrepreneur. Although contract manufacturing has become quite
popular with new businesses, the question of who bears the risk of investing money to ensure
quality (for making tooling, jigs, fixtures, inspection mechanisms, etc.) is critical. This is
primarily because, with a new business entity, ‘the product’ does not exist yet. Unless
investment is made to ensure quality the product may not come to fruition.
Clearly the entrepreneur is in a weaker position of bargain, because there is no past
sales history of the product. In such a situation a signal for future market demand can
be as valuable as the sales itself. One such effective signalling device is crowdfunding. A
crowdfunding campaign can assess a prospective customer’s willingness to pay, as well as
estimate the potential size of a future market. It is likely that the size of a post-campaign
market is positively correlated with the subscription levels in the campaign. However, the
strength of the signal (the correlation between the subscription levels in the crowdfunding
campaign and the demand in the post-campaign market) as a predictor of future market size
affects the wholesale price contract extended by the supplier, as well as the crowdfunding
parameters set by the entrepreneur in the crowdfunding campaign. This eventually has an
impact on the delivery risk faced by investors (backers) in crowdfunding. If the subscription
levels in a crowdfunding campaign are not large enough, the entrepreneur may refrain from
making the required investment for product development exposing backers to the risk of
delivery failure. Since the size of the future market is an estimate that depends on the
strength of the crowdfunding signal,1 the signal itself becomes a crucial parameter in affecting
the degree of risk exposure.
We find that as the strength of the crowdfunding signal increases, investors (backers)
1We will use the phrase “crowdfunding signal” to imply the signal from the subscription levels in the
crowdfunding campaign.
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are exposed to a greater risk of losing their investments (pledge amounts) and yet not get
possession of the product. This runs contrary to the notion that a more informative signal
reduces risk. Among the parameters set in a crowdfunding campaign is the target amount
that an entrepreneur wants to raise, and pledge levels through which investors can commit
support to the campaign. For the pledge amounts to be actually deducted from the investors
account, the aggregate pledge levels committed must exceed the target amount. That is,
unless the target is reached the investor is protected from losing her pledge amount. The
target, therefore, acts to protect backers from the risk of losing their pledge amounts un-
less a “sufficiently large” amount is raised to start production and therefore ensure delivery.
However a rational entrepreneur may select a target and pledge combination such that suc-
cess in crowdfunding does not necessarily ensure investment for product development. A
“better” crowdfunding signal increases the post-campaign market size, thereby offering the
entrepreneur a buffer to absorb the cost of reputation and any penalty to the supplier for
“no production.” Hence, the entrepreneur sets a low target threshold increasing the backer’s
risk of non-delivery. On the other hand a “poor” quality signal increases the entrepreneur’s
reliance on crowdfunding to generate demand (or, by the same token generate funds) as
the size of the post-campaign market shrinks. Therefore, an entrepreneur sets a high target
threshold, reducing the backer’s risk exposure.
When backers in a crowdfunding campaign have a different valuation than consumers in
a post-campaign market, an entrepreneur earns a higher payoff by price discrimination. The
relative concentration of backer “types,” based on the cost of waiting, affects the probability
of delivery failure. The possibility of getting a higher surplus from waiting until the product
reaches the market limits the pledge amount that may be charged to the backers. If backers
do not lose significant value from waiting, then an entrepreneur cannot charge a pledge
amount that diminishes backer surplus any more than what they could earn if they waited. As
we show, when the backer population consists of either patient or impatient backers, it is only
the impatient backers that are exposed to the risk of delivery failure. A larger patient backer
population limits an entrepreneur’s incentive to keep a lower threshold than needed to break
even. The degree of consumer patience is, however, relative to any potential gains in quality
from implementing feedback from delivering to the backers in the campaign. This helps
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explain the proliferation of agencies (Arrow for Kickstarter and Indiegogo)2 that can attest
to the quality of campaigns in crowdfunding platforms where promising campaigns get the
aid of product design, supply chain and logistics support. By conveying that there is limited
gains in quality from waiting, the proportion of patient backers increase. Thus, getting an
endorsement from these agencies besides conveying quality also reduces any opportunistic
target setting incentive by the entrepreneurs, thereby reducing the backer’s risk exposure.
The role of an effective supply chain in ensuring timely delivery to backers can be under-
stood from the infamous failures of the Pebble SmartWatch and Zano Drone which, although
a huge crowdfunding success, failed to deliver the products as promised to its backers be-
cause of supply chain issues.3 We explain the potential causes of these failures by including a
supplier’s incentives as well. In crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo, the entrepreneur
can continue to receive orders even after the campaign ends by placing it under a separate
‘InDemand’ campaign. By modelling the pre and post-campaign demand as two discrete
phases, where the entrepreneur places a firm order with the supplier only after the campaign
ends, and may not invest unless a threshold number of backers pledge in the crowdfunding
campaign, we study the impact of delivery failure on the supplier as well. When an en-
trepreneur approaches the supplier as a potential future supply source, the supplier offers
a wholesale price contract that is contingent on reaching this threshold. We use the term
“contingent wholesale price” to refer to the contingency that the entrepreneur may not give
the orders to the supplier if the subscription levels are not large enough. In the event this
happens, the entrepreneur has to pay the exercise price of not producing. The exact level
of this penalty is determined by the supplier endogenously. The crowdfunding target and
pledge is kept by weighing the benefits of an easily reached low target threshold against
the cost of reputation and the supplier penalty. In the special case where the target and
pledge is kept such that the critical number of backers that must pledge for crowdfunding
success equals the necessary threshold for the supplier to invest in fixed cost for produc-
tion (no risk of delivery failure), we find that the optimal target increases with increase in





crowdfunding market and correlation in the crowdfunding and post-crowdfunding demand.
The target decreases as the mean demand in post-crowdfunding increases. Also, the target
increases with uncertainty in the crowdfunding market and decreases with the uncertainty
in the post-crowdfunding market.
The supplier invests resources only when there is profit from engagement. We are the
first to study the impact of a profit maximizing supplier on delivery failure in crowdfunding
campaigns. We show that the pledge and target in a crowdfunding campaign, besides being
signals of quality (Chakraborty and Swinney 2019), also reflect a supplier’s incentives. In
section 2 we position in the context of existing literature and in section 3 we describe the
model and introduce the notations. In sections 4 and 5 we discuss the model when the
entrepreneur does not price discriminate and when she does. We conclude in section 6.
3.2 Literature Review
There are several strands of literature that are related to this study. The research ques-
tion is motivated by why some, otherwise successful, campaigns fail to deliver. Belavina et al.
(2019) study this issue as “fund misppropriation,” where bad actors among the entrepreneur
run away with the money raised without delivering rewards to the backers. We show that
entrepreneurs who fail to deliver the product to backers subsequent to a successful campaign
may not necessarily be bad actors, but might simply act rationally by trading off the cost of
reputation and the cost to exercise its right of “no production,” with the benefit of an easily
reachable target. We also show that in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms to
deter misconduct, a wholesale price contract with a “no production” penalty is effective in
reducing the risk a backer faces. Chakraborty and Swinney (2019b) find that entrepreneurs
are able to signal a high quality product by keeping a higher target threshold for campaign
success. They assume that quality is correlated with the fixed cost of product development.
However, as we show, the target and pledge amount may be reflective of the parameters in a
supplier contract which makes the target, as a signal of product quality, particularly noisy.
Our paper is also closely related to the advance selling and price discrimination literature.
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The impact of advance selling on strategic buying behavior is studied extensively (Prasad
et al. 2011, McCardle et al. 2004). We draw parallels between crowdfunding and advance
selling, and show the impact that strategic buying behavior is incumbent on backers finding
waiting, till the product is successfully launched in the market, beneficial. Unlike advance
selling, the underlying product in a crowdfunding campaign is not developed. If the expected
product valuation in the post-campaign market compensates the loss in valuation due to
waiting, backers will pledge strategically. The presence of strategic backers reduces the
risk of delivery failure. We find that although strategic buying behavior reduces the profit
a firm earns, in the context of crowdfunding it provides incentives to the entrepreneur to
protect investors against delivery failure. Contrary to Li and Zhang (2013) we find that
a better signal can increase the risk of delivery failure. In most papers published in OM
journals, the retailer is treated as a newsvendor, and model second period orders accordingly.
Although, we use the approach of updating prior demand estimates, we do not assume
that the entrepreneur behaves likes a newsvendor. We assume that the order quantity
communicated will equal the expected post-campaign market size.
We study the effect that the contingency of a fixed cost investment has on the target
and pledge amount in crowdfunding. Wei and Zhang (2018) study the effect of a pre-order
contingency on the participation of strategic customers. Depending on distribution of a
post-campaign market, the size of which is positively correlated with the sales outcome of
the campaign, we find that the degree of correlation, the size of the fixed cost investment,
size and distribution of the backer population all affect the target and pledge amount.
The use of a test market to update estimates of retail demand is used for capacity
planning. Tsay (1999) studies a capacity investment problem where the outcome of a first
stage demand is taken as the signal for demand in a subsequent stage. There is also a
sizeable literature on the option to delay the capacity investment decision to a second stage
(Van Mieghem and Dada (1999), Anand and Girotra (2007), Anupindi and Jiang (2008).
These papers do not consider the possibility of bankruptcy which is crucial for startups.
Papers which considers aspect of capacity investment with demand uncertainty, along with
bankruptcy cost are Babich (2008), Babich et al. (2007). In our paper we do not model
capacity but incorporate a cost to the reputation of the entrepreneur in the event a delivery
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failure happens.
Barring the study of Swinney et al. (2011) and Tanrısever et al. (2012), very few studies
model the impact of penalty on the optimal time to raise funds. Both studies, while arriving
at optimal values of their decision variables use a threshold survival probability to determine
the optimal capacity investment. In our study we assume an expected profit maximizing
entrepreneur. They also do not study the strategic interaction of a supplier and entrepreneur,
as we do.
Research in crowdfunding, as a signal for future market size, lies at the confluence of a
publicly observable signal with no information asymmetry. Unlike most studies that treat
the entrepreneur’s signal about the size of a future market as private, the outcome of crowd-
funding is accessible to both the supplier and the entrepreneur. Therefore, there is no
asymmetry in the signal received. Among papers where a supplier’s order and therefore
capacity reservation depends on the quantity order by a retailer, Berman et al. (2019) show
that the manufacturer (entrepreneur) has an incentive to always signal a larger market size
to the supplier. They show in the presence of an option to defer the capacity reservation
decision till uncertainty about the new product is resolved, the manufacturer will report
their true private information. We do not model a suppliers decision to reserve capacity,
instead we assume that the entrepreneur will pay a penalty if it does not honour orders
when the crowdfunding campaign is successful, thereby compensating the supplier for any
capacity reservation. Although we restrict ourselves solely to a wholesale price contract the
efficacy of other supply chain contracts on the degree of innovation initiated by the supplier
has been studied by Wang and Shin (2015). They find that revenue sharing contracts are
the most efficient in obtaining the outcome of a centrally coordinated supply chain.
We do not consider the aspect of competition in our model, as the crowdfunding ‘market’
is a market for ‘potential’ demand without a physical product developed yet. In the context
of instantaneous ramp-up in computing space by using ‘autoscaling’ in cloud computing
Fazli et al. (2018) study the effect of capacity decision by two competing firms with and
without the option of scaling up production after demand uncertainty is resolved. They find
that capacity can strengthen competitive intensity or relax it, depending on the uncertainty
associated with success of the new product.
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More broadly, our paper is related to research at the interface of operations and finance,
studying how a firm’s financial decisions affect its operations (Buzacott and Zhang 2004, Ding
et al. 2007, Chod and Zhou 2014, Chod 2017, Tunca et al. 2017, Kouvelis and Xu 2021).
Closely related are those study the financing and operations strategies of startups. Chod and
Lyandres (2011) examine the benefits of IPO under product market competition and demand
uncertainty. More recently, Chod and Lyandres (2021) study the extent to which risk-averse
entrepreneurs can transfer venture risk to fully diversified investors under ICO financing.
We refer the reader to Babich and Kouvelis (2018) for a recent review of the operations-
finance literature and Allon and Babich (2020) for a specific review of crowdfunding. Our
work contributes to this stream of literature by showing how and why seemingly successful
crowdfunding campaigns fail to deliver rewards to backers.
3.3 Model
We model a game where the total demand (Z) for the product consists of backer sub-
scription levels in the crowdfunding market (X) and a post-campaign demand (Y ) that is
positively correlated with the crowdfunding subscription level. Specifically, we let total mar-













where the covariance in the two markets, σXY = ρσXσY . The uncertain demand in the
crowdfunding campaign is denoted by X which is normally distributed with mean µX and
variance σ2X . The cumulative distribution function of the crowdfunding market demand is
denote by FX(.) (the complementary cdf is denoted F̄X(.)), and the density by fX(.). The
post-campaign demand Y is positively correlated (ρ > 0) with the outcome of the crowd-
funding campaign. The demand in the post-campaign market is normally distributed with
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mean µY and variance σ
2
Y . The positive correlation is representative of the fact that a higher
number of pledges in the crowdfunding campaign increases the post-campaign demand. The
closer the value of ρ to one, the more precise the signal. Since both the supplier and the
entrepreneur assess the expected demand in the post-campaign market subsequent to the re-
alization of demand in the crowdfunding campaign, it is imperative that we explicitly specify
the expected post-campaign market size conditional on the subscription level in the crowd-
funding campaign: E(Y |X = x) = µY + ρ σYσX (x − µX). Given our assumption of a positive
correlation, if the crowdfunding outcome is more than the prior mean of the campaign, then
the expected posterior demand, E (Y |X = x), is more than the prior expected demand in
the post-campaign phase, µY .
We now define the variables and sequence of the game. The entrepreneur approaches the
supplier with the design of the prototype and seeks a quote for each component for supply.
The supplier studies the design and offers a wholesale price, w, for each component. and
asks the entrepreneur to fund a fixed investment M to ensure quality. It is common practice
for manufacturers of technological and hardware products to have tools and fixtures for an
efficient transition to large scale production. Even for products that are less “tactile” in
nature, there are often several rounds of development before a product comes to fruition.
These efforts may often be wasted and come at a heavy expense. M represents the minimum
amount that must be funded for the product to be launched in the market. There are
two reasons why the supplier asks the entrepreneur for the fixed investment. The first
reason is simply because the supplier has a better negotiating leverage. A supplier, typically,
has a stronger bargaining position when dealing with an entrepreneur and therefore often
dictates the terms of contract.4 The second reason is because the prospect of a long term
association is very uncertain. Hence, the supplier refrains from committing to a long term
investment. The entrepreneur agrees to invest M , if the total market size, conditional
on seeing the crowdfunding subscription levels, are large enough to recover (break-even)
the investment. For some crowdfunding subscription level x and pledge amount pc, unless
(γpc − w)x + (pc − w)E(Y |X = x) ≥ M , where 1 − γ is the commission that the platform
4Inspite of the rapid rise of contract manufacturers, the balance of power, when dealing with entrepreneurs,
still seems to be heavily skewed in favor of the suppliers.
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gets from the campaign proceeds, the entrepreneur does not invest in the development cost
M . The entrepreneur sets the target T and pledge level pc, after arranging the channel of
supply. We will study a situation where the product valuation may change subsequent to
the crowdfunding campaign allowing the entrepreneur to price discriminate, with the post-
campaign selling price denoted pm. A backer commits to paying pc, which is deducted from
the backer’s account only if the aggregate pledges exceed the target T (a state in which
the campaign is deemed “successful”). The entrepreneur is obligated to deliver the product
to the backers if the campaign is successful. Hence, unlike traditional investment practices,
in a reward based crowdfunding campaign, backers participate to get a novel product by
a pre-committed time. It becomes evident that the entrepreneur, besides using the target
amount T to inform the backers the amount needed for product development,5 also serves
as a parameter to protect the backers against the risk of losing their pledges if sufficient
amount of money is not raised. We look at two cases, one in which backers are not strategic
and another where backers are strategic and consider buying from the retail market once
the product becomes available. The presence of strategic backers allows the entrepreneur
to charge a retail price that is different than the pledge set in the crowdfunding campaign.
When backers are not strategic, backers that choose not to pledge in the campaign do not
consider buying in the retail market. We note that the subscription in the crowdfunding
campaign, x is a part of the total demand only if the aggregate pledges exceed the target T
set by the entrepreneur. That is:
E(Πe) =
(γpc − w)x+ (pc − w)E(Y |X = x) if x ≥
T
pc
(pc − w)E(Y |X = x) if x < Tpc
This gives a lower threshold number of backers (xLT ) that must subscribe to the campaign
for the entrepreneur to make the investment M , when the campaign succeeds. When the
5It is possible that the product is already in an advanced state of development, and the only purpose
of conducting a crowdfunding campaign is to test the potential market size. From our in depth study of
reward based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, we find that such cases are few. For the purposes
of the paper, we assume that the entrepreneur has no past sales, and depends entirely on the proceeds of a
crowdfunding and a post-campaign market for sales.
47
campaign fails, the entrepreneur may still invest in M if a higher threshold number of backers
xUT subscribe to the campaign. These two thresholds are respectively:x








Clearly, xUT > xLT . The above mentioned conditions gives rise to a lower and upper thresh-
old number of backers that must pledge for the campaign depending on whether the cam-
paign is successful or not. The entrepreneur’s preferred range within which to keep the
critical number of backers for campaign success ( T
pc
) is specified in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. For any target and pledge amount pair (T, pc), an entrepreneur invests the
required development cost M if the number of backers, x, pledging in the crowdfunding cam-
paign exceeds xLT . Furthermore, the entrepreneur finds it preferable to keep a target and
pledge such that T
pc
≤ xLT .
As the number of backers needed for campaign success ( T
pc
) increases, the expected payoff
of the entrepreneur decreases. This happens, because reaching the target becomes less likely.
Therefore, the entrepreneur finds it preferable to keep a target as low as possible. If the
number of backers needed for campaign success ( T
pc
) is strictly lower than xLT , then for all
backer subscription levels x where T
pc
< x ≤ xLT , backers are exposed to the risk of non-
delivery of their rewards. In this event, although the campaign is successful in reaching the
target set by the entrepreneur, it falls short of reaching the investable number to break even.
Since the product cannot be manufactured for backer subscription in this range, we assume
that there is a fixed cost R to the reputation of the entrepreneur. As the supplier plans to get
orders based on the initial discussions with the entrepreneur, for backer subscription in the
range T
pc
< x ≤ xLT , a penalty Γ is levied by the supplier on the entrepreneur, as the orders
for which the suppliers reserved capacity don’t materialize. We will refer to this penalty
as the “option-premium” charged by the supplier to the entrepreneur to exercise the option
of not producing. As the threshold number of backers (xLT needed for the entrepreneur to
make the investment M increases, the risk of delivery failure (for the same target and pledge
amount) increases. Thus, the sensitivity of xLT , to the environment parameters is crucial in
understanding the risk of delivery failure to the backers, which we study in Lemma 3.2.
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Lemma 3.2.















≥ 0 and ∂2xLT
∂w∂pc






≥ 0 and ∂2xLT
∂w∂p
≥ 0. The threshold price level w∗ = M(γσX+ρσY )
(1−γ)(µY σX−ρµXσY )
.
2. If the ex-ante payoff from the crowdfunding and post-campaign market exceeds the product
development cost, (γpc − w)µX + (pc − w)µY ≥ M , the crowdfunding subscription level




≥ 0. If (γpc − w)µX + (pc − w)µY < M , ∂x
LT
∂ρ
< 0. The rate of increase in
the breakeven subscription level, as a result of a stronger signal, increases as the profit
margin increases. That is, ∂
2xLT
∂λ∂ρ
≥ 0, where λ = pc − w.
Proof: Refer Appendix
We observe that increasing the pledge or wholesale price can increase or decrease the
threshold amount needed for the entrepreneur to invest the product development cost. With
regards to the sensitivity of xLT to the crowdfunding market signal as a predictor of the size of
the post-campaign market, the following intuition holds. If (γpc − w)µX+(pc − w)µY ≥M ,








where x ≥ T
pc
is the subscription level in the crowdfunding campaign. The updated payoff






Since (γpc − w)µX + (pc − w)µY ≥ M , the backer subscription level needed for the en-
trepreneur to invest is lower than the ex-ante mean crowdfunding demand, xLT < µX . All
else remaining the same, as the correlation between the two markets increases, the scope
of error, µX − x, reduces. Hence, the number of backers needed to break even is closer




is critical as it emphasizes the interaction of market signal with the margin
the entrepreneur can command. This result will be particularly useful for our discussion of
equilibrium results.
The backers in a crowdfunding campaign observe the target and pledge levels before
making a pledge commitment. We also assume that the backers are aware of the prod-
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uct development cost M , and the unit cost of manufacturing the product c.6 Hence, the
backer knows that unless the entrepreneur finds it feasible to invest the development cost
the component will not be developed and the promised reward to the backers will not be
delivered either. All backers have a homogeneous valuation v for the product. We model
the possibility that the product valuation may change after the crowdfunding campaign as
a result of backer feedback after getting possession of the product. In the section on price
discrimination we incorporate the potential for the product valuation to become θv where
θ ∈ {θl, θh} with equal probability. To accommodate the possibility of the valuation increas-
ing two folds we let 0 < θl ≤ θh ≤ 2. When the entrepreneur price discriminates the price in
the post-campaign market will be denoted pm. If the entrepreneur finds it feasible to invest
the fixed amount M , the component gets made with probability φ, where 1 − φ represents
the potential for a technical problem after the onset of production. The onset of a technical
problem is independent of the demand in the crowdfunding campaign. The stages of the
game is shown in Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.1: The stages in investment of a project by an entrepreneur/supplier through a
crowdfunding campaign.7
For all subsequent calculations we use the identity for calculation of partial moments
of a normal distribution with mean µX and variance σ
2
X from Winkler et al. (1972), where∫ m
−∞ xf (x) dx = −σXω (zm) + µXΩ (zm). ω and Ω are the pdf and cdf of the standard
normal distribution and zm =
m−µX
σX
is the standardized value. We do not standardize the
6If not the cost, knowing the margins that the supplier earns could also lead the backer to the value of
the wholesale price.
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variables to zm, for ease of representation. For a non-standardized normal random variable,
the identity becomes
∫ m
−∞ xf (x) dx = −σ
2
Xf (m) +µXF (m). We will use the identity for all
derivations.
3.4 Choice of optimal Target, Pledge and Wholesale Price with no price
discrimination
We proceed with our analysis by first assuming that the entrepreneur commits to charging
a post-campaign sale price that equals the pledge levels in the crowdfunding campaign. It is
very common to observe that entrepreneurs try to entice backers to pledge in a campaign by
suggesting that prices may increase in the post-campaign market. Assuming the pledge and
prices to be the same also helps in simplifying the investment decision of the entrepreneur.
Our choice of using a contingent wholesale price contract is inspired by Wei and Zhang
(2018) in which production is contingent on reaching a pre-specified target. The rational
for engaging in such a contract is that it safeguards both the the supplier and entrepreneur
against the risk of low market subscription in the test market, and being compelled to borrow
money to produce the product. We will now proceed to analyse the equilibrium.
3.4.1 Effect of Contingent Wholesale price contract without “No-Production”
penalty (NOP regime)
Although the entrepreneur keeps a target low enough to ensure that the campaign is
successful, campaign success alone may not be sufficient for the entrepreneur to invest in the
fixed product development cost. If the campaign is successful but the number of pledging
backers is not large enough for investment, the entrepreneur does not invest and the product
is not developed. In this situation the entrepreneur incurs a ‘fixed’ cost to its reputation, R.
Since, investment by the entrepreneur depends on whether the number of backers pledging
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exceed the lower threshold xLT , the payoff of the entrepreneur may be expressed as:






















where the first component represents the situation where the entrepreneur incurs a cost to
its reputation on account of non-delivery of the product. The amount raised from the cam-
paign passes to the entrepreneur as long as the target is reached, however the supplier starts
production only if the entrepreneur makes the investment on reaching the lower threshold.
Similarly, all post-campaign payoffs from the campaign depend on meeting the lower thresh-
old number of backers in the crowdfunding campaign. The second component represents the
payoff from the campaign conditional on raising the target. Observe that the entrepreneur
pays a commission 1−γ on the amount raised to the platform. The post-campaign revenues
depend on the realization of the subscription levels in the crowdfunding campaign. If the
backer size is lower than the number needed for the entrepreneur to proceed with the invest-
ment, then the production does not happen. Therefore, all post-campaign revenues depend
on reaching the investment threshold xLT . The total cost of the components purchased from




, where supplies are needed only when production happens
or when the subscription level in the campaign meet the minimum investable number. Since
the entrepreneur pays the fixed development cost, it is deducted when production starts.
Any backer that contemplates investing in the campaign faces the uncertainty of not
receiving the product even when the campaign is successful. This uncertainty consists of a
technical problem at the supplier with probability 1 − φ. Incorporating for this possibility





The pledge amount is lost only if the target is reached in the crowdfunding campaign.
Incorporating this aspect we get the backers net payoff as:










Knowing the payoff of the backer the entrepreneur keeps a pledge amount so that E (Πb) ≥ 0.
Finding the pledge amount in terms of the target from the expression and substituting in
the expression for the entrepreneurs payoff gives the payoff expressed in terms of the target.
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Optimizing over the target we can find the target and therefore the pledge amount in terms of
the wholesale price offered by the supplier. The supplier anticipating the response from the
entrepreneur keeps a wholesale price that maximizes her payoff. The payoff of the supplier
is expressed as:





Simplifying the expected payoff of the entrepreneur and supplier, we get the following expres-
sions. In arriving at the simplified expression we use Winkler et al. (1972) for determination
of partial moments of a normal distribution. For any target (T ), pledge (pc) and wholesale
price (w) the payoffs of the entrepreneur and supplier are given by:


















































E (Πs) = φ (w − c)
{













Optimizing the suppliers payoff by substituting the optimal tar get and wholesale price gives
the equilibrium which is characterized in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. The equilibrium target, pledge amount and wholesale prices depend on the
cost of reputation if the entrepreneur fails to deliver the product subsequent to a successful
campaign.
• High Reputation Cost: When R ≥ φvxLT (φv, w∗), the optimal pledge amount is pc = φv









= φ (w − c)
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xLT (φv, w) and ∂x
LT
∂w
= σX{−(1−γ)φv(µY σX−ρµXσY )+M(σX+ρσY )}{(γφv−w)σX+(φv−w)ρσY }2
.
• Low Reputation Cost: When R < φvxLT (φv, w∗), the optimal target is T = R
γ
, and the
optimal pledge and wholesale price is obtained by solving the constrained optimization
problem:
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– maxE (Πs) = φ (w − c)
{









φ (pc − w)
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≥ 0. The first constraint is obtained by equating the dif-
ferential of the entrepreneur’s payoff with respect to p to zero.
It is difficult to obtain closed form expressions for the wholesale price, Target and Pledge
amounts from the previous expressions. Therefore, we resort to numerical analysis in section
3.4.3 to understand how the pledge, Target, wholesale price and payoffs of the entrepreneur
and supplier with the parameters of the model. Our focus is on the degree of risk exposure







3.4.2 Effect of Contingent Wholesale price contract with “No-Production” penalty
(WOP regime)
In the previous section we looked at the optimal parameters set by the entrepreneur and
the supplier, when no penalty is imposed on the entrepreneur in the event of a failure to
start production. In a real situation it is highly unlikely that the supplier proceeds with a
word of mouth assurance from the entrepreneur to reserve capacity for production orders.
In this section, we look at a scenario where the supplier charges a fee in the event that the
entrepreneur, subsequent to the outcome of the crowdfunding subscription, is unable to raise
the required amount to break even. We will denote this fee Γ. This fee is applicable only
when the entrepreneur does not proceed with the production order. This could be thought
of as a fee to exercise of the option of no production, or as an upfront booking fee that
is returned if an order is placed. This requires the following change in the payoff of the
entrepreneur.






















Note that the entrepreneur has to pay the fee only if the backer subscription levels raise the
target but are not sufficiently large to signal breaking even with participation of consumers
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in the post-campaign market. However, this cost is fully recovered from the entrepreneur.
The expected payoff of the supplier now becomes:









With the incorporation of the option-premium cost, the supplier ensures that all costs as-
sociated with the entrepreneur’s involvement, and any failures owing to this association is
fully recovered from the entrepreneur. The supplier incorporates the best response of the
entrepreneur in its own payoff to get the parameters of the contract (w,Γ). The equilibrium
condition is characterized in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.4 (Equilibrium Pledge, Target, Option Premium and Wholesale Price). The
equilibrium pledge, target, option premium and wholesale price are stated:










• Target best response function for a given level of option premium Γ is T = R+Γ
γ
.

















• The wholesale price is obtained by maximizing the supplier’s payoff from the regular
season sales: (w − c)
{









3.4.3 Numerical Analysis - Same Price Regime
Due to the lack of closed form expressions of the equilibrium target, pledge amount and
threshold levels; to conduct comparative statics on the risk exposure a backer faces, we take
recourse in Numerical Analysis. Our primary objective is see how the impact of correlation
between the two markets, and cost of reputation affect a backer’s risk exposure. Throughout
the analysis we have assumed that the coefficient of variation of the crowdfunding market is




). This helps in ensuring that
σXµY ≥ ρσY µX . This assumption is reasonable, as the relative variation of the crowdfunding
market should be higher than the regular market in the selling season. We also assume that
γcµX + cµY ≥M , to ensure the most optimistic scenario where all parties know that even if
backers were to pay the marginal cost of the product, it will still be sufficient to cover for the
55
production cost. However, as we show, the ex-ante expected payoffs do not guarantee that
entrepreneur’s will invest in the product development cost after observing the crowdfunding
subscription levels. Our observations from the analysis are the following:
Observation 3.1 (Impact on Delivery under the same price regime). The observations apply
whether or not an option premium is charged by the supplier.
1. As the crowdfunding market becomes a better signal of the size of the post-campaign





, of backers, increases.
2. As the cost of reputation for failing to deliver the rewards following a campaign success






more, there always exists a high enough reputation cost at which the entrepreneur prefers
to set T
pc
= xLT and pc = φv.
3. There exists a γ∗ such that for all revenue shares γ < γ∗, campaigns do not participate in
crowdfunding platforms. Furthermore, increasing the entrepreneur’s share of the payoffs
increases the risk of delivery failure.





with increase in Reputa-
tion Cost R, Crowdfunding Signal ρ, and the Entrepreneur’s Share of the campaign proceeds
γ, under the NOP regime
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with increase in Reputa-
tion Cost R, Crowdfunding Signal ρ, and the Entrepreneur’s Share of the campaign proceeds
γ, under the OP regime
The parameter values for the numerical analysis are:µX = 1400, µY = 1200, σX =
750, σY = 300, φ = 0.7, c = $20,M = $10000. We vary the crowdfunding signal(ρ) from
0 to 1 with 0.1 increments, the cost of reputation (R) from $0 to $15000 in $1000 incre-
ments, and the entrepreneur’s share from 80% to 90% with 1% increments.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the change in risk exposure when the entrepreneur chooses
the target and pledge amount T and pc such that the critical number of backers needed for
campaign is strictly lower than xLT . However, as noted in the second point of the remark,
for a high enough cost of reputation the entrepreneur keeps the critical number of backers
equal to xLT . As found in Su and Zhang (2008), as the pre-order market (crowdfunding
campaign) becomes a better predictor of post-campaign sales, the pledge amount is reduced
thereby increasing the critical number of backers needed. Although increasing the pledge
has the effect of reducing the break even number of backers as well, the drop is not as steep.
Therefore, the difference between xLT and T
pc
widens.
As the cost of reputation increases the optimal target amount increases linearly as per
Lemma 3.3. With a higher target there is less risk of the backers not getting delivery
conditional on campaign success. Therefore, a higher pledge amount can be charged as well
(when there is no premium charged by the supplier for no production orders, the pledge
actually reduces until the reputation levels are sufficiently high, refer panel in Appendix).
The wholesale price also increases. Although the break even quantity increases, it does not
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increase as fast as the critical number of backers for campaign success T
pc
. This causes the
gap xLT − T
pc
, and therefore the risk, to reduce.
As the correlation between the crowdfunding and the post-campaign market increases,
the total size of the market for the new product, conditional on the outcome of the crowd-
funding subscription levels, increases (when ρ = 0, the total size of the market conditional on
the crowdfunding outcome is x+ µY ). For all correlation levels ρ, the expected market size
increases as ρ increases). Given the equilibrium pledge amount and wholesale price, if the
ex-ante payoff from the market is sufficient to cover the fixed cost of product development,
from Lemma 2, we know that the crowdfunding subscription level for breaking even will be
lower than the mean backer population size µX . However, to compensate for a more pre-
cise signal (higher ρ), the subscription level for investment moves closer to the mean backer
population. In other words, µX − xLT reduces as the signal becomes more precise, all else
remaining constant.
With increase in the minimum threshold level, the expected payoff of both the supplier
and entrepreneur decreases. Furthermore, an increase in the minimum subscription levels





the entrepreneur must set such a pledge and target level that compensates for the reduced






must increase. Recall, from Lemma 4, that the optimal target
of the entrepreneur increases linearly in the option premium (Γ) that the supplier charges.
The supplier by increasing the option premium, not only maximizes his own payoff, but
also aligns itself with the need to increase T
pc
, as T = R+Γ
γ
. The supplier does not merely
increase the penalty, as the wholesale price reduces more than the pledge amount so that the
net impact of xLT reduces. However, in equilibrium we find that the increase in correlation
increases xLT more than the optimal margin reduces it, with the result that xLT increases
overall. When the cost of reputation is low, we find that the increase in xLT is more than






needed for campaign success. As a result,
the delivery risk xLT − T ∗
p∗c
increases.
Comparing the two contracts of the same price regime, with and without the option
premium to exercise the right of no production, we find the following result:
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Proposition 3.1 (The role of suppliers in reducing delivery risk.). All other parameters of
the crowdfunding and post-campaign remaining constant, if the Entrepreneur’s cost of rep-
utation exceeds a threshold R∗, the entrepreneur will keep a “risk-free” critical number of
backers for campaign success, where T
pc
= xLT . Denoting, RO and RN as the threshold repu-
tation costs with and without the option premium, at equilibrium RO < RN . In other words,
suppliers can exert a positive externality on the crowdfunding campaigns by incentivizing low
reputation players to set a risk-free critical number of backers. When there are no penalties,
players with only very high cost of reputation set a risk free-number of critical backers.
Based on a comparison of the contingent wholesale price contracts, with and without a
premium for exercising the option of no production, we find that because of the discipline
that the supplier imposes on the entrepreneur while setting the target and pledge amount,
both the entrepreneur and the supplier are better off with a contingent wholesale contract
with an exercise price for no production. This is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.2. In a single price regime, a wholesale price contract with option premium
dominates a wholesale price contract with no premium for exercising the option to not pro-
duce.
Proof: Follows from comparison of the two regimes and the numerical analysis.
We also find that the share of the total channel profit is higher for the entrepreneur
when the reputation costs are higher. Although, the total channel profits decline, the share
of the total payoff in the channel increases for the entrepreneur as the cost to its reputation
increases.
We note that the observations are a result of the values of the parameters chosen. When
the population parameters (mean and standard deviations) of the backer and post-campaign
market distributions change, such that the only feasible pledge and retail prices are such that
(γpc−w)µX +(pc−w)µY < M , the results change. Specifically, as the correlation coefficient
between the two markets increase, the probability of delivery risk reduces while any increase
in the share of revenues of the entrepreneur results in a decrease in the probability of delivery
failure.
Subsequent to the numerical analysis, we can generalize our observations by studying
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the contingent wholesale price contract when pledge and post-campaign prices are equal (No
Price Discrimination)
Observation 3.2. The impact of a change in cost of reputation (R), strength of signal
(ρ) and platform commission rate on the pledge (pc) and wholesale price (w), premium op-
















Both pledge and wholesale prices increase as the crowdfunding market sends a better signal








. As the platform decreases
its commission rate (or γ, the entrepreneur’s share, increases), the pledge level decreases









• As the cost of reputation increase, the entrepreneur pays a lower premium to exercise the






. A stronger crowdfunding signal increases the






. Increasing the entrepreneur’s share



















, but in a WOP regime the target increases as strength of






. With increase in the entrepreneur’s share













• As the cost of reputation is above a threshold R∗ any increase beyond it increases the en-
trepreneurs payoff increases. If R ≤ R∗ the payoff decrease with increase in cost of rep-
utation
(
if R > R∗; ∂E(Πe)
∂R




. The suppliers payoff decreases, total
channel payoff increases and the entrepreneur’s share of the total channel profit decreases















With a better crowdfunding signal the entrepreneur’s payoff increases and supplier’s pay-

















. The total channel profit increases
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A higher share of campaign revenues decreases the total channel profit at the expense of

































in the entrepreneur’s share of the campaign proceeds the risk exposure of backers of not







The above observations are based on our numerical analysis results, which are available
in panels B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 of the Appendix.
3.5 Price Discrimination when crowdfunding backers and regular buyers have
different valuation
We assume that there are consumers who will buy the product in the regular sea-
son if the product becomes available. Letting the pledge amount during the crowdfund-
ing campaign to be pc and the regular selling price to be pm, the entrepreneur’s deci-
sion to either invest in the fixed development cost depends on whether the expected to-















≥M . In the first component,
the revenue earned by the entrepreneur is net of the fees paid to the platform (the platform
takes 1− γ of the proceeds conditional on reaching the target. Since there is a benefit from
conducting a crowdfunding campaign by getting feedback from backers who get delivery, we
assume that based on the feedback the value of the product changes to θv, where θ ∈ {θl, θh}
with Pr (θ = θl) = Pr (θ = θh) =
1
2
. Backers can give negative feedback about the product
which can reduce the valuation of the product to θlv. On the upside there could be positive
feedback which increases the value to θhv such that 0 ≤ θl ≤ θh ≤ 2. The entrepreneur
does not commit on the second period price until after completing production subsequent to
61
finishing the campaign. The expected value for the product is E (θ) v = θl+θh
2
v. In the range
the factor (θ) can take the value, we admit the possibility that the valuation of the product
may increase by two-fold (when both θl and θh take a value of 2). Therefore, conditional on
the product performance, the second period price is pm = θiv, i ∈ {l, h}. Since, the exact
impact of crowdfunding feedback is not known until the deliveries are made to the backers,
the second period pledge amount is itself a random number that depends on the outcome
of θ. Hence, the entrepreneur and backers can form an expectation of what the market
price will be as denoted by pm = E(θ)v. Substituting this value to get the expression of the
threshold number of backers needed for the backer to makes an investment is:
xLT = MσX−{E(θ)v−w}(µY σX−ρµXσY )
(γpc−w)σX+{E(θ)v−w}ρσY
.
The backer contemplating pledging in a crowdfunding campaign weighs it against buying
when (and if) the product becomes available in the regular market. That is, if E (Πcb) ≥













{δv − E (pm)}. Note
that the backer in the campaign will weigh the benefit from waiting until the product be-
comes available in the regular market depends on whether purchasing from the market earns
a non-negative payoff. That is, if δv − E (pm) exceeds zero. This leads us to characterize
consumers as either patient or impatient.














The supplier offers a wholesale price and a premium to exercise an option to not produce if
the raised amount is insufficient for the entrepreneur to make the investment but managed
to raise the target.







































. Observe that the second period price is an expectation that the entrepreneur
forms based on the relative likelihood of the product turning out to be good or bad. Opti-
mizing the expression for the optimal target gives T ∗ (Γ) = R+Γ
γ
. The supplier has the same
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payoff as in 3.8. Incorporating the best response of the target for a given option price Γ
in its own payoff, the suppliers equilibrium condition may be obtained by equating its first



















The equilibrium values when the entrepreneur price discriminates is stated in the follow-
ing Lemma.
Lemma 3.5 (Equilibrium Pledge, Target, Option Premium and Wholesale Price under Price
Discrimination). The equilibrium second period price, target, option premium and wholesale
price are obtained using the same rule, regardless of whether the backer is patient or impa-
tient. These are given by:
• Regular selling price pm = θiv, i ∈ {l, h}.
• Target best response function for a given level of option premium Γ is T = R+Γ
γ
.

















• The wholesale price is obtained by maximizing the supplier’s payoff from the regular
season sales: (w − c)
{









• The optimal pledge level depends on whether the backers in the crowdfunding campaign
are patient and impatient.



































{δv − E (pm)}, where E (pm) = θl+θh2 v.
When there is a high cost of waiting the backers are impatient, that is the novelty of the
product outweighs the potential benefit of waiting to see the backer feedback incorporated in
the product. In this situation, the pledge amount will be kept to extract the entire surplus
from the backers. This is a beneficial position for the entrepreneur as there is no chance of a
spillover of backers into the regular market. However, if the backer has a low cost of waiting
the entrepreneur must keep a pledge amount that ensures that there are no spillovers from
the crowdfunding market to the regular market. The above conditions clearly show that
the pledge level when consumer valuations in the secondary market are different than in the
crowdfunding market, the pledge is lower, than when there is no price discrimination. Based
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on the above mentioned equilibrium characterization we can conduct a numerical analysis
similar to the one we conducted for the same price regime.
3.5.1 Numerical Analysis - Payoffs with Price Discrimination
We highlight that discrimination is effective only when the feedback received as a result
of the campaign does not significantly improve the product valuation. If it does, then the
pledge will have to be very low to ensure that the backers do not move to the post-campaign
market.
Proposition 3.3 (Entrepreneur’s preference for backer types). If the cost of the entrepreneur’s
reputation R < R∗, then Entrepreneurs prefer impatient backers to patient backers in the
backer population. As the proportion of patient backers increases, the entrepreneur is more
likely to keep the critical number of backers for campaign success, T
pc
equals the number of
backers to break even. R∗ = γφvxLT (φv, w∗), where w∗ is the wholesale price that maximizes
the suppliers payoff.
Figure 3.4: Entrepreneur’s Preference for Impatient Backer’s as evidenced by the highest
payoff with changing Crowdfunding Signal ρ, and the Entrepreneur’s Share of the campaign
proceeds γ, under Price Discrimination
When backers are impatient or attach a high value to the novelty of the product it gets
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manifested in the heavy discounting that is done to the valuation at a later date. It is
rational, therefore, to charge a higher pledge from these backers for impatience. If, however,
backers are patient than the most that may be charged from the backers is capped by the
expected benefit from crowdfunding. Hence, the pledge cannot be increased arbitrarily. We
find, that as the cost of the reputation in case of delivery failure increases, the equilibrium
option premium decreases (as it becomes less likely for delivery failure to happen). Therefore,
for a sufficiently large cost of reputation, R∗, T
p
= xLT where T = R
∗
γ
as Γ (R∗) = 0 for all
R > R∗.
Corollary 3.1 (Effect of Impatient Backer’s on Risk Exposure).





the entrepreneur earns a higher payoff by keeping






. Consequently, only impatient backers are
exposed to the risk of delivery failure.













in the entrepreneur’s share of the campaign proceeds the risk exposure of backers of not







When backers are patient, the entrepreneur realizes that unless pledges are significantly
low the backers will prefer to wait until the product launches successfully in the regular
market. The backers do not mind waiting especially because the pledge is capped by the
net surplus that may be earned by an even better product. The entrepreneur is better off
by extracting the full surplus by requiring that a campaign is successful only if the break-
even number is reached. This is accomplished by setting the critical number of backers
for campaign success equal to xLT . However, the entrepreneur earns a higher payoff when
backers are impatient, as the upside from waiting until the product is successfully launched
is not compensated by the loss in value because of waiting. Consequently, there is greater
latitude for the entrepreneur to increase the pledge levels.
Corollary 3.2. As the proportion of impatient backers in a crowdfunding platform increases,
all else remaining constant, the possibility of delivery failure increases.
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This is particularly relevant in the case of crowdfunding campaigns where backers do not
usually have the experience that VCs and angel investors have. We now study the sensitivity





when the entrepreneur can price discriminate.
Observation 3.3. The impact of a change in cost of reputation (R), strength of signal (ρ)
and platform commission rate on the pledge (p) and wholesale price (w), premium option (Γ),





















Both pledge and wholesale prices increase as the crowdfunding market sends a better signal








. As the platform decreases
its commission rate (or γ, the entrepreneur’s share, increases), the pledge level decreases









• As the cost of reputation increase, the entrepreneur pays a lower premium to exercise the






. A stronger crowdfunding signal increases the
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• The equilibrium target set by the entrepreneur increases as the cost of reputation and








. With increase in the entrepreneur’s







• As the cost of reputation increases the entrepreneurs payoff increases, the suppliers payoff


















a better crowdfunding signal both the entrepreneur’s and supplier’s payoff decreases, but





















. A higher share of campaign revenues de-






















The comparative statics when backers are impatient are presented in Figure B.5 of the
Appendix. When the entire backer population are patient the entrepreneur keeps a target
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and pledge amount that removes all possibility of delivery failure. Therefore, there will be
no impact of a change in the cost of reputation.
Observation 3.4 (Comparative Statics when backers are patient). As stated in Proposition
3.3 when the entire backer population is patient the entrepreneur keeps a target and pledge
amount that removes all possibility of delivery failure. Therefore, there will be no impact
of a change in the cost of reputation. The effect of the strength of correlation (ρ) between
the crowdfunding and post-campaign market and platform commission rate on the wholesale







• As the platform decreases its commission rate (or γ, the entrepreneur’s share, increases),














. With increase in the entrepreneur’s share of the campaign proceeds







• With a better crowdfunding signal both the entrepreneur’s and supplier’s payoff decreases,





















. A higher share of campaign revenues in-























Often the reason for delivery failure when a campaign has raised a sufficient amount
is attributed to the malicious intent of the entrepreneur. We find that the entrepreneur
indeed trades off the benefit of failing to deliver rewards after a successful campaign, with
the cost of keeping a high critical number of backers for campaign success. Keeping a target
and pledge pair that makes it less likely for the campaign to be successful, comes with the
benefit that the backers are insured against losing their money in the event of campaign
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success. However, if the cost of reputation is not too high the target and pledge is kept so
as to expose backers to the risk of losing their pledge amounts.
This problem is further exacerbated because of the participation of a supplier who par-
takes of the profits, besides the platform which charges a commission to all successful cam-
paigns. In the event that an entrepreneur has the choice of walking away from a commitment
to make a fixed investment for quality after observing the crowdfunding outcome, we find
that this makes the supplier more willing to give up a share of its revenue. The supplier
knows that if it takes too much of the share from the payoffs it may not end up getting
the contract, as the critical number of backers needed for campaign success will be high.
Therefore, it takes a lower share of the total channel payoffs. Furthermore, against what
our intuitions would suggest, as the quality of the crowdfunding signal as a predictor of the
size of a future market increases, that tends to increase the risk exposure of the backers.
This happens because with a high enough post-campaign mean market size, there would be
too much to loose by keeping a high crticial number of backers. Thus, the prospect of a
high payoffs from the post-campaign market results in such a target and pledge pair, that
increases the risk exposure of the backers.
Entrepreneurs try to induce backers to pledge in a campaign by suggesting that a higher
price will be charged in the regular market. For a product that is not yet developed such
a claim is at best a possibility. If indeed the product turns out to be as good as promised
it will command a higher price in the secondary market. However, in many cases it is seen
that subsequent to deliveries there are severe criticisms of the product functioning. Since the
comments that are posted are available in the public domain, it is likely that the willingness to
pay (valuation) for the product will actually decrease subsequent to a campaign. If, however,
backers lose substantial value due to waiting, their impatience makes it more likely for them
to pay a higher pledge during the campaign. This makes it easier to reach a target which
incentivizes the supplier to seek a lower exercise price for the “no-production” option. This
increases the gap between the investable backer number and the critical cutoff for campaign
success. Thus, unless the product improves substantially because of crowd participation and
feedback, the entrepreneur cannot charge a premium in the post-campaign market but also
expose the “impatient” backers to a higher risk of non-delivery subsequent to a successful
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campaign.
Funding agencies and venture capitalists rely on signals of various kinds to assess the
potential of a new product. Crowdfunding has been shown to be an incentive compatible
mechanism for such estimations. However, as the quality of the signal improves (due to
a higher correlation between the crowdfunding and post-crowdfunding market), it can also
expose backers to a higher risk of delivery failure. This is consequential to policy makers,
regulators and all such agencies who are custodians of ensuring investor protection and safety.
Although new businesses are rife with uncertainties of various sources, the availability of
funds has been the most cited source of failure. The less studied stakeholder is the supplier
which is critical in not only scaling production but offering critical product development
guidance that helps scaling. Often the entrepreneurs design with an outlook to create a niche
in the market. The expertise for Designing for Manufacturing, a field in its own right, comes
with domain knowledge and experience on either side of product development, design and
manufacturing. The entrepreneurial teams although comprised of bright minds may not have
the expertise to study aspects of product design that hinder large scale production or increase
cost. Almost always the first exchange between a supplier and an entrepreneur ends up with
a ‘dose of reality’ which exposes aspects of over-designing that hinder scaling and increase
cost. While changing design is an ongoing process, these initial exchanges are excellent in
retaining the value proposition from the ‘frills.’ A promising area of future research could
be to investigate how the marginal benefit from implementing feedback received from a
crowdfunding campaign trades off against the cost of implementing these changes by the
supplier. Although we assumed that the order to the supplier is the same as the expected
future market size conditional on the outcome of the campaign, studying how the results
change if the “optimal order quantity” is ordered, may be interesting. Furthermore,modelling
reputation cost as consisting of both a fixed and variable component and studying its role
on a platform’s rule of recommendation can be an interesting research direction as well.
The impact of an endogenously determined minimum order size may also give interesting
insights about the risk of delivery failure. We believe that unless the unique risk sources
that new businesses face is incorporated, a comprehensive understanding of why “successful”
campaigns fail to deliver will be at bay.
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4.0 Effect of Seasonality, Sales Growth and Fiscal Year End on the Cash
Conversion Cycle
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC ) measures the duration between a firm’s outgoing and
incoming cash flows. Firms track the CCC metric and employ it as a benchmark since lower
CCC values may signal better operational and credit performance. We develop a typification
of firms based on the processing lead time and credit periods negotiated with suppliers
and customers, and demonstrate how these characteristics interact with sales growth rate,
seasonality and fiscal year end to affect CCC. Based on our analytical models, we hypothesize
that the impact of sales growth rate and the indirect effect of time on CCC can be positive
or negative depending on the firm type. We also identify the crucial role that the demand
pattern in the Zone of Influence, an interval that we define around the fiscal year end, plays
in determining the CCC. We test our hypotheses empirically using a multi-level (random
effect) model and a fixed effect model, where the levels of analyses are the specific firm
types and individual firms respectively. Our results, based on quarterly financial data of 58
firms over a 12-year period, confirm the hypothesized effects of sales growth rate, fiscal year
location and seasonality on CCC. Though frequently used, CCC is thus a nuanced metric
and needs careful interpretation. The findings of the paper are important to facilitate more
accurate longitudinal CCC analyses and benchmarking practices that account for unique
differences in growth rates, location of fiscal year end, and seasonality.
4.1 Introduction
Comparing the performance of large retailers, a Harvard Business Review article (Fox
2014) states that “The key metric of a company’s cash-generating prowess is the cash con-
version cycle.” Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC ) is a pan-organizational measure of efficiency
(Gitman 1974) that measures “the average days required to turn a dollar invested in raw
material into a dollar collected from a customer” (Stewart 1995). Business analysts and
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researchers have used CCC, in conjunction with other metrics, to compare financial and op-
erational performance. When benchmarking performance across firms, a lower CCC value is
considered to imply superior performance. However, this ostensibly obvious implication may
not hold since, as we show, CCC is a highly nuanced metric and requires careful interpreta-
tion. We develop a classification system for firms based on their processing lead times, and
their supplier and customer credit periods. A firm’s type, stemming from this classification,
interacts with Sales Growth Rate (SGR), Seasonality and Fiscal Year End (FYE ) in a com-
plex fashion to affect its CCC. We show that the CCC is affected by the demand pattern
only in a specific time interval around the FYE. The demand pattern outside this interval
is not of any consequence, only the mean demand is. Our results show that the complexity
of the relationship in the underlying factors makes it difficult to estimate intuitively the di-
rection of change in CCC following benchmarking exercises—thereby underscoring the need
for exercising caution when using the CCC metric.
Academics and practitioners have used CCC in many different contexts. For example,
Hendricks et al. (2009) use CCC as a measure of operational slack and show that supply
chain disruptions have a lower impact on stock returns for firms with higher operational
slack. CCC is used in industry as a performance metric to determine senior executive
compensation as demonstrated in DEF 14A statements.1 C-suite executives of Apple, Coca
Cola, PPG Industries, and US Steel have used “Cash Conversion Cycle” in recent analyst
calls to spotlight superior performance.2 The Association of Supply Chain Management
(ASCM) lists CCC as a primary metric for measuring asset management efficiency in the
SCOR model.3 In an ASCM report (Bolstroff 2018), CCC is used to classify firms as
“Laggards” if they have an average CCC that is 73 days higher than “Leaders”. Likewise,
The Hackett Group ranks companies using CCC based on annual fiscal year end data.
Comparing performance using annual CCC data can result in erroneous inference if we
1Firms file proxy statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in advance of
annual meetings. Form DEF 14A (Definitive Proxy Statement) provides key information, including corporate
governance and executive compensation to shareholders.
2Search results by using “Cash Conversion Cycle” in S&P Capital IQ.
3“The Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model provides methodology, and diagnostic and
benchmarking tools that help organizations make dramatic and rapid improvements in supply chain pro-
cesses.” Quote from SCOR Version 12.0 document, 2017. ASCM is the largest association of supply chain
professionals.
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ignore Sales Growth Rate (SGR), Fiscal Year End (FYE ) and Seasonality. For example, the
rankings in the CFO/Hackett Group Working Capital Scorecard may not be valid unless we
account for these factors. Appendix C.4 lists sample quotations with potentially incorrect
comparisons and use of CCC. Next, consider Dell Inc.’s statement from its 2008 Form 424B34
filing (pages 55-56): “. . . our direct model allows us to maintain an efficient cash conversion
cycle, which compares favorably with that of others in our industry.” This favorable inference
is based on a longitudinal CCC comparison (which is also presented in the filing) and may not
be valid if SGR, FYE and Seasonality differ across the comparison set. For instance, Dell’s
FYE is on the Friday nearest January 31 while HP’s FYE is on October 31. Overlooking this
FYE difference can affect our conclusions: In 2008, HP’s CCC was 16 days (about 32%)
lower in January compared to in October (Appendix C.2.1). Dell only presents its own
annual data, and it is not clear if it made such an adjustment for HP and other competitors.
The impact of such inferences can be worsened if a firm makes major policy changes based
on CCC benchmarking. For example, in 2013 PG increased the credit period extended to its
suppliers from 45 days to 75 days (Esty et al. 2016, Goel and Wohl 2013, Strom 2015) to level
its payment terms with industry peers and improve CCC. A major competitor, Unilever has
its FYE on December 31 while P&G has its FYE on June 30. To benchmark accurately, we
must compute PG’s CCC on December 31. But this change increases the difference between
P&G’s actual and targeted CCC by 13 to 20 days during the 2012 – 2014 period (Appendix
C.8).
We study how processing (inventory) lead time,5 credit extended by suppliers and to
customers interact with SGR, Seasonality and FYE to affect CCC. Our motivation for se-
lecting these factors, among others that affect CCC, is twofold. First, the balance sheet
measures used in computing CCC depend on demand (we assume demand equals sales)
that is determined by SGR, Seasonality, FYE, processing lead time and the credit periods.
Second, together, these factors span firm-specific, supply chain, and industry characteristics.
A firm’s credit policies depend on its industry, procurement and sales strategies, and supply
4Firms file Form 424B3 as a supplement for clarifications and updates to a firm’s initial prospectus.
5For a manufacturer, the “processing (inventory) lead time” is the total time for manufacturing an item,
and for a retailer, it is the total time that an item is held in inventory. We refer to this time as processing
lead time.
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chain bargaining power exercised through contractual terms negotiated with suppliers and
customers. The processing lead time depends on factors such as supply chain and compet-
itive strategies, manufacturing technology, inventory policy, and operational performance.
The FYE determination depends on tax implications, auditor advice, seasonality, strategic
reasons (e.g., optimal time to announce financial results), cadence for new product launches,
etc. These factors are not easily changeable. For example, a firm may not be able to change
its credit terms unilaterally if its customer or supplier wields more power in the supply chain
relationship. Even when the firm is the dominant player, extending (shortening) payment
terms for a supplier (customer) can weaken the supply chain. The relationship between these
factors is complex—a firm may not be able to account simultaneously for its credit policies,
processing lead time, SGR, FYE, and Seasonality when analyzing CCC values longitudinally
or benchmarking with competitors. Our goal is to understand this relationship better.
We typify firms based on the processing lead time, and supplier and customer credit
periods, and study the effect of a change in SGR on CCC by its Firm Type. Our analysis of
a stylized demand pattern helps characterize the compound effect of FYE, Seasonality and
SGR on CCC. This analysis helps develop our hypotheses. We also demonstrate that the
balance sheet components of CCC depend on sales in only a subset of the fiscal cycle, which
we call the Zone of Influence (ZoI ). The ZoI is determined by the FYE location, processing
lead time, and supplier and customer credit policies. Sales variability or growth outside of
ZoI does not affect CCC, only the mean annual sales does.
To validate our hypotheses, we build two empirical models that differ in their level of
analyses. The first model aggregates firms by their type and controls for the random effect
of firms in the sample, while the second model investigates the fixed effect of firm while
controlling for types. Since the type of a firm may change over the long run, both models
allow for this change to occur for all firms during the period of analysis. Our results, based
on data from 58 firms over a 12-year period, show how SGR, FYE, Seasonality influence
CCC values. These factors can improve or worsen the CCC depending on the firm type and
ZoI. Thus, even though these factors may be unchangeable in the short run, neglecting to
incorporate them can lead to flawed recommendations and misguided managerial initiatives.
We suggest improvements in the interpretation and use of CCC.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. We review the literature in Section 4.2 and
model the components of CCC in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 develops our hypotheses based
on the analysis of different stylized demand patterns and Section 4.5 discusses the empirical
validation of our hypotheses. In Section 4.6, we conclude with some managerial implications
of our work. Appendix C.3 provides the proofs of the propositions, and additional details
about the empirical analysis.
4.2 Literature Review
Although CCC is used frequently in practice (e.g., Appendix C.4 for a sampling of
company statements) to gauge firm performance, academic research on CCC is limited.
Farris and Hutchison (2002) show that a focus on CCC reduction drives firms to achieve
better supply chain performance both within and outside a firm’s boundaries. Using data
from a Brazilian company, Zeidan and Shapir (2017) show that CCC management increases
shareholder value. In the context of a firm’s ability to recover from supply chain disrup-
tions, Hendricks et al. (2009) use CCC as a proxy for operational slack: Firms with higher
CCC have higher operational slack. They show that firms with greater operational slack
have a less negative stock market reaction to supply chain disruptions as measured by the
two-day cumulative abnormal return. Wang (2019) shows that a zero-investment portfolio
constructed by buying stocks of firms with low CCC, and shorting stocks of firms with high
CCC, earns a positive return beyond what is explained by traditional asset pricing models.
A firm’s efforts to decrease only its own CCC may result in suboptimal decision making
from a supply chain perspective. Hutchison et al. (2009) study the benefits of transferring
inventory to a “low-cost-of-capital” stage and extending favorable credit terms as a way of
improving supply chain profitability. They show how supply chain profitability can increase
despite an increase in the CCC. Hofmann and Kotzab (2010) investigate supply chains from
a single firm and collective chain perspective. They suggest that improvements in CCC
from a single company’s perspective may not add value to the overall supply chain because
a powerful focal firm may derive all benefits of the WC improvements in the supply chain.
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These papers overlook how SGR, Seasonality and FYE affect CCC.
WC is a related liquidity measure and has been studied more extensively than CCC
(we show the two metrics differ in Appendix C.7). For example, studies of misspecification
and measurement error in total accruals to detect earnings management (Dechow 1994,
Dechow et al. 1995) control for sales growth. McNichols and Wilson (1988), and Jones
(1991) introduce models which have become the standard for testing hypotheses in earnings
management. These early papers use total accruals as the dependent variable and one-
period lagged sales to control for sales growth. We use CCC as the dependent variable while
using quarterly dummy variables for seasonality and a long-term time index to account for
trend. Dechow et al. (1998) use a stochastic random walk demand primitive to explain
negative serial correlation in cash flow change. Like them, we develop our hypotheses by
using a demand primitive and develop an analytical expression for CCC. We find that SGR
interacts with the processing lead time and credit periods to either decrease or increase CCC.
Categorizing firms based on the processing lead time relative to the values of credit periods
extended to suppliers and customers, we find the sensitivity of CCC to a change in SGR for
each Firm Type. Classifying firms in this way, we posit that serial correlation in operating
cash flow (Dechow et al. (1998)) is also affected by the credit and inventory policies of a firm.
The cost of inventory, receivables and payables depend on the credit terms with suppliers
and customers, the demand pattern and location of the fiscal year end. The inventory and
credit policies define the interval, Zone of Influence, around the fiscal year end. Under a mild
restriction, we find that the demand pattern only in this interval affects the value of CCC ;
the demand pattern outside of the interval is inconsequential as long as the mean annual
demand is held constant.
Some papers (Banker and Chen 2006, Banker et al. 2015) find that changes in WC result
from backward- and forward-looking sales. This leads to correlation in accruals. Collins
et al. (2017) use a four-period (instead of one-period) lagged sales measure to account for
sales growth and seasonality. In line with the critique of the assumption of uniform accrual
generating process by Dopuch et al. (2012), our basis for the classification of Firm Type
accommodates for heterogeneity in credit and inventory policies, both temporally and cross-
sectionally across firms for benchmarking. While these papers use various controls for sales
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growth, none model (and test) the interaction of differing credit policies and processing
lead time across firms at a granular level. Moreover, even though WC and CCC are both
liquidity measures, we can show that they can move in opposite directions for the same firm,
necessitating an independent investigation of CCC.
Frankel et al. (2017) study the impact of managerial compensation on abnormal WC
reductions by considering inconsistent seasonal patterns (firms with lowest sales in Q4) in
different sub-samples to test their hypotheses. In contrast, we investigate the variation
in seasonality to show how seasonality, sales growth rate, and FYE interact. An implicit
assumption in Frankel et al. (2017) is that sensitivity of WC change does not depend on
the Firm Type. We postulate and validate the direction in which CCC will change for
firms of different types and sales growth rates. Some companies (Facebook, US Steel, etc.)
that use CCC as a metric for performance evaluation and executive compensation, must be
cognizant of the degree to which Seasonality and FYE differences affect CCC. Otherwise,
factors unrelated to managerial performance may confound employee appraisals.
Conducting a thorough literature review and discussing different measures of earnings
quality, Dechow et al. (2010) emphasize that the decision context is as important as the
metric under study. Given CCC ’s use for efficiency measurements, and performance and
investment analysis, its vulnerability to misinterpretation increases. Pointing to the difficulty
of comparing financial ratios, Lev and Sunder (1979) highlight non-linearities that may be
induced due to differences in size and presence of an intercept term in the denominator. Our
analysis extends this observation and we submit that Sales Growth Rate, Seasonality, and
Fiscal Year End interact with the processing lead time and credit policies to affect the CCC
metric. By explicitly modeling the factors that can distort interpretation of the CCC metric,
our research alerts CCC users and empirical researchers in both operations management and
accounting.
Specifically, the research objectives of this paper are to:
1. Highlight the complicated interaction between Sales Growth Rate, Seasonality, and Fiscal
Year End and its effect on CCC.
2. Construct an analytical model to hypothesize the directional impact of the above factors
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on CCC, and test the hypotheses empirically, and
3. Propose the concept of Zone of Influence, formulate it as a function of the processing time
and credit policies, and investigate its role in quantifying the components that comprise
CCC.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the effect of idiosyncratic
characteristics such as Sales Growth Rate, Seasonality, and Fiscal Year End on CCC by
classifying firms based on their credit periods and processing lead time. Specifically, we
determine the directional impact of these factors on CCC. We contend that a lack of context
in using CCC can lead to misinterpretations and append important subtleties to the “lower
CCC value is better” creed.
4.3 Model and Notation
In this section, we model CCC and its components. To keep our analytical model
tractable, we consider a single product, and assume that demand is deterministic and equals
sales. Our model applies to both manufacturers (who procure raw materials and compo-
nents for processing) and retailers (who procure finished goods to sell). We assume that
the manufacturer follows a just-in-time procurement and processing strategy, acquiring the
components right when needed, and shipping the finished products as soon as the process-
ing is complete. Retailers buy the finished goods and maintain pipeline inventory at their
distribution centers and retail stores. Suppliers and company personnel (e.g., employees and
sub-contractors) extend “credit” to the firm for the same duration, ls. Likewise, the credit
extended to all customers, lc, is the same. These assumptions can be relaxed.
Let f (t) denote sales at time t and T the duration (in days) of a fiscal year (FY). The




if r denotes the product’s unit selling price, the annual sales revenue is rDτ+T . The Cost of
Goods Sold for the FYE at τ+T , COGSτ+T is the sum of the component and processing costs
incurred during the year. Let c be the purchase cost per unit (raw material or component cost
77
for a manufacturer; finished good cost for a retailer). Let v be processing cost per unit per
time period, which consists of direct labor, direct overhead, and indirect allocated overhead,
distribution and holding cost components.6 Since the processing activity at a retailer is
limited, v for a retailer may have only the holding and distribution cost components. Thus,
v may be small relative to c. We assume that v remains constant during lp, the “processing”
lead time; lp corresponds to the processing lead time for a manufacturer and to the time for
which finished goods are held in inventory for a retailer. Thus, COGSτ+T = (c+ vlp)Dτ+T .
The CCC (in days) for a FYE at time τ + T is CCCτ+T = DSOτ+T + DIOτ+T −
DPOτ+T where DSOτ+T is the Days of Sales Outstanding, DIOτ+T is the Days of Inventory
Outstanding, and DPOτ+T is the Days of Payables Outstanding measured at time τ+T (see,
for example, Gordon et al. (2019)). Next, we derive the expressions of these components.
Appendix C.5 summarizes our notation. For convenience, we assume that the parameters
ls, lc and lp are bounded below by zero and bounded above by the fiscal year duration T .
We permit them to change during the year as long as they do not affect the computation of
DSOt +DIOt−DPOt at t = τ , τ + T . To avoid special cases, we also assume that τ ≥ T
in the development below.
4.3.1 Days of Sales Outstanding
Let ARt denote the accounts receivables at time t, and lc denote the credit period that the
firm grants to its customers. Then, the average of the accounts receivables at the beginning










t=τ+T−lc f(t)dt. The Days of Sales Outstanding is computed by dividing
this average by the sales for the FY ending at τ + T , and multiplying by T to covert the
sales outstanding into days. Thus, the Days of Sales Outstanding for a FY ending at time








6We assume that allocated indirect overhead includes any fixed costs and depreciation expenses relating
to plant and machinery. We can relax this assumption if fixed costs are expensed rather than capitalized
into inventory.
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4.3.2 Days of Inventory Outstanding
The inventory at time t is the work-in-process (for a manufacturer) or the finished goods
procured (for a retailer) in the interval (t− lp, t). The inventory cost at time t, ICt is
the sum of component procurement and processing costs. A just-in-time strategy implies
that all procurement is done for sales arising lp periods later. Hence, the procurement
cost component of ICτ is c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt. For modeling purposes, we assume that the unit
processing per time period, v does not vary with the stage of processing (this assumption
can be relaxed). Thus, a unit that spends t days (where t ≤ lp) in inventory contributes vt
to the processing cost. Since all procurement is done for sales arising lp periods later, the
total processing cost at time τ is v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ))f(t)dt and the total inventory cost at
time τ is ICτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt + v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt. This expression also applies
to a retailer, except that the processing cost component, v may be zero or small relative









4.3.3 Days of Payable Outstanding
The accounts payable at time t, APt is the sum of amounts outstanding for purchases
and processing done during the period from t− ls to t. We assume that payments are made
on their due date. Thus, the accounts payable at time τ is:
APτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt+v
[∫ τ+lp
t=τ+max(lp−ls,0) (lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt+ lp
∫ τ
t=τ+min(lp−ls,0) f (t) dt
]
.
The first term in this expression is the amount due at time τ to the suppliers for all pur-
chases. The lp term in the integral limits of the first term arises because purchases are made
for demand lp periods into the future. The ls term in the lower limit of the integral accounts
for the credit granted by the supplier. The second and the third terms account for the pro-
cessing cost incurred on work in progress (WIP) and finished products respectively. When
lp > ls, none of the parts procured from τ− ls to τ completes the production cycle. Thus, the
payables relating to the processing cost payables are only on account of WIP. However, when
lp ≤ ls the processing cost is due to both WIP and finished products. The processing cost for
finished products is vlp multiplied by the quantity of finished products made; this is the third
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component in the expression for APτ . Notice that the third component becomes zero when
lp > ls. A similar argument applies when the firm is a retailer. We can now express Days of








4.4 Development of Hypotheses
In this section, we investigate factors that affect a firm’s CCC and develop our hypothe-
ses. Section 4.4.1 considers the effect of SGR and Firm Type on CCC, where Firm Type
depends on lc, lp and ls. For convenience, we refer to lc, lp and ls, collectively, as “Operating
Policy.” Section 4.4.2 studies the effect of Time on CCC, and Section 4.4.3 investigates the
interaction of SGR and FYE on CCC. Appendix C.3 provides the proofs of the propositions
in this section.
4.4.1 Effect of Sales Growth Rate and Firm Type on CCC
We say that a firm’s inventory performance is high (low) when lp is low (high) relative to
ls and lc. We use inventory performance as the basis for categorizing firms into the following
four Firm Types: High (H) when lp < ls − lc, Medium-High (MH) when ls − lc ≤ lp < ls,
Medium-Low (ML) when ls ≤ lp ≤ ls + lc and Low (L) when lp > ls + lc. We say that a firm
is operationally efficient when lp < ls− lc, i.e., its inventory performance is high, and it is of
Firm Type H. If a firm of this type has constant demand, suppliers fund its WC needs and
the CCC is negative. For Firm Types MH, ML and L, CCC is nonnegative when demand
is constant. To discretize the firm types, we choose the four intervals as stated because the
intervals depend on a comparison of an operational performance metric (lp) with two credit
period metrics (ls and lc).
To estimate the effect of SGR on CCC, we assume a linear demand form, f (t) = α+βt,
where α is a constant, t denotes Time, and β denotes the SGR. Figure 4.1 summarizes the
sensitivity of CCC to changes in growth rate, where the threshold Γ(c, v, lp, lc, ls) equals
−3c (lc + ls − lp) (lc − ls + lp) + v
{




Proposition 4.1. The sensitivity of CCC to changes in SGR for a linear demand form,
f (t) = α + βt, depends on Firm Type as summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Sensitivity of CCC to change in SGR for a linear demand form
As the growth rate (β) increases, CCC increases for Firm Type H, decreases for Firm
Types MH and ML, and may increase or decrease depending on the value of the threshold
Γ for Firm Type L.
Interpretation: An increase in SGR, β increases the value of the snapshot measures:
receivables, payables and inventory. However, since the flow measures, Sales and COGS,
also change as β changes, the change in the components of CCC is not obvious. The proof
of Proposition 4.1 shows that DSO always decreases as β increases, but the difference DIO
– DPO may increase or decrease depending on the firm type. Therefore, CCC can increase
or decrease as β increases. For example, when lp ≥ ls, DIO – DPO always increases with
β, but the net effect of increasing β on CCC depends on whether the decrease in DSO is
greater or less than the increase in DIO – DPO. An incomplete analysis might attribute a
decrease in CCC to managerial action rather than to an increase in the sales growth rate for
Firm Type MH or ML. Thus, analysts might overstate the effect of managerial action when
a lower CCC is observed. For Type L firms (that is, firms with lp > ls + lc), the impact of
an increase in sales growth rate on CCC depends on the purchase cost, c and the processing
cost, v in addition to the Operating Policy (lc, lp, and ls). This effect on CCC depends on
threshold Γ, which captures the interaction of the Operating Policy and the cost parameters
(c, v). As a special instance, when v is relatively small compared to c (as is likely the case for
retailers), Γ > 0 and the impact of an increase in SGR on CCC is positive. In other words,
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for firms with a sufficiently long processing lead time, lp and relatively small processing cost,
v, an increase in β will increase CCC.
As an example, Target (TGT) and Walmart (WMT) are of the same Firm Type (L) but
TGT grew faster than WMT between 2006 and 2012. If we assume that the processing cost
(v) is negligible for both retailers, i.e., Γ > 0, Proposition 4.1 suggests that TGT’s increase in
CCC will be higher than that of WMT’s. We observe this in the empirical results presented
in Section 4.5. WMT’s management, comparing its lower CCC change to TGT’s, might
overstate the effect of its improvement initiatives. Likewise, if TGT were to benchmark its
CCC with WMT’s, it should increase the reported CCC values of WMT as WMT grew
at a lower rate. Any implications based on CCC comparisons across firms (e.g., as in Fox,
2014) must be done with utmost caution. Even if firms have comparable growth rates, any
inter-firm differences in CCC changes will be confounded by Firm Type. We remark that the
Operating Policy (lc, lp and ls), especially lp is unobservable. In our hypothesis validation,
we use DSO, DIO, and DPO respectively for these parameters as approximations. DSO,
DIO, and DPO are available for publicly held companies and can be used by analysts for
classifying firms. Finally, we note that Proposition 4.1 holds when there is no seasonality.
Section 4.4.3 studies the effect of a secular demand form with seasonality on CCC. This
analysis motivates the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.1. A change in sales growth rate, (β), affects CCC. The direction of change
in CCC depends on the Firm Type as defined in Proposition 4.1.
4.4.2 Mediation Effect of Time through Sales on CCC
Even when Sales does not exhibit any seasonality, and has just a secular trend, CCC
may change with time for two reasons. First, there may be a direct effect of Time due
to, say, longitudinal industry-wide changes such as a collective push for increasingly faster
payments by suppliers, quicker billing due to the introduction of progressively improving
technology platforms, or introduction of modern supply chain finance methods. For example,
blockchain technologies can help mitigate trade friction (Cong and He, 2019), and thus
accelerate cash flow. Second, as Sales itself changes over time, it may induce an indirect
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effect on CCC because Sales influences COGS, DIO, DPO and DSO. This indirect (that is,
mediated through Sales) effect of Time on CCC may occur even when Sales is not seasonal.
Not accounting for the mediated effect of Time on CCC might distort the estimates for the
direct effect of time. To formally test for the mediated effect of Time on CCC through Sales,
we state Hypothesis 4.2; Appendix C.3.2 provides additional details.
Hypothesis 4.2. Time affects CCC both directly and indirectly, that is, mediated through
Sales. The mediated effect of Time on CCC through Sales depends on the Firm Type.
Implication: For analyzing longitudinal performance improvements, firms compute and
report CCC values over time. Hypothesis 4.2 states that even when a firm’s Operating Policy
(lc, ls, lp), processing and procurement costs (v, c), and growth rate remain unchanged, and
there is no direct effect of Time, CCC may change due to the mediated effect of Time
through Sales. This effect depends on the company’s Firm Type which is defined by its
Operating Policy. Specifically, for a Type H firm, (Type MH and ML firms), an increase
in Sales increases (decreases) CCC.
4.4.3 Effect of Fiscal Year End and Seasonality on CCC
We now discuss the effect of Seasonality and FYE location on CCC. We assume that the
Operating Policy remains unchanged in the short term. Consider the intervals [τ − lc, τ +max (ls, lp)]
and [τ + T − lc, τ + T +max (ls, lp)]. Only the demand patterns in these intervals affect the
CCC metric for a FYE at time τ +T . The demand pattern during the rest of the year does
not affect CCC, only the mean annual demand does. The reason for this observation follows
from our computation of DSO, DPO, and DPO in Section 4.3. Therefore, we refer to each
of these intervals as the Zone(s) of Influence (ZoI ). Figure 4.1 shows the ZoI at time τ .
Figure 4.1: Timeline for the Zone of Influence (ZoI ) relative to a Fiscal Year Ending at τ .
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We assume that the demand pattern in the ZoI around τ is the same as the demand
pattern in the ZoI around τ + T . Thus, the comments below analogously apply to the ZoI
around τ + T , and we suppress the subscript T . We partition the ZoI around τ into the
intervals [τ − lc, τ ] and [τ, τ +max (ls, lp)]. The demand in the region [τ, τ +max (ls, lp)]
affects payables (AP τ ) and cost of inventory (ICτ ) while the demand in the region [τ − lc, τ)
affects the receivables (ARτ ). When lp > ls, the difference ICτ − AP τ increases as mean
annual demand in the region [τ, τ + lp] increases and so does DIOτ −DPOτ . Keeping the
customer credit period lc constant, CCCτ increases as average demand increases. However,
when lp < ls (Firm Types MH and H), an increase in mean demand in the region [τ, τ + ls]
reduces DIOτ −DPOτ and therefore CCC.
Proposition 4.2 compares the CCC values for two identical firms (i.e., firms with the
same demand pattern, Operating Policy, and cost structure (v, c)). Firm i has its FYE at
τi, i = 1, 2. The demand function has a step (up or down) at τ1 while the demand in the
ZoI around τ2 is constant. Let da, db, du be three constants where du is the average demand






Proposition 4.2. Let the demand function in the ZoI around τ1 be characterized by
{f1 (t) = db, t : τ1 − lc ≤ t ≤ τ1} and {f1 (t) = da, t : τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ1 +max (ls, lp)}, and the de-
mand around τ2 be characterized by {f2 (t) = du, t : τ2 − lc ≤ t ≤ τ2 +max (ls, lp)}. For two
firms that are identical in all respects except that Firm i has its FYE at τi, the relation-
ship between their CCC values, CCCτ1 and CCCτ2 respectively, is as summarized in Table
2. Furthermore, with a stepped demand, CCCτ1 increases if either demand contributing to
receivables (db) or payables (da) increases as a proportion of mean annual demand.
Interpretation: When benchmarking CCC, analysts and firms may fail to mention the
effect of differing FYE (e.g., Fox, 2014). This omission can lead to erroneous interpretations
as FYE and seasonality interact to affect the demand in the ZoI which in turn affects
the CCC as indicated in Proposition 4.2. For example, when comparing CCC values of
AMZN and COST, analysts must account for the difference in their FYE and Seasonality.
AMZN’s FYE is on December 31, and COST’s on August 31. AMZNs sales in January
are lower than the sales in December, and because of this step function, AMZN’s FYE will
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Table 4.2: Sensitivity of CCC to a change in FYE location
correspond to τ1 in the model above. For AMZN, lp < ls, and since the mean annual demand
is in between the December and January demands, AMZN’s demand pattern corresponds
to case min (db, da) < du < max (db, da). COST has lower variation in demand around
its FYE of August 31. Therefore, COST’s FYE corresponds to τ2 in the model above.
Since COST’s Operating Policy also satisfies lp < ls, AMZN has a lower CCC on account
of its stepped demand at its FYE (i.e., CCCτ1 < CCCτ2). We validate this observation
empirically in Section 4.5 and show that the increase in CCC can be substantial. If differences
in FYE s across firms are not accounted for, then any rankings based on CCC (e.g., The
Hackett Group, cfo.com) may be incorrect. A firm’s CCC might be lower due to a favorable
demand pattern in the ZoI rather than due to its overall performance. Managers must
exercise caution when benchmarking their company performance with the performance at
other companies using the CCC metric if seasonality during the ZoI is high. Otherwise, their
conclusions might only be the result of legacy (the fiscal cycle the firm follows). Indeed, the
CCC values may be misleading and potential opportunities for improvement may be missed.
Furthermore, executive compensation, if tied to the performance along the CCC metric,
might incentivize managers to act in their own self-interest and manage only the ZoI factors
that affect CCC. As Frankel et al. (2017) mention, various studies (Oyer 1998, Bushee 1998,
Levy and Shalev 2017) have documented inefficient managerial action to achieve temporarily
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better financial figures. Such actions are indeed short-sighted and harbor classical agency
problems.
Proposition 4.2 also applies if a firm facing the demand pattern as described above were
to switch its FYE from τ1 to τ2.
Corollary 4.1 shows that their CCC values are the same if the demand pattern in the
respective ZoI s for the two firms is constant.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose two identical firms have FYEs at τ1 and τ2 respectively. Suppose fur-
ther that the demand pattern in the ZoI for Firm 1 is {f (t) = d1, t : τ1 − lc ≤ t ≤ τ1 +max (ls, lp)}
and for Firm 2 is {f (t) = d2, t : τ2 − lc ≤ t ≤ τ2 +max (ls, lp)}. Then the CCC values for
the two firms evaluated at their FYEs are equal, that is CCCτ1 = CCCτ2 even if d1 and d2
are different.
Interpretation: The corollary illustrates the difference between WC and CCC. Al-
though, the WC could be higher, lower or the same for the firm with the higher demand, the
CCC values for both firms are equal when the demand is constant during their respective
Zones of Influence. Proposition 4.2 along with Corollary 4.1 leads us to hypothesize the
effect of FYE ending and Seasonality on CCC.
Hypothesis 4.3. The change in CCC increases as seasonality in Sales during the ZoI
increases. When Sales has low seasonality, changing FYE does not significantly change
CCC.
This model helps understand how the seasonality in the ZoI affects CCC. We explore
this concept further using a stylized demand which has both trend and seasonality in Section
4.4.3.1.
4.4.3.1 CCC for Demand with Seasonality and Secular Trend .
We now investigate how Seasonality, FYE and SGR affect CCC. Since demand in the ZoI
has a crucial impact on CCC, and the ZoI duration is typically shorter than a business cycle
duration, we do not incorporate the cyclical component of demand. We assume an additive
demand model with trend and seasonality defined by f (t) = α+βt+St where α is the base
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demand, and βt and St are respectively the secular trend and the seasonal components of
demand at time t. First, we set SGR (β) to zero and vary only the seasonality component
keeping the total demand in the fiscal year constant. We then analyze the situation which
has both positive SGR (β > 0) and Seasonality. A stylized demand form helps us change
seasonality, and generate more wide-ranging seasonality patterns than the one in Section
4.4.2. We first model a demand function with only the seasonal component by a piece-wise
linear function that repeats every T days. Figure 4.2 depicts the seasonal demand pattern.
Figure 4.2: Seasonal Demand form f(t)
Let t0 denote the beginning and t7 = T the end of the FY. Let b denote the base level
of sales, and δu1,δd and δu2 denote the rates of increase and decrease of demand in the
periods [t1, t2], [t3, t4], and [t5, t6] respectively. Appendix C.3 gives the functional form of
the sales. This demand function is very flexible. By changing the values of ti ( i = 0, 1, .., 7),
δu1,−δd and δu2, we can change the duration and the extent of seasonality. We assume
T = t7 − t0 = 360 days. For our illustration, the values of (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7) are (0,
90, 150, 180, 210, 240, 330, 360) days respectively. Also, since we want f(t) ≥ 0, we need
b + δu (t2 − t1 )− δd (t4 − t3) ≥ 0, that is, b ≥ δu (t6 − t5) assuming δu1 = δu2 = δu. Along
the lines of (Rajagopalan 2013) we define Seasonality Index as SI = max f(t) −min f(t)
min f(t)
, t ∈
ti, i = 0, 1, . . . , 7. We study the CCC values for this demand function by altering the SI
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while keeping the total demand invariant. While the annual demand remains the same, the
seasonality indices of the demand forms vary. We studied 22 seasonality indices ranging
from 0 to 45. Only two of these demand patterns, relevant for the discussion, are given in
Appendix C.4.
Table 4.2 shows the effect of seasonality and FYE for β = 0 and β = 2.5 respectively.
The parameter values are T = 360, c = $20, v = $1, p = $125, lm = 60 days, lc = 30 days,
ls = 30 days, and annual demand=45000 units. When t0 corresponds to the end of December,
t1, t3 and t5 correspond to the end of March, June and September. We observe that both SI
and FYE affect the CCC values, and increasing seasonality magnifies the difference in CCC
values. An increase in seasonality may either increase or decrease the CCC depending on
the FYE. For example, when the FYE is on June, increasing the SI increases CCC. Thus,
a firm with a SI of 0.42 will have a CCC of 56.48 days when compared to a firm with a SI
of 0.11 and CCC of 51.03 days (an increase of more than 10%). In this case, even though
the firms adopt the same credit policy and have the same process lead times, an analyst
may infer that the firm with the higher SI has worse operational efficiency. The situation
is reversed when the FYE is on September. With this FYE, firms with higher seasonality
indices have a lower CCC.
The difference between CCC of firms having the same SI but different FYE s (June and
September) may be high or low. For example, the difference in CCC values at a seasonality
of 0.11 is 4.1 days (51.03 – 46.98) as compared to 13.8 days (56.48 – 42.72) at a seasonality
of 0.42. The magnitude of the difference depends on which FYE ’s are compared. When
the supplier credit period increases to 90 days, the difference in CCC either due to different
FYE s or seasonality reduces. In this analysis, expressions from Section 4.3 but compute
them monthly.
Analysis: With seasonal demand, we see that changing the FYE affects demand in the
ZoI. Even when two firms have the same total annual demand and Operating Policy, their
CCC values may not be equal. Demand at t3 and t5 (Figure 4.2) corresponds to the maximum
and minimum demand in the fiscal cycle. We vary the seasonality index by increasing the
maximum demand and reducing the minimum demand so that max f(t)−min f(t)
min f(t)
increases. For
the chosen Operating Policy, this translates into average inventory being more than average
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Table 4.3: Change in CCC with Seasonality and FYE.
Demand with β = 0 Demand with β = 2.5
payables and implies exceeds DPO. When the FYE is at t3 and seasonality increases the
difference in DIO and DPO also increases. In other words, the difference in DIO and DPO
is higher for FYE at t3 than at t5. For the specific example, Sales (and accounts receivables)
at FYE t3 are consistently higher than Sales (and accounts receivables) at FYE t5. An
increase in Seasonality increases the difference in Sales (and accounts receivables) at t3 and
t5. Combining these observations, we find that the change in CCC is higher for FYE at
t3 than at t5. The time points t3 and t5 correspond to end of June and September in the
specific example used (refer Figure C.1). This explains the increase in difference of CCC
values with an increase in seasonality. The effect of seasonality is less pronounced when the
ZoI does not include either the minimum or the maximum demand during the fiscal year,
such as when FYE is at time t1.
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4.5 Empirical Analysis
The CCC metric unifies three fundamental areas of business and supply chains: procure-
ment, operations, and sales. A lower CCC represents ‘faster’ cash recovery and operational
leanness. While operational efficiency is an important factor driving CCC, different growth
rates, FYE s and seasonality confound the “lower CCC is better” rationale. We model CCC
as a variable dependent on Sales, Time, FirmType and FYE. Since firm policy (lc, lp and
ls) is unobservable, we use DSO, DIO and DPO values as surrogates to classify firms into
the categories defined in Figure 4.1. Companies do not report monthly balance sheet data;
hence, we conduct our analysis by calendar quarters. If a FYE does not coincide with a
calendar quarter, we shift it to the nearest calendar quarter end for our analysis. To validate
our hypotheses, we build an aggregate-level model (at Firm Type level) and a firm-level
model. We use the guidelines of Green and Tukey (1960) to make the distinction between
fixed and random effects. We treat the variable Firm Types as fixed because it has a finite
number of levels with all levels represented in the sample. The firms are from a larger pop-
ulation and therefore their idiosyncratic effects are random. We investigate the mediating
effect of Sales on CCC. We also allow Time to have both a direct and an indirect effect on
CCC. Figure 4.3 depicts the relationships.
Figure 4.3: Factors Influencing CCC
Dataset: For the aggregate level analysis, we identified six industries with SIC codes
3663 (Radio and Television Broadcasting and Communications Equipment), 5311 (Depart-
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ment Stores), 5331 (Variety Stores), 5912 (Drug and Proprietary Stores), 5940 (Sporting
Goods Stores) and 5961 (Catalog and Mail-order Housing) to test our hypotheses. We used
Quarterly financial results on Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, Inventory, COGS
and Sales for 12 years (2006-2017) from the Wharton Compustat Database. The industries
chosen comprise highly seasonal (Retail) and low seasonality (Drug and Proprietary Stores)
firms. One important criterion in selecting industries was to ensure enough firms that did
not have their FY endings at the end of calendar quarters; there were 21 such firms in our
sample (Table C.11). We dropped firms which did not have all 12 years of data, had outliers
with abrupt jumps in Sales and those which changed their FY endings. A total of 10 firms
were removed from the analysis using these criteria (Table C.12). Note that we did not
delete firms for which the Firm Type changed over time so that we could investigate the
effect of change in Firm Type. There were four missing values for Sales which were replaced
by the average sales of the last four quarters. The resulting sample consisted of 58 firms
(Table C.12) in the six industries mentioned earlier. Costco (COST) which remained as the
only firm in SIC 5399 was included in SIC 5311. We calculated the components: DSO, DIO
and DPO by taking average of receivables, inventory and payables at the start and end of
the calendar quarter and dividing by the sum of the previous four quarters’ Sales (for DSO)
and COGS (for DIO and DPO). From the DSO, DIO and DPO values, we computed CCC
for each calendar quarter. For example, AMZN’s FYE is on December 31. We computed
AMZN’s CCC with December 31 as the year end, but also computed its CCC on March
31, June 30 and September 30 to understand the effect a change in AMZN’s FYE might
have. We replicated these quarterly calculations for all firms (58), for each of the 12 years,
resulting in a dataset with 2784 observations. The summary statistics of the firms in the
sample are available in Appendix C.11.
To validate our findings at the firm level, we considered a subsample of seven general
retailers (SIC codes 5311, 5331, 5940 and 5961) and three pharmaceutical retailers (SIC
code 5912). We selected the retail sector for several reasons. First, sales for some firms (e.g.,
department stores) in this sector demonstrate significant seasonality. Second, companies in
the retail sector have experienced different growth rates. For example, AMZN’s sales have
grown at a higher rate than its competitors over the last decade, while sales of Sears have
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seen a decline. Finally, the firms have different FY endings. These observations indicate that
using this sample as a test bench facilitates empirical validation of our findings regarding
Seasonality, SGR and FYE in Section 4.4. The pharmaceutical firms are characterized by
very low seasonal fluctuations and serve as a contrast to the highly seasonal (general) retail
firms.
4.5.1 Model Specification and Analysis
We now describe Models AL and FL qualitatively before presenting their technical de-
tails. Model AL incorporates both fixed and random effects of Firm Type. The fixed effect
accounts for Firm Type heterogeneity in the sample, while the random effect accounts for
heterogeneity of Firm Type excluded from the sample.7 Observe that the effect of Sales on
CCC may be due to a fixed sensitivity by Firm Type or by random sensitivity by Firm.
Therefore, Model AL includes Sales in both the fixed effect and the random effect compo-
nents. Since Firm Type changed for more than half of the firms in our sample, the distinction
between random Firm level controls and fixed Firm Type controls is necessary to validate
Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2. Model FL estimates firm-specific sensitivity to a change in SGR
by incorporating fixed controls for firms. Using these fixed controls allow us to study the
effect of interactions of Firm with Sales and FYE changes. These models help us validate all
three Hypotheses at the Firm level over the 12-year horizon. Both models include a term for
macro-economic shocks. Superscripts A and F respectively denote the coefficients (unless
unique) used in Models AL and FL.
4.5.1.1 Aggregate Level Analysis (Model AL) . To study the impact of SGR by
Firm Type on CCC, we use a random-effects model. We specify the Model AL below with an
explanation of the Dependent, Independent and Control Variables. We follow the convention






A + [θAi +Qitη
A
i + γiSit + tβ
A
i ] + εit
7We use the term fixed and random effect to mean, respectively, variation on account of subjects within
the sample, and on account of variation from subjects which are not a part of the sample.
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In this model, the index i denotes the firm and t is a time index ranging from 1 to 48 quarters.
The dependent variable CCCit is the Cash Conversion Cycle of firm i at time t. ∆
A is the
fixed intercept. The choice of independent variables is motivated by the need to separate
aggregate sensitivity of CCC to Sales Growth by Firm Type and sensitivity to firm level
characteristics such as FYE. In Model AL, the fixed effect part comprises the interaction
of Firm Type with Sales and Time while controlling for macroeconomic shocks by year. A
change in the credit or operational policies affects lc, ls or lp that may change the FirmType
over the twelve-year horizon. We used Firm Type H as the reference; the variable Pit is
a row vector of size three corresponding to MH, ML and L. This vector takes a value 1
corresponding to the specific Firm Type of firm i in period t and is 0 otherwise. The vector




L ) measures the effect of Firm Type. The interaction
of Sales by FirmType SitPit, allows us to capture the sensitivities of CCC to Sales by













L ). A year specific control Tit controls for year-specific shocks which
are measured by the vector π (which is a row vector of size 12, since we have 12 years of
data). The random effect part of the model, demarcated by (square) parenthesis, consists of
firm specific controls. Apple (AAPL) is used as the reference firm and Q1 (Calendar Quarter
1) as the reference calendar quarter. The coefficients θAi corresponds to the random intercept
of firm i. When reporting the results, we add the mean, µθ of the random intercepts to the
fixed intercept to get the overall intercept value. The coefficients ηAi correspond to random
slopes for calendar quarter ends, γi corresponds to Sales and β
A
i corresponds to Time. These
random parameters follow a multivariate normal distribution as defined in Appendix C.5.
εit is a normally distributed error term. To validate our hypotheses, Sales is regressed on
Time and FirmType in Model S.
Sit = ∆
S + Pitδ










Sit is the sales of firm i at time t, λj is the effect of Time by Firm Type j (it) (after
controlling for average firm-level heterogeneity). We included this variable because the firm
policy (lc, lp, and ls) affects Sales. The remaining independent variables are similar to
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Model AL and distinguished by the use of superscript S. Let j (it) denote the FirmType







= ρAj(it)t and t is always positive. Thus, the directional impact of
SGR by Firm Type j is measured by the sign of ρj. To test Hypothesis 4.2, the indirect effect
of Time, ρAj λj is tested for significance for firm type j. The significance of the product ρ
A
j λj
is tested by generating empirical distributions of the product of the growth rate in Sales, λ,
and the sensitivity of CCC to Sales, ρA from Model AL as suggested in Rungtusanatham
(2014).
4.5.1.2 Firm Level Analysis (Model FL) . To validate the effect of change in SGR
at the level of firms, we test Model FL which uses fixed control for firms. We study seven
retail firms (AMZN, WMT, DKS, TGT, COST, JCP, SHLD) that present a mix of different
FY endings and varying growth rates, and three Pharmaceutical chains (CVS, RAD, WBA).
The relatively stable Sales at these three firms offers a contrast to the highly seasonal nature
of the retail firms – an observation we exploit to validate Hypothesis 4.3. We regress CCC
on Sales and Time while controlling for FirmType and Y ear for year-specific shocks. Since
the sensitivity of sales growth to CCC is of interest at the level of the firm, we put fixed
controls for firms that vary with Sales, Time and Calendar Quarter end. We refer to this







i Sit + ψ
F
i t+ (SitPit)ϕ+ +Titπ
F + εit
The firm specific intercept for firm i in period t, ∆Fit = ∆
F + ηFit where η
F
it adjusts for the
difference in FYE between the benchmark firm and firm i in period t. This adjustment
parameter ηFit is tested for significance to validate Hypothesis 4.3. For this model, we use Q4
as the reference quarter for all firms and Qit is a vector of size three. At any time t, if Firm
i’s FYE is in the same quarter as the benchmark firm (TGT) then the corresponding element
in Qit = 0, and Qit = 1 otherwise. The sensitivity to sales coefficients ρ
F
i for each firm is
reported in Table which is used to validate Hypothesis 4.1. To address changes in Firm
Type, we put a fixed control for Firm Type in vector Pit. As with Model AL, the elements
of Pit take a value 1 corresponding to Firm Type of firm i in period t and 0 otherwise.
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The coefficient ϕi is added to ρ
F
i to adjust for a change in Firm Type while estimating the
sensitivity of CCC to Sales, Sit. ψ
F
i is the trend component of firm i after controlling for
firm type and πF are the year specific shock similar to Model AL.
We regress Sales to Time and indicators for calendar quarters while placing fixed controls
for firms interacted with Time, Sales and CalendarQuarter. This model is similar to Model
S but with fixed control for firms. As earlier, Model S is used to validate our hypotheses.
It is not explicitly stated to save space. Similar to Model AL, the empirical distributions of
SGR and CCC sensitivity to Sales, i.e., the product ρFi β
F
i , is used to get the indirect effect
of SGR to validate Hypothesis 4.2 for Firm i.
4.5.2 Results
We now present the empirical results for Models AL and FL. Section 4.5.2.1 describes
the results for Model AL and Section 4.5.2.2 gives the results for Model FL.
4.5.2.1 Model AL Results . The unconditional model, with random control for firms
only, has an Intra Class Correlation (ICC) of 0.84 which suggests high firm level heterogeneity
that should be controlled for, thus validating our model specification. Firm level heterogene-
ity can also affect CCC in interaction with Sales and FYE s. The Base Model (refer Figure
6) has Sales and Time as the independent variables (and no interaction effects), Model AL1
uses random (intercept) control for firms θAi , Model AL2 uses control for firms varying by
Sales (θAi and β
A










and ηAi ). While we would have preferred a model with random slopes for sales, trend and
calendar quarter, the estimation algorithm failed to converge (we used lme4 in R; Bates,
2010.) We now discuss the fixed effect of the independent variables (Figure 6). In a Base
Model with Sales (no interaction with FirmType) and Time as independent variables,
while placing fixed controls for CalendarQuarters, FirmType and random intercept for
Firms, we find that Sales is indeed a significant predictor of CCC. Since we are interested
in validating the sensitivity of CCC to growth rate for each FirmType, we include Sales
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interacted with FirmType in all subsequent models. We observe that sensitivity of CCC


















significant. The coefficients are significant for Models AL2 through AL4 as well. All the
predicted signs match except for Type H firms for which Proposition 1 suggested a positive
sensitivity to sales growth. This shows that all firm types, on average, will report a higher
CCC value if they do not experience increasing Sales. Hypothesis 4.1 is supported for ML
and MH type firms. To validate the sensitivity of growth rate on CCC for an L type firm,
the value of (average) Γ is needed (Proposition 1). The unavailability of processing and
purchase costs (needed for computing the average value of Γ), makes validating Hypothesis
4.1 for L type firms difficult. To validate Hypothesis 4.2, we first look at the direct effect
of Time. This direct effect is positive and significant for Firms Types MH, ML and L (
C.1) in Model AL1 with the coefficients being ψAMH = 0.53, ψ
A
ML = 0.43, ψ
A
L = 0.25. The
effect is not significant for Firm Type H. The direct effect is observed to be significant in
all models AL1 through AL4. To validate how Time is mediated through sales, following
the suggestion of Rungtusanatham (2014), we generate empirical distributions of ρAj λ
A
j for
each Firm Type j. The coefficients ρAj from Model AL1 and λj from Model S follow a
normal distribution with standard deviation equal to the (reported) standard errors which
were used to generate the distributions. 100,000 simulations of the product ρAj λ
A
j were used
to empirically generate the 95% confidence intervals for each Firm Type j (4.4). We find
that Time has a negative mediating effect for Firm Types H, ML and L while the effect of
mediation is insignificant for Firm Type MH. 4.4 reports the 2.5 (LL) and 97.5 percentiles
(UL) for the average mediating effects. Hypothesis 4.2 is therefore supported for the effect
of Time.
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Table 4.4: Results of Model AL variants with CCC as the dependent variable and for
Model S.
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Table 4.5: Mediation Effect of Time on CCC by FirmType (95% Confidence Interval)
Firm Type LL UL Mean
H -0.38 -0.064 -0.22
MH -0.022 0.026 0.0019
ML -0.065 -0.0047 -0.031
L -0.083 -0.014 -0.045
4.5.2.2 Model FL Results To analyze effects at firm level we refer the results obtained
from Model FL. We found evidence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error
terms and therefore a straightforward use of OLS standard errors would have led to incor-
rect inference. Therefore, we use the Newey-West robust standardized error for statistical
inference as used in Oyer, 1998. To address endogeneity issues from omitted variables, we
find the coefficients of Model FL by regressing CCCit to the estimated sales. There was
no significant difference in magnitude and no difference in the signs of the estimates. We
build Model FL1 through FL5 by progressively putting controls for Firms (Model FL1),
interaction of Firms and Sales (Model FL2), Firms and Time (Model FL3), Firms and
FYE (Model FL4) and finally adding FirmType (Model FL5). C.2 summarizes these
results. From the results of Model FL5, we observe that only three firms (TGT, CVS and
WBA) have significant sensitivity to Sales
(
ρFTGT = 4.32, ρ
F
CV S = −1.35, ρFWBA = −1.13
)
,
and we focus on these three firms next to check for Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis 4.2. 4.5
summarizes the observed and hypothesized signs sensitivity of CCC to SGR.
Recall from Section 4.4 that Γ > 0 for retail firms since the value-added parameter, v is
small. Thus, for TGT, the predicted sensitivity of CCC to SGR is positive. This matched
the observed sensitivity. The Firm Type of CVS changed from Medium-Low (ML) in 2013
to Low (L) and shows a negative sensitivity to sales growth thus providing evidence for
Hypothesis 4.1. WBA’s Firm Type changed from Medium-Low (ML) in 2014 to Medium-
High (MH) in 2016 (perhaps due to its acquisition of Alliance Boots). The sign of the
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coefficient ρFWBA = −1.13 matches the predicted sensitivity in Hypothesis 4.1. TGT’s type
changed to L in 2014. Thus, CCC shows significant sensitivity to Sales and we find support
for Hypothesis 4.1 for these firms.
We test for the direct effect of Time as stated in Hypothesis 4.2 (please see Table C.3
in Appendix C.1). We find that the direct effect of time is significant for TGT and CVS
(ψFTGT = −1.00, ψFCV S = 0.91) but not for WBA.











TGT + L + + 4.32 Match
CVS + ML - - 1.35 Match
WBA + ML, MH - - 1.13 Match
Testing for the indirect effect of Time using the same approach as for Model AL. Table
4.6 gives the 95% confidence intervals of ρFj λ
F
j for all three firms. All three coefficients
are significantly different from zero, thus lending support to Hypothesis 4.2. To check for
Table 4.7: Model FL: Firm Level Mediating Effect of Time on CCC (95% Confidence
Interval)
LL UL Mean
TGT 0.034 0.57 0.29
CVS -1.4 -0.47 -0.96
WBA -0.65 -0.37 -0.51
Hypothesis 4.3, we specify CVS as the reference firm. CVS (and the other pharmaceutical
firms, RAD and WBA) has low seasonality facilitating the measurement of FYE changes.
As Figure 7 shows, retail firms have different FYE s. Figure 7 also lists the effect of changing
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the FYE for each retailer from Q4, the reference quarter. For example, changing AMZN’s
FYE from Q4 to Q1 will increase its estimated CCC by 17.79 days. These results follow
from Model FL, where the three components of vector ηFi for firm i measures the impact of
changing the FYE quarter from Q4. The reported values in Figure 7 are the change from
Q4 (CCCij−CCCi,Q4), where j is one of the other three quarters. We note that ηFCV S, ηFRAD
and ηFWBA are not significant. This supports Hypothesis 4.3 since CVS, RAD and WBA have
very low seasonality. Consequently, comparisons of pharmaceutical firms based on annual
CCC would be valid even if these firms have different FYE s. For five of the remaining
seven firms, changing the FYE does have a significant impact on the CCC (at a significance
value of 0.10). Hypothesis 4.3 is thus, supported at the firm level. This ability to calculate
CCC values by changing the FYE quarter helps us look at the results as a counterfactual
(e.g., how much would the CCC of AMZN change if it shifted its FYE from December 31
to June 30). Such counterfactuals are crucial for meaningful benchmarking when firms have
different FYE s. A firm benchmarking AMZN’s CCC must recalibrate its targets if its FYE
is different from AMZN’s. As an example, COST which has its FYE in August (i.e., the
nearest previous quarter is Q2) should recalibrate its targets when benchmarking its CCC
with AMZN’s. Results from Figure 7 indicate COST should add 18.8 days on average to
AMZN’s CCC to adjust for the difference in FYE s. As previously given examples illustrate,
managers, business consultants, financial analysts and academic researchers often do not
make such a correction.
100
Table 4.8: Model RC . The impact of change in FYE from Q4 end
4.5.3 Robustness Checks
In Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, we used quarterly data because firms do not publish balance
sheet and income statement data more frequently. However, seasonality does not have a
quarterly cadence, and so spikes and troughs will get smoothened when we aggregate data
by quarters. Second, we offset the FYE to the nearest calendar quarter when needed. Third,
there may also be idiosyncratic industry variations. We now do robustness checks to address
these issues. We consider a model, Model RC, that includes Industry as a variable to
account for industry-level changes in CCC. Also, we do not change the FYE to the previous
quarter. None of the 52 firms in the sample have Fiscal Years ending in May, October and
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November. Hence, we used eight binary variables to control for the FYE effects and January
as the base. As in Oyer (1998), adding CalendarQuarter makes no significant difference to
the results. In Model RC, k an index for the industry. The model assumes that firm-level
heterogeneity does not explain the variance in CCC anymore than does FirmType. Thus,
FirmType constitutes a unit of analysis and the average sensitivity of CCC to change in
sales growth may be obtained by controlling for the industry effects only. We consider discuss
Model RC in which random controls are put for firms nested within industries.
CCCikt = ∆
R + ρRSitPit + δ
RPit + γiFit + Π
RTit + θk(i) + γiSit + λk(i)t+ θk + λkt+ εit
While independent and control variables have similar meaning as in Models AL and FL
(the coefficients use the superscript R), there are two main differences. First, every firm i is
nested within its industry k, the random intercept θk(i) incorporates the structure of firm i
nested within industry k and θk is a random intercept for industry. To correct for an overall
industry trend in CCC, we model the random slope coefficients λk(i) and λk similarly. Since
Sales is recorded at the level of a firm, the random slope γi varies by firm. The variable Fit
controls for all eight FY months in the sample instead of simply Calendar Quarters. We
build Model RC progressively by first adding industry level controls (Model RC1) and then
add controls for firms nested within industry (Model RC2). The size of covariance matrix
of Model RC2 increases in proportion to estimates of firm-industry level correlations. C.14





. For all other credit policies, the coefficients are significant(
ρRMH = 0.46, ρ
R




. FY month ends are significant (i.e., γ9 = −52.77
when FY ends in September). The significance of the parameters were calculated using
the Satterthwaite method of finding p-values. When we include the firm level controls as
well (Model RC2), we find that the signs of the coefficients of sales are the same as the
signs obtained in Model AL
(
ρRMH = −17.36, ρRMH = −23.26, ρRML = −23.21, ρRL = −23.33
)
.
While Time is insignificant as a direct effect, we test for the indirect effect of Time as
mediated through Sales. As with Model AL we find support for mediation. Model RC1
shows significant results for all months but Model RC2 shows significant sensitivity only in
FYE ending September. We conjecture that this is due to the unavailability of monthly
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financial data. As mentioned previously, January sees a distinctive drop in monthly sales
following the December holiday season. However, this drop gets subdued by aggregation
in our sample when firms, following a January end fiscal cycle, do not report their sales in
December. Thus, although accounting for different FYE s the level of Sales is of the same
order as Sales ending in December (that is the seasonal effects are the same). It is more
apt, therefore, to refer to Model FL results to assess the degree of recalibration to correct
for a difference in FYE. Overall, no departure from results obtained in Sections 4.5.1 and
4.5.2 is observed. This observation indicates that our model is robust given the granularity
at which the data was obtained.
4.6 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper shows that even when two firms have the same Operating Policy
(defined by supplier credit period, processing lead time and customer credit period) and the
same mean demand, CCC values may differ because of differing Sales Growth Rates (SGRs).
When the demand patterns are the same, the CCC s of the two firms could be significantly
different because of the interaction of Seasonality and Fiscal Year End (FYE ). We also show
that demand in only a subset of the fiscal cycle, the Zone of Influence (ZoI ), affects the
CCC values. Hence, even when discounting for differences in SGR, an optimally located
FYE may confer the benefit of the “right mix” of demand seasonality in the ZoI, resulting
in a lower CCC. Additionally, even when a firm does not have any demand seasonality, the
sensitivity of CCC to changes in SGR can be positive or negative depending on the Firm
Type (which depends on Operating Policy). If a company’s Firm Type changes due to a
change in its Operating Policy, because of modified credit terms, improved processing time
or better inventory management, the impact on CCC will depend on the firm’s original and
new Firm Type. We emphasize that only the relative supplier and consumer credit terms,
and processing lead time, and not their absolute values, determine the Firm Type. We also
find that Time affects CCC both directly and indirectly through Sales. The interactions
between these factors complicate the interpretation of CCC. For example, even when a firm
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implements process improvements to decrease CCC, an increase in SGR may increase CCC
depending on its Firm Type. This suggests that we need to exercise caution when comparing
CCC values for firms of different types.
The collective impact of SGR, Seasonality and FYE on CCC depends on the Operating
Policy, cost parameters and demand pattern. These factors interact in a complex way to
affect the CCC. We offer three rules of thumb, suitable for well-behaved demand forms.
First, higher demand seasonality of the focal or benchmarked firm increases the importance
of measuring CCC at a point in time where seasonality is comparable. Second, as we found
in our computations, the impact of Seasonality and FYE is higher than the impact of SGR.
Third, any change in the Seasonality outside the ZoI does not affect the CCC as long as the
mean demand is constant.
Next, for a more granular comparison of CCC values of two firms that have different
FYE s, we make certain assumptions to ensure parity in all other parameters. Specifically,
we assume that the firms have the same Operating Policy with supplier credit period being
greater than the processing lead time. Furthermore, the two firms have the same procurement
and processing costs, selling price, annual demand, SGR and Seasonality. The firms differ
only in the location of their FYE. A firm which has its FYE located where demand is
increasing will report a lower CCC compared to a firm which has its FYE located where
the demand is decreasing. This is because although the width of the ZoI is the same, the
excess payables over inventory cost is higher when demand is increasing. Finally, consider
the case where the two firms have different seasonality indices (as measured by the spread
in the demand), and both firms have their FYE s at their lowest demand values. If the peak
demand for both firms falls within their respective ZoI s and occurs after the lowest demand,
the firm with higher seasonality will have a higher CCC. Because of the complexity of the
underlying relationship, it is difficult to estimate intuitively even directionally, let alone
numerically, the movement of CCC when changes occur in SGR, FYE and Seasonality.
Decision makers, analysts and consultants may use CCC values without considering dif-
fering FYE locations, Seasonality, and SGR. Neglecting to account for these factors could
lead to incorrect conclusions and inaccurate targets for performance improvements. Con-
sequently, CCC benchmarking-driven efforts by a firm to improve operational efficiencies
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might be unwarranted.
Finally, we note that there is increasing emphasis on the use of secondary financial data
in academic research (Rabinovich and Cheon 2011). Researchers of such data sources often
use annual or quarterly firm-level accounting data to draw conclusions. The reason is a sys-
temic limitation: Balance sheet data is publically available only on an annual or quarterly
basis. In contrast, the duration of the “seasonality” can be shorter. Therefore, it is difficult
to account for aberrations caused by the interaction between Seasonality and FYE location
when benchmarking CCC and other such metrics across companies. Promising future re-
search directions include investigating whether adjusting CCC components by detrending
and deasonalizing results in a metric that more accurately captures differences in operational
efficiencies across companies. The codependence between the factors we have studied, such
as how the Operating Policy itself changes with Sales, might also be interesting. One could
also study how managerial incentives and decisions are affected when an adjusted CCC met-
ric is used rather than an unadjusted one. Another line of avenue for research might be to
investigate if managers indulge in CCC management, as they do in earnings management,
when CCC is an input in the compensation formula. For accurate benchmarking, it is im-




In my thesis, I investigate the reasons of why campaigns that reach their target amounts,
fail to deliver the products to the backers. Specifically, I find that entrepreneurs with a low
cost of reputation will participate in a crowdfunding campaign and keep a target that is
lower than the product development cost. The participation of a supplier, and a penalty
for the contingency of not following through on initial order commitments, disciplines the
entrepreneur. However, even with the imposition of a penalty the entrepreneur will keep a
target and pledge amount that expose backers to the risk of delivery failure, if reputation
costs are very low. The main contributions of chapters 2 and 3 is to look at how, a platform
by following a specific threshold induces the entrepreneur to keep a low target, and how
a suppliers involvement in the product development process can restrain the entrepreneur
against opportunistic target setting.
In chapter 4, we find evidence that firms which rely on Cash Conversion Cycle for drawing
conclusions about their operating efficiency may wrongfully infer better operating efficiency.
It is possible that factors exogenous to a firm’s operations, demand seasonality, growth
rate and Fiscal Year differences may cause CCC values to be lower. The results of the
chapter are particularly relevant to a large stream of operations management literature that
uses accounting metrics uncritically as proxies of operational slack, efficiency and financial
contagion to name a few. By addressing about the extent of wrongful misattribution we
make a case for a cautious use of accounting metrics.
The theme of the dissertation was to show how parameters; target amount in crowdfund-
ing and CCC, intended for the benefit of investors may not serve their intended objective.
We provide evidence for it by including the motives of platform and suppliers in a crowd-
funding context; and by including differences in growth rate, seasonality and Fiscal Year
differences for the Cash Conversion Cycle.
Moving forward I will continue to research at the interface of Operations Management and
Finance, with a particular focus on novel mechanisms to raise funds and ensure transparency.
Particularly, the use of Blockchains and Initial Coin Offerings have become popular with
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investors. The design of these mechanisms, although intended to provide transparency and
therefore reduce risk, may expose investors to risk the same way as crowdfunding has. I





A.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Variable and parameter definitions
Decision Variables
p Pledge level that backers pay to be entitled to the product – chosen by entrepreneur
T Target amount to be raised by the campaign – chosen by entrepreneur
γ Entrepreneur’s share of campaign revenues – chosen by platform (platform’s share is 1-γ)
α Threshold percentage of target that entitles campaigns for promotion – chosen by platform
Parameters
v Valuation of the product
s Backer’s altruistic utility from supporting a campaign
M Development cost of the product
N Random variable indicating the number of informed backers in the campaign
N̄ Total size of informed backers in the population
Z Total size of uninformed backers in the population
k Probability of technical success when sufficient funds to cover development cost are avail-
able
δ Expansion factor of backer population conditional on campaign promotion
π Profit in the external market, post campaign, if product is successfully produced
j L, I,H, corresponding to low, intermediate and high fractional threshold values
Πjb Payoff of Backers for j = L, I,H
108
Πje Payoff of Entrepreneur for j = L, I,H
Πjp Payoff of Platform for j = L, I,H
T j
∗
e Optimum target that maximizes payoff to the Entrepreneur for j = L, I,H
T j
∗
p Optimum target that maximizes payoff to the Platform for j = L, I,H
Re Reputation cost incurred by entrepreneur on failing to deliver the product to backers
Rp Reputation cost incurred by the platform if the entrepreneur fails to deliver the product
Figure A.1: A snapshot of recommended projects in Kickstarter1
1Examples of Promoted Campaigns on Kickstarter (as on December 24, 2020)
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Figure A.2: Stages of a crowdfunding campaign
A.2 Proofs of Propositions, Lemmas and Corollaries
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1



































The expression for ∂p
∂T
is obtained from (2). When T = Mv
γ(v+s)
, the biggest value consistent
with the region T ≤ Mv
γ(v+s)








the biggest value of T = Mv
γ(v+s)
for the region, yields that
∂E(ΠLe )
∂T
> 0. Given the concavity
of the payoff function, it follows, therefore, that the highest payoff for the region is obtained
when the target is Mv
γ(v+s)
.
Next, we consider the possibility that T > Mv
γ(v+s)
. In this case, the pledge level is a
constant independent of the value of T , and is equal to p = v+s. Differentiating the expected









Setting this expression to zero yields a target value of Re γ.










, as reported in the Proposition.




























The expression for ∂p
∂T
is obtained from (6). When T = vM
γ(v+s)α(1+δ)
, the biggest value
consistent with the region T ≤ vM
γ(v+s)α(1+δ)





tuting these values yields
∂E(ΠIe)
∂T
> 0 at T = vM
γ(v+s)α(1+δ)
, the biggest value of the target in
the region. Given the concavity of the payoff function, it follows that the highest payoff for
the region is obtained when the target value is vM
γ(v+s)α(1+δ)
.
Next, we consider the region define by T > vM
γ(v+s)α(1+δ)
. In this case, the pledge level, p
is a constant and equals v + s. Differentiating the expected payoff expression with respect







. This implies that the














, as reported in the
Proposition 2.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting the optimal values of target and pledge levels from Propositions 1 and 2
into the payoff functions of the platform in (4) and (8), respectively, yields that the payoff
of the platform in the regions specified is the same for both Cases 1 and 2.
A.2.4 Proof of Corollary 1
With the RS rule, as with the FT rule, uninformed backers observe the realization of
the random number of informed contributors, n, before contributing. Using this number
as a signal, the population of backers expands by the multiplicative factor δ. Hence, if the
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pre-promotion revenues collected in the campaign are pn, the post-promotion revenues are
np (1 + δ). Therefore, the total revenues raised by the campaign with the RS rule equal
the total revenues raised with the FT rule. Since γ is the same, the expected commission
retained by the platform is the same for both the FT and the RS rules. Moreover, as discussed
in the remarks following Proposition 2, the probability of product non-delivery is also the
same for both these rules under Cases 1 and 2. This implies that the platform’s expected
reputational cost from a project is the same for the FT and the RS rules. Therefore, the
platform’s expected payoff from each project is the same under both the FT and the RS
rules for Cases 1 and 2 (i.e., when production success is not guaranteed) and γ is kept the
same. Hence, the platform is indifferent between using these two rules.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Cases (i) and (ii). According to Proposition 3 the expected profits of the platform are
















































when Re ≥ Mv(v+s)
Comparing (A.1) with the equilibrium profits in (9) for Case 3, yields the cutoff values
of Rp reported in the Proposition.
A.2.6 Proof of Corollary 2
Enforcement of production success is more likely when the minimal cutoff levels on Rp
reported in Proposition 4 decline. In Case (i) of Proposition 4, the cutoff level declines if s
or γ go up, or when v or M go down. In Case (ii) of Proposition 4, the cutoff level declines
if M or Re go down or when γ goes up.
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A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Follows from the discussion preceding the Proposition.
A.2.8 Proof of Proposition 6
To obtain the comparative statics results, we use the Implicit Function Theorem by
deriving the total differential of the first order condition (12). To obtain the sign of ∂γ
∂f
, where



















. Because E (Πp) is a concave function of γ, it follows that
∂E2(Πp)
∂γ2
< 0 and the sign of ∂γ
∂f
is determined by the sign of ∂E
2(Πp)
∂γ∂f
. Partial differentiation of
the expression for ∂E(Πp)
∂γ
with respect to any parameter, yields, therefore, the results reported
in the Proposition.




> 0, when M∗ < M , this part follows.
ii. The entire population participates in one of two cases:
a. If the term inside the radical of the expression for M∗ is negative, namely if
sµ [(µ+ 2λ) (2v + s)− 2Re (v + s)] > [λ (v + s) +Res]2, there is no real solution to
the equation W (M∗) = 0. This is more likely to happen when the expected revenues
in the campaign, µ are relatively high, when the altruistic benefit, s derived by
backers is high, and when the reputation cost, Re incurred by the entrepreneur for
non-delivery of the product is low.
b. When the real solution derived for M∗ in (13) is bigger than M . Once again, this is
more likely when µ and s are relatively big and Re is relatively small.
iii. When µ and s are relatively small and Re is relatively big, the solution for M
∗ in (13)
may be smaller than M .
iv. Substituting s = 0 into the solution for M∗ in (13), yields the result.
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A.2.10 Proof of Proposition 7
Cases (i)(a) and (i)(b) follow from the first order condition for γ in (13). Case (ii) follows
because, from (16), ∂M
∗
∂s
> 0, and from Lemma 2, M∗ = µ when s = 0. Hence, when s > 0,
M∗ > µ. As a result, entrepreneurs facing development cost in the interval M ∈ (µ,M∗]
will be active on the platform despite never being able to deliver the promised product. For
these entrepreneurs, M > γ (1 + δ) (v + s) N̄ , where the right-hand-side of the last inequality
measures the maximum revenues that can ever be raised in the campaign.
A.3 Extensions of the model
A.3.1 Allowing informed backers to withdraw pledges when few other informed
backers participate
In this extension, we consider the possibility that when the number of informed backers
is revealed post promotion, some informed backers who have already pledged may change
their mind and withdraw their pledges. We formulate this possibility by assuming that
the total number of backers after the promotion is [n (1 + δ)− βδ]. Hence, if n < β the
total size of the backer population actually declines because some informed withdraw their
pledges. In this case, the campaign definitely fails commercially, given our assumption that
(v + s)N < T . Hence, promotion leads to an expansion of the backer population only if
n > β. In this case, the threshold level on α that determines the three cases we considered



















/ (1 + δ) (Commercial success guaranteed but pro-
duction success is not guaranteed).
Most of the qualitative results we obtained in the main text, when β = 0, remain similar,
with the exception being that the expected profits of the platform may be different in Cases
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A.1 and A.2 compared to Cases 1 and 2 in the main text, respectively. The next Proposition
reports the comparison of the expected profits of the platform in these two cases.
Proposition A.1 (Low Fractional Threshold). For a fixed sharing rule γ of campaign
revenues:












, the platform’s expected profits
are the same irrespective of whether the threshold value α selected by the platform ensures













, the expected profits of the platform are
higher when the threshold level for promotion selected by the platform cannot ensure the










the platform prefers to choose the threshold to ensure the commercial success of the
campaign.
Hence, only for intermediate values of the reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur,
reported in part (ii) of the Proposition, the platform may have a strict preference between
Cases (i) and (ii). Because of this different result, the decision of the platform of whether to
enforce production success changes as well, as we report in Proposition A.2.
Proposition A.2 (Intermediate Fractional Threshold). For a fixed value of γ, there ex-
ist threshold levels R∗p1 and R
∗
p2 indicating indifference between ensuring and not ensuring
production success so that:







a. If Rp < R
∗
p1, the platform chooses α in a manner that does not guarantee production
success (Cases i or ii).























, the platform chooses α in a manner that guarantees









≤ Rp < R∗p2, the platform chooses α in a manner that
does not guarantee either commercial or production success (Case i).
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c. If Rp ≥ R∗p2, the platform chooses α to ensure the production success of the campaign.







a. If Rp < R
∗
p2, the platform chooses α in a manner that does not guarantee production
success (Cases i or ii).
b. If Rp ≥ R∗p2, the platform chooses α to ensure the production success of the campaign.
iv. When R∗p1 < R
∗
p2. The threshold levels decrease with the values of the parameters s, γ,
δ, β and increase with the values of the parameters v, M , and Re.
R∗p1 and R
∗











































The results implied by Proposition A.2, are similar to those reported in Proposition 2.4
of the main text. Specifically, the platform is more likely to enforce production success when





and γ are big, and when M and v are small. The only difference with the case that β = 0
is that for intermediate levels of reputational cost incurred by the entrepreneur (in part
(ii) of the Proposition), the platform has a strict preference of ensuring commercial success


















≤ Rp < R∗p2.
A.4 General distribution function of the informed backer population
In this section, we explore whether the results derived for the uniform distribution can
be extended to other distribution functions. For simplicity, we assume that the probability
of technical success is one, namely k=1, β = 0, and the reputational cost of the platform
is sufficiently small, so that the threshold level of promotion does not guarantee the com-
mercial success of the campaign. Let f (n) and F (n) denote the density and cumulative
distribution functions, respectively, of the number of informed backers. The expected payoff
























entrepreneur sets the highest pledge possible to ensure that the informed backer obtain a
nonnegative payoff. This pledge can never exceed the maximum willingness to pay of backers




= 0 for p ≤ v+ s, yields two observations. First, the maximum pledge
of v+s is attained at a target level T u < M
γ
when s > 0.











if s > 0. Hence, as in the
case of a uniform distribution, the pledge reaches its maximum value at a target level strictly
lower than the funds necessary to cover the development costs. Second, we can obtain the the
expression for ∂p
∂T




= 0, for p ≤ v + s. Define
x ≡ T
(1+δ)p














F (x) = vF (y)−(v+s−p)
p








[1−F (x)](1+δ) > 0. Hence, as in the case of the uniform distribution, a higher
target level allows the entrepreneur to set a higher pledge. Moreover, for T ≥ T u, the pledge





= (1 + µ) pγ
∫ N̄
x
nf (n) dn+(π −M) [1− F (y)]−Re [F (y)− F (x)].
When T ≥ T u, the pledge level is a constant equal to v + s. Hence, in this case, the














≥ T u. When Re
γ
< T u, the optimal solution for the
target level falls in the region where p < v + s. We differentiate the expected profits of the























0. Because the profits of the entrepreneur increase with T throughout the region, it follows
that T eopt = T
u when Re
γ











The solution is very similar to that derived under the uniform distribution.
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A.5 Empirical Analysis for Kickstarter Data
Our conclusions about the effect of campaign promotion rule on the optimal target and
pledge amount, rely on the assumption that campaigns which raise a high ‘Percentage of
Target’ are more likely to be promoted.2 It is well established in the literature that people
rely on results on the first few pages of a search engine to determine which pages to visit
(Ghose et al. 2014, Agarwal et al. 2011, Ghose and Yang 2009, Ursu 2018). We extend this
search rationale to a crowdfunding platform. Campaigns that have a lower rank appear in the
first pages, and therefore, draw a larger backer population. To empirically establish whether
a higher ‘Percentage of Target’ results in promotion, we compile a dataset comprising of
campaigns that are promoted, based on specific sorting categories, in the first 10 pages of
Kickstarter.3 Each page consists of 12 campaigns. We took six samples every day from
June 27 to August 15 at randomly chosen time points to avoid a consistent pattern of
browsing and time zone effects. There are many potential search categories that one can use
to browse through the different campaigns in Kickstarter. A prospective backer can do a
focused search for a campaign, browse for products under the various ‘product categories’,
or get ‘suggestions’ from the platform. These ‘suggestions’ are further sorted depending on
a backer’s preference for products which are ‘just launched’, ‘popular’, ‘recommended’ or
‘staff picks’.4 Our intention in choosing all the potential product categories is to show that,
regardless of how the backers choose to navigate the crowdfunding platform, campaigns that
raise a higher ‘Percentage of Target’ have a lower (better) rank. Since there are 120 (10 ×
12) campaigns for each sorting category and four sorting categories, there are 480 campaigns
in each sample. The raw data size we started with had a size of 480 x 50 x 6 observations.
The metrics we tracked for each campaign were:
Name: Campaign name which also serves a unique identifier.5
2Because crowdfunding platforms use the “Load More” or “Show More” buttons at the bottom of each
page of recommended campaigns to continue displaying additional campaigns from the recommended list,
we use improvement in the ranking of a campaign as a measure of the recommendation in this investigation.
3Kickstarter does not list campaigns in distinct pages but appear as one scrolls down the page. The page
numbers, however, appear in the HTML script.
4The Kickstarter platform uses the following names for sorting the campaigns, ‘Trending’ for ‘Popular’
campaigns, ‘Everything’ for ‘Recommended’ campaigns and ‘Project We Love’ for ‘Staff Picks’.
5The name of the entrepreneur and a short description of the dataset are also available
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Demographic details: Country of Origin and Location of the campaign.
Amount Pledged: $ amount pledged, including for campaigns that originate outside the US.6
Backer Count: Number of backers who have already pledged.
Launch Date: Date when the campaign was launched.
End Date: Date when the campaign is scheduled to end.
Target: Amount to be raised through the campaign.
Sorting Category: Specific category (recommended, popularity, staff pick, or just launched)
in which the campaign is ranked.
Rank: Order in which the campaigns are presented to an unregistered onlooker, for the
specific sorting category.
Percentage Funded: Amount raised as a percentage of the target level.
Product Category: Specific category in which the campaign is listed.
Time Stamp: Time epoch when the sample is taken.
We tracked 724 distinct campaigns over the 50-day period. In our sample, around 75% of
the campaigns had met their targets at some point, and 25% had raised 10 times (1000%) of
the target amount. Among the 108 product categories, the highest number (90) of campaigns
were listed under Tabletop Games followed by products in Product Design (67). Products
under the “Product Design” category are technologically intensive and require substantial
development cost. Hardware on average had the highest backer count. Most listed campaigns
originated in the United States (58%) followed by United Kingdom (14%). 77% of the
campaigns had a target level less than $20,000. We now describe the models that guide our
research questions.
Because our objective is to validate how the rank of a campaign is affected by the
Percentage of Target, we designate the rank of a campaign as the dependent variable, where
Rankit is the rank of campaign i at time t. The independent variables are as follows:
CampDuri measures the duration of the campaign, DaysToEndit measures a potential
“end effect” for the campaign as cited in Burtch et al. (2020) and Chakraborty and Swinney
(2019a). We also control for the target that each campaign keeps Targeti. We include both
a continuous variable for the lagged percentage of target raised, PercFuni(t−1), and a binary
6Rather than converting foreign currencies ourselves, we rely on the $ amount that Kickstarter provides.
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variable Threshold Percent Funded TPFit which equals one if campaign i has reached a
specific threshold percentage of target at time t. We use three different percentage threshold
values: 100%, 300% and 500%. The variable Xi controls for the product category to which
the campaign belongs, and the specific sorting method a backer uses (i.e., ‘just launched’,
‘popularity’, ‘recommended’ and ‘staff picks’.) Unlike Godes and Silva (2012), we could not
control for the backer’s identity as it is confidential. The model is given below:
Rankit = β0+β1CampDuri+β2DaysToEndi+β3PercFuni(t−1)+β4Targeti+β5TPFit+γXi+εit
The results in Table 9 clearly show that an increase in the Percentage of Target raised results
in an improvement (reduction) of rank. The rank of a campaign improves (reduces) by 1.5
units when the campaign is funded three times over (TPF = 300%), all the other variables
held constant. Interestingly, we observe that the campaign ranking worsens (increases)
when the campaign is just funded (TPF = 100%). It may be that because the platform
is assured of its commissions, once a campaign is fully funded, the platform prefers giving
priority to other campaigns that raise a higher amount, thus guaranteeing higher commission
for itself. With a higher threshold than 300%, the impact on rank becomes progressively
stronger (i.e., for TPF = 500%, all else constant, rank reduces by 3 units). Furthermore,
the continuous lagged percentage variable is significant and negative, implying that a unit
increase in percentage has the effect of improving the rank of a campaign. We also find
that there is an improvement in the rank of a campaign as the campaign draws to a close
(Days To End). Campaigns with a longer duration have a lower rank. We also find that
campaigns are ranked 9 points lower, on average, when a backer alters his sorting category
from campaigns that are ‘just launched’ to ‘recommended’ campaigns. These results are
robust both in direction and statistical significance if either of the two variables (but not
both), the continuous lagged percentage funded variable and the threshold percent funded,
are included as independent variables.
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Table A.2: Results from Data Analysis of Kickstarter Recommended Campaigns
Effect of increase in Percentage Target on Campaign Rank
Dependent Variable: Rank of Campaign
Estimate Std. Error LL (95% CI) UL (95% CI)
Intercept 150.969*** 20.014 111.739 190.196
Campaign Duration -0.421*** 0.112 -0.639 -0.202
Days to End -0.402*** 0.014 -0.431 -0.374
Percent Funded
(Lagged)
-0.0003*** 9.45E-05 -0.0005 -0.0001




-1.531*** 0.527 -2.563 -0.498
Sort by “Popularity” 9.077*** 0.647 7.808 10.346
Sort by “Recom-
mended”
-18.517*** 0.575 -19.644 -17.39





Proof of Lemma 3.2.
We know that xLT = MσX−{pc−w}(µY σX−ρµXσY )
(γpc−w)σX+{pc−w}ρσY
. Taking the derivative with respect to the
pledge we find that ∂x
LT
∂pc






post-campaign market is relatively more stable than the crowdfunding market) so long as







≤ 0. Given the value of our parameters in
the numerical analysis w < w∗, therefore, ∂x
LT
∂pc
≤ 0. Furthermore, ∂2xLT
∂w∂pc
≥ 0. That is a as
pledge amount reduces and so does the whole sale price it has the effect of increasing the
threshold investment number. Taking the derivative of xLT with respect to the wholesale
price we get, ∂x
LT
∂w
= (1−γ)σX(µY σX−ρµXσY )(w
∗−pc)
{(γpc−w)σX+{pc−w}ρσY }2








≤ 0. The other signs follow from the relative position of the pledge amount pc and
wholesale price w relative to the threshold w∗.
Taking the differential of the threshold number of backer for investment with respect to
the strength of the crowdfunding market signal ρ, we get,
∂xLT
∂ρ




≥ 0⇔ (γpc − w)µX+







µXσXσY −{ Mpc−wσX−µY σX}σY
{σX+ρσY }2
. Observe that as the margin, pc−w increases the increase




≥ 0, where λ = pc − w.
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B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
At the boundary setting T
pc
= xLT assures the backer that conditional on campaign
success, the investment will be made for sure which will also ensure that the product is
delivered. Therefore, the backer will be ready to give up pc = φv in this situation. The
target therefore, is simply T = φvxLT . Since the entrepreneur will decide the optimal
wholesale price in response to the pledge amount the entrepreneur sets, the supplier will





















where xLT = xLT (φv, w). Equating ∂E(Πs)
∂w
to zero, gives the condition as stated in Proposition
1.1.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.4
For all target amounts that are strictly lower than the minimum amount of backers
needed for the entrepreneur to invest in the fixed cost, there could potentially be a cost
to the reputation of the entrepreneur if the campaign succeeds but the entrepreneur fails to
deliver the product. This is true for all realizations in the range T
pc
≤ x < xLT . Differentiating













to zero, gives the optimal target. Once the target is known, the payoff
maybe calculated as a function (best-response) of the wholesale price offered by the supplier.
That is, substituting the optimal value of the target in the expression for the net payoff of












The supplier incorporates the best response of the entrepreneur, in its own payoff (3.4) and
maximizes it w.r.t to the wholesale price w. By using Winkler’s rule of partial moments
(Winkler et al. 1972), we can rewrite the payoff of the supplier as:


































to zero while incorporating the net payoff of the backer gives the optimal
pledge and wholesale price as stated in Proposition 1.
B.2 Figures - Comparative Statics without Price Discrimination
Figure B.1: Effect of change in Pledge, Wholesale Price and Target with increase in Reputa-
tion Cost R, Crowdfunding Signal ρ, and the Entrepreneur’s Share of the campaign proceeds
γ, under the NOP regime
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Figure B.2: Effect of change in Pledge, Wholesale Price and Target with increase in Reputa-
tion Cost R, Crowdfunding Signal ρ, and the Entrepreneur’s Share of the campaign proceeds
γ, under the WOP regime
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Figure B.3: Effect of change in Total Channel Profit and Entrepreneur’s Share in Total
Channel Profit, under the NOP regime
Figure B.4: Effect of change in Total Channel Profit and Entrepreneur’s Share in Total
Channel Profit, under the WOP regime
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B.3 Figures - Comparative Statics with Price Discrimination
Figure B.5: Effect of change in Pledge, Wholesale Price and Option Premium under Price





Table C.1: Model AL. Sensitivity of CCC to Time
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Table C.2: Model FL. Effect of SGR on CCC
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Table C.3: Model FL. Effect of Time on CCC
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Table C.4: List of sample quotes (for the first half of 2019)





CEO “. . . within our industry, we
are bottom quartile in cash
conversion cycle. . . ”











CFO “. . . and you know some
of our competitors, HP for
example, are at a much
lower cash conversion cy-
cle. Part of the reason that
you see this high number is
the introduction of vendor-












“. . . when we look at the
other factors in the busi-
ness, we think about cash
conversion cycles. At the
Securities Analyst Meeting,
we said that, that would be
minus 32 days. In quarter
1, it was negative 35. . . ”
(February 28, 2019
Thursday). HP Inc at
Morgan Stanley Technol-
ogy, Media & Telecom











“. . . When we look at
the cash conversion cycle,
our – and benchmark versus
our competitors, our days
sales outstanding are rela-
tively high, our days of in-
ventory are relatively high
and our days payable are
relatively low. And so we
are putting – and have put,
but are putting a aggressive
push on each of those areas.
And we think that there is
opportunity to go after each
of them. . . ”
(February 15, 2019 Fri-
day). Q4 2018 Newell
Brands Inc Earnings Call











“. . . For the fiscal year, our
cash conversion cycle was
significantly better than the
year-ago period, down 21
days, as we executed against
programs to achieve work-
ing capital reductions, such
as extending payment pro-
grams with our suppliers
and inventory management
programs. . . ”
(January 24, 2019
Thursday). Q4 2018 Mc-
Cormick & Company Inc




Table C.5: Summary of Notations
Notation Description
c Purchase cost per unit
v Processing (e.g., manufacturing, distribution, holding) cost per unit per time period
lc Credit period granted to consumers (in time periods)
ls Credit period negotiated with suppliers (in time periods)
lp Processing lead time (in time periods)
r Selling price per unit
T Duration of a Fiscal Year
FY Fiscal Year
FYE Fiscal Year End
τ, τ ′ Fiscal year end (FYE ) locations
Dτ + T Total annual demand between τ and τ + T
b Average annual demand
t Time
f(t) Demand at time t = 0, f(t) = α + βt+ St
α Constant in the demand function
β Sales Growth Rate (SGR)
St Seasonality at time t
SI Seasonality Index
da, db, du Specific demand levels
ARt Accounts receivables at time t
ICt Inventory Cost at time t
APt Accounts Payable at time t
DSOt Days of Sales Outstanding at time t
DIOt Days of Inventory Outstanding at time t
DPOt Days of Payables Outstanding at time t
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COGSt Cost of Goods Sold for Fiscal Year beginning at time t
CCCt Cash Conversion Cycle at time t
C.2 Method of Firm Classification




High (H) DIO < DPO–DSO
Medium High (MH) DPO–DSO < DIO < DPO
Medium Low (ML) DPO < DIO < DPO+DSO
Low (L) DPO + DSO < DIO
We use the DIO as proxy for lm, DPO as proxy for ls and DSO as proxy for lc. Therefore,
to identify a High firm type, we find those that have DSO + DIO–DPO < 0 or CCC is
negative. For all other firm types the CCC is positive. One could argue that there be a
binary type with just two firm types, ones that have a negative CCC and those that have
a positive CCC. However, we find that the impact of growth rate on the firms that have
a positive CCC when the firm type is L and H, an increase in growth rate increases the
CCC. All other firms that have a positive CCC have a negative sensitivity to increase in
sales growth. Therefore, a binary classification system will not work. Also, because we are
using the current CCC values to study the impact on CCC, some may argue that there will
be problems with collinearity. This is, however, not true. We are using the relative values
of DIO, DSO and DPO to categorize the firms only. These are not continuous variables.
The idea is to see, that given a particular level of cash recovery, what effect does increase in
sale has on CCC, and does it improve or worsen the CCC values.
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C.2.1 CCC Comparison - Hackett Group
Dell’s FYE is on the Friday nearest January 31. By recalibrating its FYE to match
its peer HP’s FYE on October 31, we observe that there is a decrease of 0.5 days (Table
C.7, FYE CCC highlighted in yellow; adjusted in grey). The reason that Dell’s CCC does
not change significantly is because Dell’s sales does not exhibit much seasonality, probably
because of its direct sales model and dynamic pricing strategy.
Table C.7: CCC Analysis of Dell
HP has its FYE on October 31. Therefore, if it wanted to undertake a benchmarking
exercise of CCC it must align its FYE to match that, for example, of Dell’s FYE on January
end. Doing so results in a decrease of approximately 16 days (Table C.8).
Table C.8: CCC Analysis of HP
Similarly, P&G has its FYE on June 30 while Unilever has its FYE on December 31.
P&G’s DPO on December 2013 was 10 days lower than its DPO in June 2013 (Table C.9).
Also, if PG benchmarked itself against Unilever’s DPO in June, they would have targeted
an even steeper value of 105 days instead of 75 days. Therefore, unless P&G adjusted for
the differences in fiscal year end, it either overestimated its performance or targeted a much
more ambitious CCC value.
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Table C.9: Model AL. Sensitivity of CCC to Time
C.3 Proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
C.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
We will compute the CCC at time period τ+T . Since f (t) = α+βt, the demand during
the period τ to τ +T is Dτ+T =
∫ τ+T
τ











of Goods Sold is COGSτ+T = (c+ vlp)
∫ τ+T
τ











DSO at time τ + T . We now use the expressions from Section 3.1 to compute ARτ =
1
2




+ rlc (α + β (T + τ)). Substituting the values from














this expression that DSOτ+T equals lc adjusted by
βl2c
2α+β(T+2τ)
to address changing demand
between τ and τ + T .
Difference between DIO and DPO at time τ + T when lp < ls.
Expressions from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 give ICτ−AP τ = 12 (ls − lp) (c+ vlp) {−2α + β (ls − lp − 2τ)}



















DIOτ+T −DPOτ+T . Substituting the values, we get DIOτ+T −DPOτ+T = lp − ls +
β(lp−ls)2
2α+β(T+2τ)
. Note that due to a reasoning similar to above, DIOτ+T − DPOτ+T is not just
lp − ls but is also affected by the demand change between τ and τ + T .
AddingDSOτ+T to the above expression we get CCCτ+T = − (lc−ls+lp)(−2α+β(lc+ls−lp−T−2τ))2α+β(T+2τ) .




Difference between DIO and DPO at time τ + T when lp ≥ ls. Using the results from



















Observe that 3c (lc + ls − lp) (lc − ls + lp) ≥ 0if ls ≤ lp ≤ ls + lc. Under the same con-
ditions v
{
2l3s − 3lp (l2c + l2s) + l3p
}
≤ 0 which can be seen by factoring 2l3s − 3lp (l2c + l2s) + l3p
into (ls − lp)
(
2l2s − l2p − lslp
)
− 3l2c lp ≤ 0. If, however, lp > ls + lc the condition as stip-
ulated in the proposition has to hold for ∂CCCτ+T
∂β







C.3.2 Development of Hypothesis 4.2
Suppose Sales is not seasonal, and just has a secular trend. The changing Sales will affect
Cost of Goods Sold, Accounts Receivables, Accounts Payables and Inventory. These changes
will affect CCC. In addition, CCC may change over time because of implementation of
increasingly faster payment systems, industry push to adopt better inventory management
methods (and thereby reduce inventory), faster information transmittal and retrieval, and
better process management (for, say, incoming quality inspection or invoice approval). We
refer to the second effect of Time on CCC as a direct effect, and the former effect as an
indirect effect, that is, the effect of Time mediated through Sales. Figure 4.3 in the paper
depicts this relationship between Time and CCC graphically. The direct and indirect effects
can occur even when there is no seasonality. To determine the impact of Time on CCC,
that is, to find ∂CCC
∂t
, we denote CCC at time t as CCCt and express it as a function of
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Sales and Time. That is, we define CCCt = CCC(Sales(t), t), and by the rule of total









The first term on the right-hand side is the direct effect of time, and the second term on
the right hand side is the mediated effect of Time on CCC through Sales. Computing the
mediated effect of Time is important to account for the effect of a secular change in Sales
on CCC.
C.3.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let ARτ ′ , AP τ ′ and ICτ ′ denote the receivables, payables and cost of inventory when
the FY ends at τ ′. Let ARτ , AP τ and ICτ have similar interpretations when FY ends










(lp − (t− τ))dt. The reason why the condition holds is because f(t) = da when τ ≤




t=τ−ls+lp (lp + τ − t)f(t)dt =
clsda+vda
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp (lp + τ − t)dt. The rationale for the above is the same as for the inventory
cost. Lastly, ARτ = r
∫ τ
t=τ−lc f(t)dt = rdblc. The comparison of CCC for seasonal and
constant demands essentially reduces to the comparison of the three elements of CCC. We






















. Note that Dτ = Dτ ′ and
∫ τ−ls+lp
τ
(lp + τ − t) dt =∫ τ ′−ls+lp
τ ′
(lp + τ
′ − t) dt.Whenda < du < db, ARτ ′ < ARτ .



















τ (lp+τ−t)dt τ ′
>
CCCτ .
However, if lp < ls, then AP τ = clsda + vda
∫ τ+lp
τ
(lp + τ − t)dt + vdalp (ls − lp). Sub-
stituting the values of ARτ and ICτ we get CCCτ =
1
Dτ
[dblc − (ls − lp) da]. Comparing the
expression with CCCτ ′ =
1
Dτ ′
[dulc − (ls − lp) du], CCCτ > CCCτ ′ if dblc − (ls − lp) da >
dulc − (ls − lp) du ⇒ (db − du) lc > (ls − lp) (da − du) ⇒ da−dudb−du <
lc
ls−lp . When min (db, da) >




ls−lp . Furthermore, we conclude that
CCCτ > CCCτ ′ when da < du < db and CCCτ < CCCτ ′ when db < du < da.
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C.4 Demand Patterns
The explicit form of demand with only seasonality is given below. Recall in this case
f(t) = α + St. For tractability, we assume demand at time period t where t0t < t1 and
t6tt7 equals d, and δu1 = δu2. This leads to a necessary condition between the rate of
positive change in demand and the rate of negative change in demand; specifically, we have
δd = ((t2 − t1) + (t6 − t5))/((t4 − t3))δu.
Figure C.1 has twelve data points corresponding to end-of-month demand. For illus-
tration, we compare the demand patterns of two firms which have the same total annual
demands but different seasonality (0.11 and 0.42 respectively).
Figure C.1: Demand with seasonality indices of 0.11 and 0.42
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Table C.10: 12 month Demand for seasonality indices of 0.11 and 0.42
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Seasonality Index
3775 3775 3775 3850 3925 3925 3550 3550 3625 3700 3775 3775 0.11
3835 3835 3835 4090 4345 4345 3070 3070 3325 3580 3835 3835 0.42
C.5 Variance-Covariance Table for Model AL
In Model AL, the means of the effect of calendar quarter are denoted by the vector µη
corresponding to Quarters 2, 3, and 4. The parameter µθ denotes the mean for the random
intercept for firms, and µγ denotes the mean random slopes of CCC sensitivity to Sales,
and µβ is the mean trend for firms. We drop the firm specific index i for conciseness. The








′. Each of the covariance matrices Ση, ΣηΩ and ΣΩ are square matrices







































We use ηk to denote ηQk for conciseness and ease of readability.
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C.6 Computational Tables
Table C.11: Summary statistics of industries with average CCC and Sales by FYE










February 1 57.60 50.72
March 1 98.65 252.47
July 1 135.82 119.98
September 1 -35.01 32562.00
December 17 123.43 1349.35
5311 Department Stores
January 5 65.81 5206.81
August 1 3.51 23658.43
5331 Variety Stores
January 6 44.65 22612.55
August 1 7.31 484.75





February 1 50.00 6190.55
March 1 38.44 56.01
June 1 34.42 30.34
August 1 30.57 19629.88





January 2 78.64 805.55





January 2 59.36 599.14
June 1 25.52 218.24
September 1 31.56 82.29
December 8 20.12 2543.24
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Table C.12: List of firms used in this study with Ticker Symbols
Serial No. COMPANY NAME TICKER SYMBOL
1 1-800-FLOWERS.COM FLWS
2 ACORN INTERNATIONAL INC -ADR ATV
3 AMAZON.COM INC AMZN
4 APPLE INC AAPL
5 ARRIS INTERNATIONAL PLC ARRS
6 BIG 5 SPORTING GOODS CORP BGFV
7 BIG LOTS INC BIG
8 BK TECHNOLOGIES BKTI
9 BLONDER TONGUE LABS INC BDR
10 CALAMP CORP CAMP
11 CERAGON NETWORKS LTD CRNT
12 CHINA TECHFAITH WIRELESS-ADR CNTF
13 COMTECH TELECOMMUN CMTL
14 COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP COST
15 CVS HEALTH CORP CVS
16 DICKS SPORTING GOODS INC DKS
17 DILLARDS INC -CL A DDS
18 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP DG
19 DOLLAR TREE INC DLTR
20 DOUGHERTYS PHARMACY INC MYDP
21 DSP GROUP INC DSPG
22 ELECTRONIC SYSTEM TECH INC ELST
23 EVINE LIVE INC EVLV
24 EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO ESRX
25 FREDS INC FRED
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26 GILAT SATELLITE NETWORKS LTD GILT
27 HARMONIC INC HLIT
28 HIBBETT SPORTS INC HIBB
29 KOHL’S CORP KSS
30 LIQUIDITY SERVICES INC LQDT
31 MACY’S INC M
32 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC MSI
33 NOKIA CORP NOK
34 NUTRISYSTEM INC NTRI
35 OFFICE DEPOT INC ODP
36 OVERSTOCK.COM INC OSTK
37 PARKERVISION INC PRKR
38 PC CONNECTION INC CNXN
39 PCM INC PCMI
40 PCTEL INC PCTI
41 PENNEY (J C) CO JCP
42 PETMED EXPRESS INC PETS
43 PRICESMART INC PSMT
44 QURATE RETAIL INC QRTEA
45 RITE AID CORP RAD
46 SEARS HOLDINGS CORP SHLD
47 SOCKET MOBILE INC SCKT
48 SUNLINK HEALTH SYSTEMS INC SSY
49 TARGET CORP TGT
50 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICS ERIC
51 US AUTO PARTS NETWORK INC PRTS
52 UTSTARCOM HOLDINGS CORP UTSI
53 VIASAT INC VSAT
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54 WAL MART DE MEXICO SA WMMVY
55 WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE INC WBA
56 WALMART INC WMT
57 WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC WSM
58 WIRELESS TELECOM GROUP INC WTT
Table C.13: Summary statistics of CCC for Retailers
Quarter Firm Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Q4 TGT 34.07 15.11 12.21 40.58 50.05
Q1 TGT 30.13 15.55 10.87 37.46 49.93
Q2 TGT 29.68 16.86 9.14 38 50.79
Q3 TGT 31.94 18.25 8.8 40.43 54.89
Q4 AMZN -40.42 2.63 -45.99 -40.1 -36.54
Q1 AMZN -22.79 3.85 -28.6 -24.42 -17.58
Q2 AMZN -23.97 4.52 -34.2 -24.09 -19.36
Q3 AMZN -27.43 5.17 -40 -26.72 -21.22
Q4 COST 4.49 1.31 2.04 4.34 5.94
Q1 COST 2.5 0.91 1.43 2.27 3.94
Q2 COST 3.37 0.97 2.16 3.31 5.97
Q3 COST 3.85 0.34 2.97 3.88 4.3
Q4 DKS 60.39 6.27 52.1 61.55 73.38
Q1 DKS 64.51 7.12 53.12 66.31 73.07
Q2 DKS 62.27 5.1 53.23 64.23 68.72
Q3 DKS 75.17 5.83 65.95 75.57 83.57
Q4 JCP 71.51 6.14 63.95 69.38 82.04
Q1 JCP 74.97 8.57 63.83 75.71 89.65
144
Q2 JCP 74.88 8.65 62.99 75.4 84.77
Q3 JCP 86.55 9.08 74.47 83.99 98.64
Q4 SHLD 69.19 3.62 61.6 69.87 74.2
Q1 SHLD 71.57 4.16 65.03 71.7 79.38
Q2 SHLD 71.58 4.27 64.36 70.75 77.2
Q3 SHLD 79.34 3.6 70.98 80.18 83.65
Q4 WMT 9.82 1.68 7.14 9.7 12.16
Q1 WMT 10.66 1.9 8.21 10.45 13.55
Q2 WMT 9.38 2.06 6.26 9.74 12.54
Q3 WMT 12.79 2.22 8.8 13.56 15.89
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Table C.14: Model RC. Parameter estimates for Models RC1 and RC2
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C.7 A Note on the Difference between Cash Conversion Cycle and Working
Capital
The Cash Conversion Cycle and the Working Capital is used interchangeably in the
Operations Management literature. In this paper, we highlight ways in which these two
metrics may differ despite measuring the same objective, liquidity. The Cash Conversion
Cycle measures the average cash turnaround time, and therefore is an efficiency metric while
Working Capital is a more static measure which measures the ability of a firm to pay its short
term debts. We show, using analytical models how the two metrics may move in opposite
direction when an underlying factor changes.
C.7.1 Introduction
We investigate the difference in the impact of Sales Growth Rate, fiscal year end (FYE ),
and Seasonality on Working Capital (WC ) and Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC ). Both WC
and CCC are liquidity measures and some of the data elements needed for their computations
are the same. While changes in sales growth rate, seasonality and FYE location affect both
WC and CCC, the effect is different. The fundamental reason for the different effects is
that WC uses snapshot (balance sheet) data for a specific point in time while CCC uses
snapshot data for two points in time and flow (income statement) data. For computing CCC,
we use the flow measure corresponding to the time period, T between these two snapshots.
This time period is not standard and both quarter and years have been used by industry
professionals and researchers. When sales and COGS are constant, the chosen time period
does not affect the CCC.
To demonstrate that SGR, Seasonality and FYE can affect WC and CCC differently, we
assume that current assets consists of only accounts receivables and inventory, and current
liabilities consists of only accounts payables. Removing entities such as cash, short term
securities, and short-term loans, which affect WC but not CCC, makes the comparison
between WC and CCC more informative.
We study different scenarios defined by (i) three demand forms and, (ii) two conditions
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relating ls and lp. Recall that ls is credit period extended by suppliers and lp is the manu-
facturing lead time (or stocking period for retailers). Specifically, we consider the following
demand forms: 
constant demand:f (t) = Di for τ − T < t ≤ τ
seasonal demand:f (τ + T ) = f (τ) and
linearly increasing demand:f (t) = α + βt
Recall that τ is the FYE location. The first demand form helps us identify the merit of
comparing CCC across businesses that differ in size, as measured by sales and cost of sales;
the second demand form helps us identify the effect of the interaction between FYE and
Seasonality, while the third demand form shows the interaction of FYE and growth rate. It
is also critical to incorporate the two conditions, ls > lp and ls ≤ lp as they determine how
shifting the FYE affects the changes in WC and CCC. For the second two demand forms,
we focus on the changes in WC and the CCC values, rather than their absolute values.
Dechow et al. (2010) and Dopuch et al. (2012) both study the change in WC, and therefore
our approach is consistent with the accounting literature.
C.7.2 Effect of changing FYE on Working Capital and CCC for constant de-
mand.
Suppose two firms, l, and h, have identical unit revenue, r, and unit costs, i.e., c, v, values
(with no economies of scale), credit policies (ls, lc), and lead time (lp). Further, suppose that
both firms have constant but different levels of demand. Let CCCiτand (WC
i
τ ) denote the
Cash Conversion Cycle (Working Capital) for firm i, i = {l, h} at FYE location τ . The
following discussion establishes the relationship between CCCl and CCCh, and WCl and
WCh. We consider two cases:
i. Case (i) looks at CCC, where CCC lτ = CCC
h
τ for all τ , and
ii. Case (ii) looks at WC. For all τ ,




τ if and only if rlc − (c+ vlp) (ls − lp) > 0.
. ls ≤ lp. WC lτ < WChτ regardless of the parameter values.
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Let fi (t) = Di, i = {l, h}, 0 < τ−T ≤ τ denote the demand for the two firms with Dl < Dh.
Since the demand functions are constant, the FYE location τ will not affect either the CCC
or the WC values for either firm.
For i = {l, h}, from Sections 3.1-3.2, ARiτ = r
∫ τ






fi (t) dt + v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) fi (t) dt. When ls > lp, AP iτ = c
∫ τ+lp




(lp − (t− τ)) fi (t)dt+ lp
∫ τ
t=τ+lp−ls fi (t) dt
]
. Therefore,
ICiτ − AP iτ = − (c+ vlp)
∫ τ





t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt+v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp (lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt, so that IC
i







(lp − (t− τ)) fi (t) dt = Di
[
c (lp − ls) + v
∫ τ−ls+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) dt
]
.
Case (i): For a constant demand function, the receivables, inventory cost and payables are









and AP iτ+T respectively. Therefore, the average receivables, inventory cost and payables
equal the corresponding values at time τ . The calculations for DSO, DIO and DPO change




















, where Diτ = DiT is the total demand. Substituting in the expression







. Substituting for ICiτ−AP iτ
when ls > lp, we get CCC
i
τ = lc + lp− ls. Since the CCC is independent of the demand, and
the credit policies of both firm types are same, CCC lτ = CCC
h
τ . Substituting for IC
i
τ −AP iτ





. Since the parameter values
are the same for both demand forms, and the expression itself is independent of demand,
CCC lτ = CCC
h




τ when ls > lp as well as when ls ≤ lp, Case (i) is
established.
Case (ii) (a): ls > lp. From Section 3.3,
AP iτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp fi (t) dt+ v
[∫ τ+lp
t
(lp − (t− τ)) fi (t)dt+ lp
∫ τ
t=τ+lp−ls fi (t) dt
]
. Combining
terms, WCiτ = rDilc−c
∫ τ
t=τ−ls+lp fi (t) dt− vlp
∫ τ
t=τ+lp−ls fi (t) dt = rDilc−(c+ vlp)Di (ls − lp).
Thus, WC lτ = Dl [rlc − (c+ vlp) (ls − lp)], and WChτ = Dh [rlc − (c+ vlp) (ls − lp)]. Since




τ if and only if rlc − (c+ vlp) (ls − lp) > 0.
Case (ii) (b): ls ≤ lp. From Section 3.3,
AP iτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp fi (t) dt + v
[∫ τ+lp
t=τ+lp−ls (lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt
]
. Combining terms, WCiτ =
rDilc+cDi (lp − ls)+v
∫ τ+lp−ls
t=τ





lp ≥ lsWC lτ < WChτ always holds.
Summary for Constant Demand. A general merit of comparing CCC, therefore, is that
it is scale free. In the above discussion, the WC needs of the two firms are different; the firm
with the higher WC is not necessarily the firm with the higher demand. The WC values
are different for the firms even when their efficiencies in converting purchases to cash are the
same, as evidenced by equal CCC s. The discussion on Zone of Concern and Proposition 4.2
identifies the role of FYE, seasonality and growth rates that can confound interpretations of
longitudinal CCC comparisons.
C.7.2.1 Effect of FYE on Working Capital and CCC for seasonal demand. Re-
call from Sections 3.1-3.3, at time τ , the accounts receivables is ARτ = r
∫ τ
t=τ−lc f (t) dt, the
inventory is ICτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt+ v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt, and the accounts payable is
APτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt+v
[∫ τ+lp
t=τ+max(lp−ls,0) (lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt+ lp
∫ τ
t=τ+min(lp−ls,0) f (t) dt
]
.
The working capital at τ is WCτ = ARτ + ICτ − APτ .
Scenario 2A. f (τ + T ) = f (τ) and ls > lp. Because ls > lp, the accounts payable is
APτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt+v
[∫ τ+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt+ lp
∫ τ
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt
]
. Substituting
the expression for each of the constituents of working capital we get, WCτ = r
∫ τ
t=τ−lc f (t) dt−
(c+ vlp)
∫ τ
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt. In the paper, we show that the fiscal year end and seasonal-
ity interact to either increase the cash conversion or decrease it. To see the impact of
a small change in the FYE on WC when the fiscal ending is at time τ , we determine
∂WCτ
∂τ
= r {f (τ)− f (τ − lc)} − (c+ vlp) {f (τ)− f (τ − ls + lp)}. Define the contribution
margin, π ≡ r− (c+ vlp) (Dechow et al. 2010). We can now rewrite the above expression as
∂WCτ
∂τ
= π {f (τ)− f (τ − ls + lp)} − r {f (τ − lc)− f (τ − ls + lp)}.




f(τ)−f(τ−ls+lp) . This result also shows the role of the credit policies in affecting the sensi-
tivity of WC to a change in FYE. As an example, suppose two firms have different credit
policies (a potential source of heterogeneity among accrual determinants for firms in the
same industry, see p. 390, Dopuch et al. (2012)) but are otherwise identical. Let lis, l
i
p, and
lic for firm i = {1, 2} denote the supplier’s credit period, the manufacturing lead time and
the customer’s credit period. If, for firm 1, f (τ) > f (τ − ls1 + lp1) > f (τ − lc1), for all
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π > 0, a positive shift in the FYE reduces working capital. However, for firm 2 suppose






a positive shift in the fiscal year end decreases the working capital.
We now derive conditions under which the change in the CCC value is positive as the
FYE undergoes a small shift. In the WC case, the demand at three points in time, along
with the value of π
r
, determines how changing the FYE will affect WC. For the CCC case,
the total sales over the period T also affects the CCC. Dividing the receivables by the total





. By taking the partial derivative of CCCτ with respect to the FYE
we get, ∂CCCτ
∂τ
= 1{∫ τ+Tt=τ f(t)dt}2 [f (τ − ls + lp)− f (τ − lc)]. By our assumption f (τ + T ) =
f (τ), which makes the differential simpler to analyse. Clearly, if f (τ − lc) > f (τ − ls + lp),
∂CCCτ
∂τ






≥ 0. In this situation, we observe
that the impact of a shift in the FYE could be different for CCC and WC.
Scenario 2B. f (τ + T ) = f (τ) and ls < lp. The accounts payable in this case is
APτ = c
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp f (t) dt + v
∫ τ+lp
t=τ−ls+lp (lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt. Using this expression, we get
WCτ = r
∫ τ
t=τ−lc f (t) dt + c
∫ τ−ls+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt + v
∫ τ−ls+lp
t=τ
(lp − (t− τ)) f (t) dt. To study the
sensitivity of the working capital to a change in FYE, we find the partial derivative of WCτ
with respect to FYE τ and obtain ∂WCτ
∂τ
= r {f (τ)− f (τ − lc)}+c {f (τ − ls + lp)− f (τ)}+
v
{





= r {f (τ)− f (τ − lc)}+(c+ vls) f (τ − ls + lp)−
(c+ vlp) f (τ) + v
∫ τ−ls+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt. As earlier, setting the contribution margin π = r −

















To find the expression for the CCC it is convenient to express the WC as: WCτ =
r
∫ τ




























To find the sensitivity of CCC to change in FYE, we differentiate the expression above to get
∂CCCτ
∂τ
= 1{∫ τ+Tt=τ f(t)dt}2
[
















. Shifting the FYE





f (t) dt. Compar-
151
ing the sensitivities of CCC and WC to a change in the FYE shows that when the condi-
tion c+vls
c+vlp
f (τ − ls + lp) + vc+vlp
∫ τ−ls+lp
t=τ
f (t) dt < f (τ − lc) < πr f (τ) +
c+vls
r





f (t) dt holds, then a small change in the FYE causes the CCC to reduce while
WC to increase.
Summary: Impact of Seasonality. The f(.) values in the expressions above depend on
the location of τ relative to the Seasonality. Therefore, the results for the above scenarios
also show that the impact on CCC and WC of a shift in the FYE could be different. Note
that we do not assume a specific functional form of demand which makes the analysis fairly
robust.
C.7.2.2 Effect of changing FYE on Working Capital and CCC for demand with




rlc(2α− βlc + 2βτ) and ICτ −AP τ = 12 (ls − lp) (c+ vlp) {−2α + β (ls − lp − 2τ)}.
This gives WCτ =
1
2
rlc (2α− βlc + 2βτ) + 12 (ls − lp) (c+ vlp) {−2α + β (ls − lp − 2τ)}, so
that ∂WCτ
∂τ
= β {rlc − (c+ vlp) (ls − lp)} = β {π (ls − lp)− r (lc + lp − ls)} where π ≡ r −
(c+ vlp). Therefore, for all β > 0 if lp < ls ≤ lc + lp − ls, a positive shift in the FYE
location increases WC otherwise (ls > lc + lp − ls), a positive shift in FYE location reduces
WC. Basically, for firms which have a FYE ahead of a benchmark, due to the higher sales,
the payables increase more than the firm can produce (or move from its shelves) and collect
from receivables when ls > lc + lp − ls. Therefore, the WC reduces.
From the proof of Proposition 4.1 Appendix C, when lp < ls, we know that the ex-
pression for CCC is CCCτ+T = − (lc−ls+lp)(−2α+β(lc+ls−lp−T−2τ))2α+β(T+2τ) . We can find the sensi-
tivity of CCC to a change in the FYE (τ) by differentiating the above expression w.r.t.
τ , ∂CCCτ+T
∂τ








< 0 if lc < ls − lp, otherwise ∂CCCτ+T∂τ ≥ 0.
Scenario 3B. f (t) = α+ βt and lp ≥ ls. When lp ≥ ls, substituting the expressions of re-
ceivable, payable and inventory cost from Appendix C and Scenario 2B, we know that ∂WCτ
∂τ
=
r {f (τ)− f (τ − lc)}+c {f (τ − ls + lp)− f (τ)}+v
{





























The expression for CCC when lp ≥ ls is CCCτ+T =
6c(lc−ls+lp){2α+β(lp−lc−ls+T+2τ)}+v[4l3sβ−3l2s{2α+β(2lp+T+2τ)}+lp{12αlc+6αlp−6βl2c+6βlc(T+2τ)+βlp(2lp+3T+6τ)}]
6(c+vlp)(2α+β(T+2τ))
To find the impact of a shift in the FYE location we differentiate the expression with respect
























monotonic in all the three arguments. Therefore, depending on the procurement cost c,
processing cost v and the specific threshold given by the existing credit policies of the firm,
shifting the FYE location may either increase or decrease the CCC value. Notice that if
ls = lp, then
∂CCCτ+T
∂τ
< 0 if c
v
> 6lp ⇒ vlp < c6 . What this establishes is firms that have a
low processing cost relative to direct procurement cost benefit from a (positive) shift of the
FYE location.
Summary: Impact of Trend. Shifting the FYE can either increase or decrease the WC
and the CCC depending on a firm’s Operating Policy and r, c, and v. The thresholds defining
this change are not the same for WC and CCC. Therefore, comparisons and analysis that
hold true for longitudinal comparisons of WC may not hold true for CCC.
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